

JPRS-NEA-89-073
17 NOVEMBER 1989



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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

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JPRS-NEA-89-073

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'Secret Report' on Karabakh Reported

46050002C Istanbul MARMARA
in Armenian 20 Sep 89 pp 1, 4

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The French monthly ETUDES POLEMOLOGIQUE claims that a secret report expressing the Kremlin's posture on the Karabakh issue has been uncovered. The report was reportedly prepared by the Oriental Studies Institute in Moscow and was sent to the Karabakh Commission that was set up by the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee.

The authors of the report make the following recommendations:

The commission must prolong its examination of this issue for as long as is possible. The annexation of Karabakh to Armenia is not desirable.

We must calm the people by making concessions in the cultural and social spheres. If necessary we must sometimes sacrifice some leaders and blame problems on low-level officials. In any event Karabakh should not be annexed to Armenia. For the moment, we must initiate a general atmosphere of openness so that the situation changes. As a result of this openness we will have some clashes which we will generally blame on the Armenians. We will penetrate Armenian circles as much as possible and exploit in particular the Kurds who live on Armenian territories and who enjoy the Armenians' sympathies. We will try to destroy the friendship between Kurds and Armenians." [passage omitted] The author of the said article states that he saw this report in the March 1988 issue of PENSE RUSSE, a French-language journal published in Paris by Soviet dissidents. The said publication is generally a very reliable source.

What is most shocking is that the Soviet authorities implemented the report's recommendations to the letter in the last few months. Moscow always avoided taking a clear stand on the Karabakh issue, and rather than finding a political solution it has tried to introduce reforms, has dismissed Armenian and Azeri officials and has often criticized the Armenians for their activities in Karabakh.

The most worrisome aspect of the report is what is said with regard to the Kurds. A large number of Kurds live not only in Armenia but also on the strip of land that separates Karabakh from Armenia. [passage omitted]

Contacts Between Dashnak, Soviet Officials Reported

46050002B Montreal HORIZON
in Armenian 2 Oct 89 p 7

[Interview with Hrair Marukhian, representative of the Bureau of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation]

[Text] As we reported in our previous issue, comrade Hrair Marukhian, a representative of the Bureau of the

Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Dashnak Party], recently visited Armenia at the invitation of Soviet Armenian authorities. On that occasion, HAYASTAN, the press organ of the "Nor Serunt" [New Generation] youth association of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] in France, held an interview with comrade Marukhian. We reproduce translated excerpts from that interview which was published in French.

[HAYASTAN] We learned that you visited Armenia in July 1989. What was the purpose of that visit?

[Marukhian] The 24th General Congress of the ARF resolved that the Diaspora must mobilize all of its means for the development and strengthening of Armenia. Therefore, we established contact with the Soviet Armenian government which invited us to Yerevan so that we could present the ARF proposals with regard to the scientific, economic, touristic, technological, hygienic and industrial development of Armenia.

[HAYASTAN] Which officials did you meet?

[Marukhian] We had two meetings with Prime Minister Vladimir Margaryants for a brief presentation of our proposals. During those meetings I focused on some details. A special meeting was scheduled with Armenian Communist Party First Secretary Suren Arutyunyan. In that meeting, we discussed basic issues related to the problems facing the Armenian people.

[HAYASTAN] How were the ARF proposals received by the Soviet Armenian authorities?

[Marukhian] The Soviet Armenian authorities welcomed our proposals. Our proposals were prefaced by a statement of endorsement from Armenian experts in the Diaspora, and they left a deep impression on both the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. They agreed to implement our proposals. Various steps for implementation will be taken in the coming months.

[HAYASTAN] What is the plan and what proposals were submitted to the Soviet Armenian authorities?

[Marukhian] During the presentation of our plan, we emphasized that the tragedy of the earthquake which gave rise to many problems is not the departure point of our plan. Although our plan includes many projects for reconstruction, its emphasis is on Armenia's development which should enable our country to attain the high qualitative levels in the areas I enumerated. We plan to convene a technical conference to ensure that the said plan is implemented after it is seriously examined and is not bogged down in "piecemeal" administrative practices. The said conference will be held in Yerevan soon and will bring together a score of Armenian planning and development experts from the Diaspora with experts from Armenia. Together they will examine the country's economic potential, its labor force, its facilities for banking operations and its prospects for exports, foreign

investments, training specialists and utilizing the country's natural resources with an eye to the profitable marketing of Armenia's various products.

We have been able to assess Armenia's needs and its potential cooperation with the Soviet Union and neighboring countries. The technical conference will prepare a series of important papers which will be sent to groups of specialists in the Diaspora. These groups will have the task of encouraging large corporations to enter the Armenian market. When this work makes sufficient progress organizations specialized in raising capital will raise for the Armenian government the funds it needs for its trade and economic cooperation with foreign companies that invest in Armenia. To achieve the desired goals the said specialized organizations will employ advertising and other necessary means.

[HAYASTAN] The plan you present is very bold and requires extensive work. To what extent is its success assured? How long will it take before these plans yield the desired results?

[Marukhian] The success of these plans generally rests in the hands of the Armenian people, particularly the Armenians of the Diaspora. Eras similar to the one we are experiencing today are rare in the history of peoples. Thanks to the circumstances in the international arena and favorable changes taking place in the Soviet Union and Armenia, the Armenian nation stands before a historic responsibility which is a variant of its national liberation struggle. Consequently, the Armenian people must do the impossible to make Armenia so strong and so important compared to the Soviet Union and other republics that it can become an undeniably vigorous entity. Moreover, Armenia's products must achieve a high quality level so that it can be noticed by everyone.

We are deeply convinced that our proposals concern all. At this historic moment everyone's efforts must be directed at one target. Our presence in diverse countries, the reputation we enjoy in those countries and the importance of the target we have identified must mobilize our cultural, political and athletic organizations as well as the church. The success of this plan must be considered a top priority.

In the next 7 to 8 years we must contribute to the strengthening and development of Armenia. We are condemned to succeed given the present circumstances and thanks to our demanding spirit.

[HAYASTAN] What are your impressions of Armenia and the Armenian people in these times of perestroika and glasnost?

[Marukhian] The present condition of Armenia and the Armenian people is quite worrisome in the sense that the Armenian government is burdened with 750,000 homeless people (250,000 refugees from Azerbaijan and 500,000 earthquake victims) and needs to solve crucial economic, social and national problems.

Given that in the last 18 months the Armenians of the Motherland have enjoyed freedoms which they never had in the past, we had the impression that perestroika and glasnost enjoy widespread popularity. Unfortunately, that policy has not established itself in Armenia as firmly as in other Soviet republics. Consequently, in addition to all the problems on Armenia's agenda, the implementation of perestroika is part of the principal concerns of the authorities.

During our meeting with Armenia's official representatives and the general representative circles of the Armenian people, we observed once again that the reformation of the conservative elements of the regime is proceeding very slowly. The new cadre is still besieged by the mafia and the officialdom which represents corruption. These elements cannot be replaced without persistent pressure. In any event, we can confirm that Armenia's new leadership is prepared to remove them from the government and to put into place energetic and effective state agencies.

Diaspora Parties Appeal to Gorbachev

46050002A Montreal HORIZON
in Armenian 2 Oct 89 p 1

[Joint "appeal" by the Social Democratic Clarion Party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Democratic Liberal Party to Mikhail Gorbachev issued on 23 December]

[Text] Appeal to M. Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union

The grave and critical conditions in Nagorno Karabakh and Soviet Armenia compel us to express on behalf of Diaspora Armenians our deep concern and national revulsion over this dangerous situation which the Armenian people face.

The criminal acts and conspiracies the Azeris have mounted against the Armenian people which seeks to protect its national, territorial and human rights through peaceful means, violate not only international human rights laws, but also the human principle of friendship which the multinational peoples of the Soviet Union endorse.

The blockade Azerbaijan has imposed around Soviet Armenia and Karabakh constitutes fresh evidence about the existence of a conspiracy. These intolerable tactics employed by fanatic Azeri mobs against the people's basic needs and physical security enjoy the backing of government authorities.

The passive stance and indifference of the central Soviet authorities with regard to the ongoing unrestrained savageries, the economic blockade and the distorted reports of the information media of the central Soviet government aimed at covering up the truth is incomprehensible and reprehensible.

In view of the threat this dangerous situation poses to the Armenians of Karabakh and Soviet Armenia, we appeal

to you on behalf of the Diaspora Armenians and demand that the central authorities of the Soviet Union intervene decisively and:

a) Immediately end the blockade around Soviet Armenia;

b) Guarantee the security of the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh with all necessary practical measures; and

c) Decide the fate of Karabakh in a manner that satisfies the just demands of the people of the region.

[Signed] Central Administration of the Social Democratic Clarion [Hunchak] Party; Bureau of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Dashnak Party]; and Central Administration of the Democratic [Ramgavar] Liberal Party.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Jordanian Intelligence Blamed for Border Incidents

44230006B Tel Aviv HA 'ARETZ
in Hebrew 4 Sep 89 p 1

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] Reasons for the increase in infiltrations across the Jordanian border into Israel include intelligence laxness in Jordan, and greater license for Palestinian organizations to operate with great freedom and open different offices in Jordan.

In Israel, it is known that there has been no essential change in Jordan's attitude toward terrorist penetrations from its border. Jordan is usually strict in this regard, and it also attempts to prevent the infiltration of suspicious Palestinian elements from Syria and other places. The Jordanian security authorities are also troubled by cases of infiltration into Israel by Jordanian soldiers who, affected by the events of the intifadah, took it upon themselves to carry out terrorist attacks in Israel.

Nonetheless, a change has been perceived in the Israeli tone and treatment of the latest incident next to Kfar Rupin [in the Beit She'an Valley], in which an Israeli soldier was killed and another critically wounded. However, Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, Chief-of-Staff Dan Shomron, and Central Region Commander Yitzhaq Mordekhay did not hasten to blame Amman. Nonetheless, the three took a line tantamount to advising Jordan—with a veiled warning—to take stronger measures to prevent infiltrations.

Israel is troubled by the increase in infiltrations in recent months and the number of injuries. From an operational standpoint, Jordan is unable to close its border hermetically. Those who pass through Jordanian guards also sometimes succeed in dodging, and infiltrating through, the Israeli defense system. The Israeli argument is that not only must the border be guarded, but there must be close intelligence surveillance before infiltrators reach the border. The impression is that such surveillance has become weak in the army and among civilians. Jordan has a bad experience stemming from the permissiveness with which it allowed Palestinian groups in the past to operate freely in Jordan. Such groups claim that it is their right to wage an armed struggle from any location against Israel, and that they will not pass up any opportunity to attack Israel from the Jordanian border, or to incite strife between Jordan and Israel. This was the situation when Jordan permitted Force 17 commandos of FATAH to position themselves in Jordan.

Jordan is also ignoring the financial support being given by religious elements in Jordan to members of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] in the territories, who are the most extremist of the Palestinian groups.

Iraq Reported Gaining Strength at Syria's Expense

44230006A Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 5 Sep 89 p 8

[Article by Pinhas 'Anbari]

[Text] Sometimes, it is precisely those unassuming, non-attention-getting news items which provide the true outlines of a political development. Regarding all recent developments in the Middle East, including those pertaining to Lebanon and the Palestinian issue, an item of economic news, which has not attracted special attention, reveals underground political currents already affecting Lebanon and destined to influence the situation in the territories as well.

On 6 June, a delegation of U.S. businessmen arrived in Baghdad. Iraqi leaders lavished the delegation with attention, and Iraqi President Saddam Husayn made a personal effort to meet with it and open for it every possible door in Baghdad. What is surprising is that the group deserved eastern hospitality despite not representing mainstream U.S. big business. This group represented only Texas, which is precisely the secret of the matter, namely that these Texan businessmen are very close to the White House—also primarily Texan—are major contributors to the Republican Party, and were led by an American of Arab descent, Bob 'Abbud, who did not acquire his political privileges as a result of his pro-Arab communal work, but because he is a Republican leader in Texas and a major solicitor of contributions for Bush and Baker. These businessmen represented an annual purchasing power of \$500 billion, and several of them were described as personal friends of Bush and Baker.

The businessmen were very purposeful in their visit. They examined primarily business horizons with Iraq following the war with Iran. However, they were also interested in political safeguards against the danger of their investments in Iraq being lost if Iraq again becomes involved in a war against Iran or another military adventure. All of this is doubtlessly being coordinated with the White House.

Recognizing the importance of the delegation, The London Arabic weekly, AL-TADAMUN, devoted a detailed article to it at the end of June. According to the article, the delegation reported affirmatively on the prospects for U.S.-Iraqi economic cooperation and pointed to a series of political signs that Iraq is heading toward peace and stability. According to the weekly, the fact that Iraq indeed intends to rebuild Basra and Al-Faw, two cities near the border with Iran which suffered especially heavy damage in the war, is a clear sign of Iraq's intention to become reconciled with its enemies. Other such signs are Iraq's support of Egypt's return to the Arab League without demanding the abrogation of the peace agreement with Israel, and Iraq's support of the PLO's politically moderate wing. In the

economic domain, Saddam Husayn personally and solemnly promised that Iraq would repay all of its debts, which are in the hundreds of billions, as a sign of its economic strength and desire for stability. A HOUSTON CHRONICLE reporter who accompanied the delegation published an article entirely in praise of the land of the fertile crescent under the headline "Iraq—A Promising Market."

As soon as the businessmen returned to Houston and Dallas, one began to sense the growing weight of Iraq in Lebanon and the growing support of the United States for Saddam Husayn. Although these developments are not necessarily linked, a circumstantial connection between them is nonetheless liable to have great importance.

Why, Precisely in Lebanon?

Lebanon's crisis is unique in that it constitutes a window through which central processes in the Arab world can be seen. Almost every inter-Arab conflict is represented in Lebanon: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian-Iraqi conflict, and the power struggles in Iran after Khomeyni's death as mirrored in internal conflicts in Hizballah. These are just the ends of the threads of the main conflicts. It is thus impossible to understand the latest developments in Lebanon without attempting to understand the Arab map in its entirety. Only after correctly deciphering the code of policies in Lebanon can one correctly appraise expected developments regarding the Palestinian question in the wake of the unofficial death of the initiative to hold elections in the territories. From a distance, Syria's inability to liquidate the Christian annoyance reveals the end of an important thread leading to a change of values in the entire Arab world. Syria has become weakened from a practical standpoint, without relinquishing the great vision of pan-Arabism, while the pragmatic Arab states are becoming strong thanks to the massive support which they are receiving from the current, number-one Arab power, Iraq, because the superpowers are stationing themselves behind Iraq.

From a military standpoint, Syria has no real problem. The Syrian Army could liquidate the Christian enclave if it were merely a matter of a military test of forces. However, the Syrians are unable to use their air force against 'Awn, for the same reasons which preclude Israel from using its aircraft against the intifadah, the difference between the two examples notwithstanding.

Syria currently cannot repeat what it did in Lebanon in 1976, which is to move its army forcefully and deeply into Lebanon to advance its interests with the bodies of its soldiers. It is unable to do so because no longer is it the main Arab power in the Fertile Crescent. Iraq is bringing, and Iraq has decided to bring, the entire force of its influence to bear against Syria's interests, mainly those in Lebanon, though not excluding the Palestinian issue.

Common Denominator With Europe

Last week witnessed conspicuous joint Soviet-French political activity indicating the coordination of Western

Europe and Soviet positions, not only regarding Lebanon, but also the Palestinian problem. The Soviets and the Europeans are split with the United States over the Middle East, insofar as the Americans support direct contacts, or U.S.-mediated contacts, between the different parties, whereas Europe and Moscow maintain the need to convene an international conference on the Middle East, in which the Palestinian problem and Lebanon would be the main topics. Until last week, only French diplomatic activity had been disclosed, while the Soviets assisted behind the scenes, because of the difficulty created by the discrepancy between the positions they were whispering to their Syrian allies and to what Syria and its allies in Lebanon were willing to agree.

Soviet positions in this respect are best explained in the context of the inter-bloc detente. The Soviets are obliged to prove to the West that they truly intend to compromise. Proof of such sincerity would be undermined by their support of the most extremist positions in the Arab world. The Soviets are also interested in proving to the West that they are partners in bringing peace to the world, and are not inciting conflicts. Although they would prefer to do this with the Americans, their positions are currently too distant from those of Washington, and it is easier for them to find a common denominator with Europe. They currently have a joint position with Europe regarding an international conference on the Palestinian problem, and their positions regarding Lebanon are very similar. Accordingly, the Soviets cannot support Syria's brutal shelling of civilian neighborhoods in Beirut. Nor can it support Syrian positions pertaining to hegemony in Lebanon, a development no less serious in Syria's view. Like France (i.e., Europe), the USSR is also willing to recognize Syria's security interests in Lebanon's Biq'a Valley vis-a-vis the Syrians' ability to defend against an Israeli breakthrough to Damascus. But this can be arranged in an agreement between the Government of Syria and a legal government in Lebanon, after Lebanon restores its sovereignty. Syria's bitterness over Soviet policy can be seen in an item published by the Paris-based AL-MUHARRAR in mid-July, according to which Syria is examining a deal with China to purchase missiles, which the Soviet Union is obviously unwilling to transfer to it.

The need for the Soviet Union to fall in line openly behind French positions stems from the fact that Syria and its allies in Lebanon cannot become reconciled with this policy, and as long as France has been openly connected to this policy, it has been exposed to the danger of terror directed against it by extremist forces linked with Syria and Iran. Already in May, a web of threats made by the Druze and Hizballah materialized against France; on 10 August, the Druze leader expressed Syrian frustrations when he criticized France, the Soviet Union, the Arab League, and Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, because all of them are joining forces in tune with Israel—according to him—to place General 'Awn in control of Lebanon. His criticism of Libya is interesting in that the first sign of Libya's break with the Rejectionist Front appeared in Lebanon, when

Libya supported 'Awn's government instead of the pro-Syrian forces, and refused to send arms to the Druze, sending instead a small Libyan unit lacking practical force to the Shuf mountains, ostensibly to help the Druze.

France has, in its time, invested great efforts in distancing Palestinian terror from itself. It is currently inconceivable that it would ignore the dangers posed to it by Lebanese-Syrian-Iranian terror. In the critical stage, when her small battleship neared the coast of Lebanon, the open involvement of the Soviets was requested to the great disappointment of the Syrians, and Soviet envoy Gennadiy Tarasov held almost the first meeting with 'Awn in Beirut. The Soviet approval of 'Awn opened the door for the French envoy, Foreign Ministry secretary general Francois Scheer, to visit Damascus. The latter was at pains to emphasize, after his discussions with Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar', that French and Soviet policies are coordinated.

The Conflict Continues

Nonetheless, as far as can be judged at present, French-Soviet diplomatic contacts did not go well, because of the long shadow of Iraq. In principle, the two superpowers are seeking to help the Arab League facilitate inter-Arab mediation, and there was no reason why they should not have gained Arab assistance. The problem is that Iraq was dissatisfied with the decisions of the Arab summit at Casablanca, because the Arab world did not support its demand for the full departure of Syria from Lebanon, not to be compared with recognition of Syria's security rights in Lebanon's Biq'a Valley. Syria's brutal shelling in the Biq'a Valley and against Beirut contradict its pragmatic positions in political contacts. Syria was satisfied that the Arab League rejected Iraq's demands. Moreover, on 27 August, its two mouthpieces, TISHRIN and BA'TH published a call for an end to the military character of the conflict in Lebanon in order to lay the groundwork for the implementation of constitutional reforms. The bone of contention concerned the lifting of the sea blockade. Syria informed the Soviet Union and France that it was prepared to do this if Iraq would commit itself to stopping weapons shipments to 'Awn. In Baghdad, Tarasov heard an absolute no from the Iraqis. In other words, the conflict continues. Iraq did not wish to aid this initiative, because it is making every effort to convene a new summit conference, in which clear decisions favoring a full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon will be made. The secret flirting with the United States also places the Americans behind Iraq, to the dissatisfaction of Paris and Moscow. Thus, just as French diplomat Francois Scheer declares in Damascus that Syria must have a central, active role in finding a way out of the crisis in Lebanon, the United States begins to growl at Syria, censuring Syrian acts in Lebanon at the end of last week for the first time.

Currently, the root of the problem is Iraq's unwillingness to stop arms shipments to 'Awn, and its continuing pressure on the Arabs to remove Syria from Lebanon entirely. For their part, the Syrians are not at all willing

to withdraw from the Beirut area. At the end of the week, the official Syrian daily explained why Syria would not leave: "This step would provide an opening for the division of Lebanon into cantons, in order to bring a divided state under Israel's influence." The daily exchanged the term "cantonization" for the deriding term, "Zionization."

In the middle of July, President al-Asad met with the U.S. ambassador in Damascus. According to the Paris-based AL-MUHARRAR, al-Asad made clear his view that the Lebanese would not be able to restore their sovereignty after a withdrawal of the Syrian army from the Beirut area, because tens of thousands of 'Arafat's followers and Islamic fundamentalists would arrive to conquer it, making Lebanon's problem more severe. Syria is the dam preventing this, al-Asad explained.

At times, the United States was willing to listen to such arguments, but no longer. Syria's brutality does not permit civilized countries to support it, regardless of how rational their motives may be. The PLO's mouthpiece, FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH (25 June 1989), well understands Washington's new policy directions, in determining that the Americans link Syria's policy in Lebanon with the difficulties which they are uncovering on the way to a solution of the Palestinian problem. Accordingly, the magazine predicted that the United States would soon begin to pressure Syria. The role of blocking fundamentalism and extremism will soon be taken by Iraq at Syria's expense.

Pilot's Defection Destroys Syria's Defense Plans

44000051 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] According to the Paris-based Arabic language weekly AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI, the defection of Syrian pilot 'Adil Basim to Israel destroyed all Syria's defense plans and caused confusion in the Air Force. This was stated by a Syrian officer who knows Basim.

Egypt Concerned With Israeli Water Projects in Sinai

45000037 London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 24 Oct 89 p 10

[Text] The pertinent Egyptian agencies have begun following with intense interest the current Israeli projects to exploit groundwater in the Sinai along the border between the two countries, and to try to bring it into Israeli land. These agencies have prepared a comprehensive study to evaluate these Israeli projects and plans, especially Israel's building of a dam in the Negev Desert to exploit rainwater and reap an estimated annual water harvest of almost 11,000 cubic meters.

This study disclosed that these projects should not have a great effect on groundwater stores in the Sinai, but that it requires additional financial allocations to expedite

Egyptian counterplanning on the other side [of the border] to benefit from this water. The Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources has initiated contacts with certain Arab financial institutions to obtain loans and grants to carry out these projects.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Rapprochement Reported Between 'Arafat, Jordan
44230009C Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 7 Sep 89 p 8

[Article by Pinhas Inbari: "Ten Points and Zero Political Progress"]

[Text] The birth of the 10-point plan or the Egyptian peace initiative should not give rise to exaggerated hope concerning Israel's renewed peace initiative, but one must thoroughly understand the background of resumed talk of such initiatives in order to evaluate the direction in which the political process is going.

In principle, the birth of the 10 points is connected to Egypt's desire to do something about the political stalemate in the political process, because, perhaps more than any other Arab country, Egypt is particularly interested in promoting the peace process since the current situation, in which Cairo is the only Arab capital to display the Israeli flag, is not desirable to Egypt from any viewpoint. That is the general framework, but the timing of renewed efforts is also linked to broader developments, especially concerning the consolidation or dissolution of the "Club of Four," the Arab council of cooperation among Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and North Yemen. This Club was conceived as a political alliance based on economic cooperation; for the time being, however, the four do not have many economic areas in common, and their political coordination is not much, either.

There are deep differences between Egypt and Jordan on everything to do with the Palestinian issue. Most of these differences are far below the surface, although every once in a while they do come to the fore. In principle, Egypt does not trust Hussein's intentions to really achieve a settlement of the Palestinian problem, because of his special difficulties with the Palestinians. Hussein feels too weak to shoulder a burden that may well shake his kingdom, which consists mostly of Palestinians even without the West Bank, from its foundations.

The United States, too, shares Egypt's skepticism concerning Hussein's intentions and recently, after ties were severed between Jordan and the West Bank and after Jordan noisily divested itself of responsibility for the political process, without having let Israel know anything about it, Israel, too, joined the list of sides disappointed with the king. Simultaneously, the intifadah revealed Hussein's weakness for everyone to see and exposed the gallery of pro-Jordanian figures in the West Bank in all their nakedness. These days, senior officials in Israel's

defense apparatus speak of the pro-Jordanian camp with contempt and with self-reproach about the great stock they set by that group in the past (not to mention the village associations).

In a previous article we cited passages from the minutes of President Bush's talks with King Hussein, which reflected strident notes in the relations between Washington and Amman. Jordan is currently viewed as sharply opposed to U.S. policies in the Middle East, and is paying the price for it—America is withholding the aid Jordan needs to overcome the economic crisis.

Consequently, Jordan's policy is designed to torpedo Shamir and Rabin's peace initiative and to push the process toward an international conference along Soviet and West European lines.

Egypt does not believe that an international conference along the lines of Jordan's ideas is the way to promote the opening of Israeli embassies in additional Arab capitals, and it supports the U.S. tendency to back Shamir's peace initiative. The 10 points it sent to Jerusalem to clarify Israel's intentions and tighten the link between elections and a final solution to the Palestinian problem, were designed to push aside the idea of the international conference, or in other words, to promote the American line.

Until the last Fatah conference, 'Arafat stood behind Egypt, and the 10 points were formulated at meetings between Mubarak and 'Arafat 2 months ago. During Kelly's visit, however, differences were revealed between Likud and Labor on Palestinian representation, and as a result permission was given in Israel to add the names of U.S. Palestinian professors Edward Sa'id and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod to those of Faysal al-Husayni and his friends. Subsequently, the Fatah conference proved to 'Arafat that his camp was being divided not insignificantly because of extreme messages coming from the territories under the oppression of the intifadah. Those factors caused a profound change in 'Arafat's policy.

'Arafat's decision to step closer to the Jordanian line was not, as it may have seemed in the beginning, coordinated with Egypt, but was meant to abandon the line of support for Shamir's initiative in favor of the anti-American line represented by Jordan behind the formula of an international conference.

Also, the Al-Turayfi affair proved to 'Arafat another important matter, namely that at this stage, at which his relations with Jordan have not yet been really consolidated, he does not have sufficient control over the West Bank to permit him to present an internal Palestinian team strong enough to withstand his enemies in the territories.

Consequently, Egypt's 10 points will not do much to promote a serious political process. The East Jerusalem weekly AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI on Saturday revealed details of the king's preparations with 'Arafat during his

visit to Amman, which show that a new strategic agreement is taking shape between them. According to that agreement, Cairo may cease to be at the center of Palestinian activities as it was as long as Shamir's initiative was on the agenda, and the ball may be passed to Amman, in the direction of an international conference. In addition to the return of deported personalities—probably from Abu Jihad's group—to Amman and Palestinian aid to the Jordanian economy, the sides agreed to coordinate all their moves. In so doing 'Arafat de facto told the United States: I didn't make it with you in direct contacts, now each one of my steps will be coordinated with Jordan, as it was before the dialogue with you. And since you know as well as I do what Jordan is willing to do, please meet me half way.

This is precisely what Egypt is now trying to convince the United States to do, but it is doubtful whether it will help. 'Arafat needs a solid base in the Jordanian capital to consolidate his position in the West Bank, and that will take time. As long as he does not feel secure enough he will support Jordanian, rather than Egyptian, formulas.

'Arafat's Need To Carry Pistol Discussed

44000045 London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 3 Oct 89 p 10

[Text] President of the State of Palestine Yasir 'Arafat has not been without his pistol for even a moment since the first shot in the modern Palestinian revolution was fired in 1965, with the exception of three times: when he gave a speech at the United Nations in New York in 1974, when he met Pope John Paul II, and when he gave his second speech before the United Nations in Geneva last December. No one asked Abu-'Ammar on these three occasions to remove his Smith and Wesson from his waist. He voluntarily did this out of respect for the international community and Pope John Paul II, and to show that the goal of the Palestinian weapon is peace and that the Palestinian revolution erupted "for the sake of peace on the land of peace."

As reports circulate regarding the Palestinian president's intentions to attend the coming UN sessions in New York, there is speculation that if the United States uses Abu-'Ammar's pistol as a pretext for not granting him an entry visa to the United States, he may react, as in times past, by not taking his pistol with him to the General Assembly.

The fact that Abu-'Ammar is intent on constantly carrying his pistol on his waist is not strictly for security reasons, since he also has a strong security contingent and trained, armed security personnel. His desire to continue carrying his pistol is symbolic of the fact that the armed struggle will continue until Palestine is liberated and an independent state is established.

Those close to 'Arafat say that he has not resorted to using his pistol except during several limited periods of time, when he was exposed to assassination attempts.

One such incident occurred immediately after the split in the PLO when he and his escort were passing near the (al-Bunk) region on their way to Tripoli in northern Lebanon, and another occurred when he was forced to move at night during the siege of Beirut and Tripoli.

BAHRAIN

Foreign Trade Figures Released

44000035 Manama AL-BAHRAYN
in Arabic 13 Sep 89 p 12-13

[Text] The value of Bahrain's foreign trade increased significantly during the first quarter of 1989, reaching 498.7 million Bahraini dinars (BD) compared to BD433.4 million for the same period last year. This represents an increase of BD65.3 million.

The quarterly bulletin of Bahrain's Monetary Agency published information indicating that the value of exports rose from BD210 million in March of 1988 to BD235.3 million in March of 1989. Likewise, the value of imports rose from BD223.4 million to BD263.4 million, i.e. an increase of BD25.3 million for the same period.

The increase in the value of imports is larger than that of exports, resulting in the trade deficit increasing to BD28.1 million during the first three months of 1989 compared with BD13.4 million for same period of 1988.

Oil Trade

Oil exports, which constitute 79.3 percent of total exports, amounted to BD186.7 million in March of 1989, i.e. an increase of BD21.3 million over March of 1988, when exports amounted to BD165.4 million. Oil imports, which constitute 39.6 percent of the total imports, increased by BD11.3 million from BD93.1 million in March of 1988 to BD104.4 million in March of 1989. This has resulted in an increase of BD10.3 million in the oil trade balance surplus which reached BD82.6 million compared with BD72.3 million during the same period the previous year.

Nonoil Trade

Nonoil exports rose by BD4 million to reach BD48.6 million at the end of March 1989. It is worth noting that this increase is due to the rise in the value of domestic exports which amounted to BD38.6 million in March of 1989 compared to BD25.6 million during the same period in 1988.

Exports of the industrial regions declined to BD7.7 million from BD15.9 million. Likewise, the value of reexports decreased to BD2.3 million from BD3.1 million. On the other hand, domestic nonoil imports registered an increase of BD6.9 million, reaching BD127.9 million in March of 1989. Furthermore, imports of the

industrial regions rose by BD21.8 million to reach BD31.1 million in March of 1989 compared to BD9.3 million in March of 1988.

Trade Deficit

As a result of the substantial increase in nonoil imports compared to the slight increase in nonoil exports, the nonoil trade deficit registered a sharp increase reaching BD110.4 million in March of 1989 compared with BD85.7 million in March of 1988.

Commodity Distribution

As for the distribution of nonoil exports, the agency's quarterly bulletin reported that nonoil exports increased because manufactured goods, consisting mainly of aluminum, increased from BD30.9 million in March of 1988 to BD36.9 million in March of 1989.

The value of machinery and transportation equipment registered an increase of BD20.4 million, climbing to BD60.1 million from BD39.7 million. Imports of manufactured goods rose by BD9.6 million to a total of BD33.9 million from BD24.3 million. The value of chemical imports rose by BD0.8 million to reach BD16.1 million from BD15.3 million. The value of food and livestock dropped from BD22.3 million to BD19.9 million, a decline of BD2.4 million.

Geographic Distribution

The quarterly bulletin of Bahrain's Monetary Agency indicated that 63 percent of total imports are shared by seven major countries. During the first quarter of 1989, the United Kingdom continued to be the leading exporter to Bahrain, with exports amounting to BD33.1 million or 21 percent of Bahrain's total imports. Japan is the second largest exporter with BD17.4 million or 11 percent. The United States ranked third with exports valued at BD15.9 million or 10 percent; followed by West Germany, BD12.9 million or 8 percent; Australia, BD8.9 million or 6 percent; Saudi Arabia, BD7.2 million or 4 percent. The UAE [United Arab Emirates] was in last place with exports to Bahrain valued at BD5.3 million or 3 percent.

In terms of Bahrain's nonoil exports, Saudi Arabia topped the list of importers from Bahrain, accounting for 26 percent of Bahrain's total exports valued at BD12.6 million; followed by UAE with exports reaching BD5.2 million; Japan BD4.6 million; the United States BD4.2 million; India, BD3.8 million; and Britain, BD3.3 million.

Evaluation of Offshore Assets, Currencies Discussed

90OL0069B Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 29 Aug 89 p 9

[Article: "Currencies Tabulated in Bahrain's Offshore Assets: The U.S. Dollar Is Enthroned and Gulf Currencies Rank Second; Slim Chance for Increased Participation by Deutsche Mark and Swiss Franc"]

[Text] Gulf currencies ranked second, after the U.S. dollar, among aggregate assets of 64 offshore banking units operating in Bahrain.

Assets denominated in U.S. dollars amounted to \$51.356 billion by the end of the first quarter of 1989, compared with \$48.971 billion a year earlier.

A quarterly bulletin recently published by the Bahraini Monetary Agency said that offshore bank assets denominated in Gulf currencies totalled \$7.411 billion by the end of the first quarter this year (1989). This is a decline of \$38 million from \$7.449 billion a year earlier. Meanwhile, mark-denominated offshore bank assets amounted to \$2.199 billion, placing the German mark in third place. The Swiss franc, on the other hand, ranked last with \$856 million. Assets denominated in other currencies in lesser amounts had an aggregate value of \$3.493 billion.

The Bahraini monetary agency bulletin revealed that German mark holdings have declined among offshore bank assets since the first quarter of 1988 when they were valued at \$2.350 billion. The Swiss franc suffered the same fate as it retreated from \$1.137 billion to a mere \$850 million during the same statistical period.

The monetary agency bulletin also revealed that holdings denominated in Gulf currencies have since 1979 consistently ranked second after the U.S. dollar among offshore bank assets. Gulf currencies held by offshore banks had an aggregate value of \$7.440 billion in 1979, rising to \$8.183 billion in 1980. These currencies are the Saudi riyal, the Bahraini dinar, the Kuwaiti dinar, and Qatari riyal, and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] dirham. After peaking in 1981 at \$10.568 billion, and then peaking at \$10.799 billion in 1982, Gulf currencies declined among offshore bank assets to \$9.791 billion in 1985, to \$8.37 billion in 1986, to \$7.603 billion in 1987, and to \$7.309 billion in 1988.

At the same time that Gulf, and even European, currencies have fewer opportunities to participate in offshore bank assets, such opportunities are growing for the U.S. dollar which dominates more than 80 percent of world trade in such leading commodities as petroleum, wheat, sugar, gas, and aluminum, as well as most grains and strategic goods. Most offshore banks participate in financing such activities in order to stimulate international trade and issue letters of credit for the import and export of various goods mainly denominated in the U.S. dollar.

The monetary agency bulletin emphasized that offshore bank holdings in U.S. dollars jumped from \$18.216 billion in 1979 to \$24.846 billion in 1980, to \$34.318 billion in 1981, to \$42.641 billion in 1982, to \$47.003 billion in 1983, and to \$48.316 billion in 1984. The value of U.S. dollar assets then retreated to \$43.045 billion in 1985 as offshore bank business contracted in the region as a whole. U.S. dollar holdings further declined to \$42.383 in 1986 before increasing once more as offshore banks gained more business. U.S. dollar assets were valued at \$49.948 billion in 1987, climbing to \$53.801 billion by the end of 1988.

Increase in Bank Loans Observed

90OL0069C Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 27 Aug 89 p 9

[Article: "Noticeable Increase in Bank Loans to Economic Sectors: Facilities Jumped to 616.9 Million Dinars by End of March, 1989; Loans Grow for Industry, Government, Individuals, Decline for Construction and Commerce"]

[Text] Facilities extended to all economic sectors by the country's operating commercial banks achieved substantial growth rates by the end of the first quarter of 1989. These facilities totalled 616.935 million Bahraini dinars, up from 606.557 million dinars at the end of 1988. This is a growth rate of 10.178 million Bahraini dinars. The quarterly bulletin recently issued by the Bahraini monetary agency revealed that loans to the residents sector by the end of March, 1989 showed an increase of 10.3 million Bahraini dinars, or 1.7 percent, over December of 1988.

It also revealed that the country's 19 operating commercial banks extended government loans totalling 72.2 million Bahraini dinars by the end of the current year's first quarter, for an increase of 10.9 million dinars from 61.3 million dinars in the previous quarter (December of last year). Meanwhile, loans to individuals totalled 140.9 million Bahraini dinars for an increase of 1.9 million dinars, or 1.4 percent, over the fourth quarter of 1988.

The bulletin pointed out that commercial bank loans for construction and rehabilitation amounted to 150.6 million dinars by the end of March of 1989. This is a decline of 9.8 million dinars, or 6 percent, from the fourth quarter of 1988.

It also pointed out that commercial loans during the same statistical period amounted to 109.2 million dinars compared with 118.1 million dinars at the end of 1988. This is a drop of 109.2 million dinars or 7.5 percent. Meanwhile, credit facilities to the industrial sector increased by 900,000 Bahraini dinars to a total of 76.6 million Bahraini dinars by the end of March 1989, compared with 75.7 million dinars by the end of December of last year.

On the other hand, citizens received 63.2 percent of all domestic bank loans, compared with 57.7 percent by the end of December, 1988. The major foreign banks in Bahrain extended credit to the various economic sectors calculated at 22.6 percent of all loans to residents.

New Investment Opportunities Reported

90OL0069D Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 27 Aug 89 pp 1, 5

[Article by Hafiz 'Imam: "A Study of the Strategy of Industrial Development in Bahrain: New Opportunities for Investment in Industry; Feasibility Studied for Advanced Industries in Information Technology and Computer-Related Industries; Creation of Transitional

Industries and Expansion of Existing Industries To Produce Consumer Goods for Export"]

[Text] The Ministry of Industry and Development emphasized that it aims, by formulating a future strategy for industrial development, to raise and maintain the growth of real individual income. It also emphasized that such goals could only be accomplished by the development of new highly capital-intensive industries through joint ventures and better utilization of available energy, as well as by increasing the vertical and horizontal integration of such existing industries as aluminum by constructing facilities for aluminum sheets and other support industries.

According to its study of industrial development in Bahrain, the ministry's strategy also focuses on small and medium-size industries to serve domestic and Gulf markets; on the creation of spare parts industries as well as engineering and maintenance services to serve existing industries in the region; and on developing local potential and ability to identify, study, and manage industrial investment opportunities.

The study, prepared by the industrial promotion center of the Ministry of Planning, will be presented at the seventh conference on industrial development in Arab countries scheduled for Tunis in the 20 to 25 October period.

Engineer Saqr Shahin, manager of strategic planning at the industrial promotion center, said the study aims at identifying industrial opportunities and researching the potential for developing this sector, generating basic guidelines for development methodology, and laying down scientific foundations for the expansion and development of the industrial base. He said the study of industrial development in Bahrain was conducted by the ministry's industrial promotion center to identify the economic and social factors that impact the course of industry in Bahrain, and to develop the capabilities and efficiency of the industrial sector.

Engineer Saqr Shahin pointed out that the study devoted one of its chapters to future guidelines for industrial development which can be summarized as developing new industrial investment opportunities, utilizing technical and economic feasibility studies prepared by Arab and regional organizations, promoting feasible projects with both foreign and Bahraini corporations and investors, defining projects that complement existing industries, and studying the feasibility of creating such advanced industries as information technology and computer-related enterprises.

They also call for developing a new free industrial zone in order to create an atmosphere and infrastructure suitable for advanced industries.

Saqr Shahin pointed out that the ministry's study of industrial development in Bahrain is composed of six chapters, the first of which deals with the country's natural and human resources from the population to natural resources. The population had an average annual growth of

3.3 percent in the 1983-88 period when the Bahraini population grew by 2.7 percent annually and the non-Bahraini population grew by 4.5 percent annually.

Population growth averaged 3.5 percent for males and 3.1 percent for females. Bahrain, furthermore, enjoys a young society. Those younger than 14 years of age represent 42.3 percent of the total population. Those between the ages of 15 and 24 years account for 45 percent of the total population.

Statistics enumerated by the study indicate that the ratio of workers has increased and that the labor market has more than tripled in the 1959-81 period, when the labor force grew at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent. The industrial sector, it was revealed, accounts for 19.8 percent of all the country's productivity sectors.

The study also discussed the various training centers and the qualifying of trainees. Then it pointed out such available resources as oil, natural gas, water, agriculture, and fisheries.

It turns out that 23 percent of natural gas output is used for electricity generation, 29 percent for reinjection, 13 percent for refining, 20 percent for the aluminum institute, and 13 percent for petrochemicals.

The second chapter discussed the development of crude oil and natural gas in the 1970-88 period. The study pointed out that oil production has been gradually declining since 1970, when it peaked at 77,000 barrels per day. It has since dropped to an average of 42,000 barrels per day in 1988. The production of natural gas, on the other hand, has steadily increased from 37,000 million cubic feet in 1971 to the current 218,000 cubic feet in 1988.

The study dealt with the industrial sector in another chapter, and pointed out that Bahrain has for a long time occupied a commercial position in the Gulf region, and that the discovery of oil in 1932 was a milestone in Bahraini economic development. The study reviewed the course of development during that period and until the creation in 1975 of the first specialized ministry of development which undertook the implementation of ambitious programs to develop the industrial sector. The industrial sector currently ranks fourth among the 11 sectors accountable for the domestic product in Bahrain. The transitional industrial sector accounted, at 1980 prices, for about 14.8 percent of the domestic product. The mining and quarry sector, one of the most important economic activity in Bahrain, accounted for 16.4 percent of the domestic product in 1986. Workers in that sector accounted for 18 percent of the total labor force in Bahrain.

The study classified institutions of productive industries in Bahrain. There are 41 industrial institutions for foodstuffs, carbonated drinks, and distilled water. There are 5 institutions for the manufacture of readymade clothing and leathers; 7 for furniture and wood products;

10 for paper, printing, and publishing; 50 for the production of nonferrous raw materials; 6 for the manufacture of metal products; and 66 facilities for the manufacture of metal and mechanical products and equipment.

The study pointed out that 223 factories were registered with the industrial register in 1988. Conference attendees will be familiarized with these industries in order to be acquainted with their size in Bahrain and research the feasibility of utilizing their output.

The study touched on the elements of industrialization in Bahrain by reviewing such basic factors as raw materials, water, transport, communications, banks, contacts, industrial zones, banking units, and a Gulf market for members of the Gulf Cooperation Council with an aggregate population of more than 18.79 million. The statistics reveal the volume of Bahraini trade with Gulf Cooperation Council states and with the rest of the world. In 1987, Bahrain had total exports valued at 922 million dinars and imports valued at 1,030 million dinars. It had a favorable balance of trade with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar.

A sixth chapter of the study discusses guidelines needed for future industrial development in Bahrain in order to raise real individual income and maintain the growth of national income by developing industrial growth at a certain annual rate. This is to be accomplished by specifying the contribution of transitional industries to the gross domestic product; diversifying the economic base through the exploitation of available natural resources, specifically petroleum, natural gas, fisheries, and solar power; by utilizing raw materials and semi-manufactured goods produced in neighboring Arab markets to create industrial projects in Bahrain; and by creating new transitional industries and expanding the base of existing industries in order to produce consumer and semimanufactured goods specifically for export. The guidelines also recommend the creation and development, in partnership with foreign expertise, of advanced clean and technological industries, as well as those of added financial value [as published].

The guidelines also included laying the foundation necessary to build a sustainable industrial productive base capable of continued growth and development on its own or with a limited subsidy. The study further called for the creation of domestic and regional data banks as well as research and development industrial centers. Other recommendations included the development of human resources and increased Bahraini labor participation in the industrial sector.

Two New Desalination Stations Ready for Pumping
90OL0069E Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 26 Aug 89 pp 1, 10

[Article by Hafiz 'Imam: "Dealing With the Water and Electrical Situation: Two New Desalination Stations To Pump 30 Million Gallons a Day; Linking Main Electric Network to ALBA Saves 1000 Megawatts"]

[Text] Water and electricity officials at the Ministry of Public Works are currently studying the feasibility of building two new desalination stations at al-Muharaq and Sanabis in order to deal with the water situation, provide suitable water, and lessen dependence on artesian wells.

According to pertinent studies, the two reverse-osmosis stations will have a combined daily capacity of 30 million gallons. The study will also cover the addition of two 160-megawatt gas turbines to the al-Rifa' power station, according to Engineer 'Abdallah Jum'ah, director of electricity and acting assistant undersecretary for water and electricity.

The projects, according to studies, must be operational by 1993 in order to meet the country's demand for water and power.

Eng Jum'ah pointed out that higher authorities are currently reviewing the study. He also said that another study is exploring the feasibility of some sort of electrical linkup with the ALBA [Bahrain Aluminum] company to utilize its power capacity of some 1,000 megawatts, to be available in 1993 after it expands. He added that the linkup with ALBA would allow tapping this capacity during peak consumption periods in the summer.

The acting undersecretary for water and electricity believes that the Gulf Cooperation Council integrated power grid project, which will be not be completed before the end of the 1990s, could provide Bahrain with additional power through utilization of the excess capacity of the new network that would link Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The excess capacity of the Bahrain distribution network amounts to 150 megawatts. Bahrain could also depend on Saudi and Kuwaiti distribution network reserves.

Consideration is also being given to whether it would be feasible for Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to build a large power station to serve the three of them as well as countries of the region.

Aluminum Foil Plant Underway

44000041 Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 3 Oct 89 p 9

[Excerpts] Kuwaiti and Bahraini investors recently have shown great interest in carrying out an aluminum foil production project to be constructed in Bahrain at a cost of \$50 million (19 million Bahraini dinars), particularly after a study confirmed that this project would be of great economic value for the investors and the region.

The Kuwaiti-based Gulf Investment Corporation [GIC] announced in coordination with the Ministry of Development and Industry, which recently received a feasibility study for the project, that it will call for a meeting to be held in Bahrain within a period not to exceed two weeks in order to discuss the necessary steps to implement the project. [passage omitted]

Those in charge of the project had selected Bahrain as the principal site for the project in view of the existence of the essential bases for the aluminum industry such as the Gulf Aluminum Rolling and Milling Company [GARMCO], Aluminum Bahrain [ALBA], and the Bahrain Corporation for Aluminum Stripping.

A site has been earmarked at the North Sitra industrial area for the plant, which would likely start producing 7,000 tons of aluminum foil a year.

An official source at the corporation announced that they are leaning toward signing contracts with the Bahrain-Saudi Aluminum Marketing Company to supervise the marketing of the products.

Plan To Meet Shortages in Power, Water Technicians Outlined

900L0069A Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 9 Sep 89 p 2

[Article by Hafiz Imam: "Plan Devised To Meet Shortages of Technicians in Electric and Water Sectors: Engineers To Be Hired, University To Train Tradesmen Into Technicians; Technicians Have a Ratio of 52 Percent; 10 Years Needed for 100 Percent Bahrainization"]

[Text] The Fiscal Affairs Division of the Department of Water and Electricity is implementing a plan to qualify technicians and tradesmen for employment in the water and electricity sectors which suffer marked shortages of technicians in particular. Working technicians trained in all technical jobs occupy 173 out of 332 existing positions, where foreigners account for 48 percent. [as published]

The plan centers around attracting those with a diploma or equivalent from the College of Engineering at the University of Bahrain or other institutions. It also involves a program to train division tradesmen into technicians by enrolling them in the University of Bahrain to study for a diploma in engineering. Preparations are currently underway to admit those tradesmen to the university in the second semester which begins next February, according to Ja'far al-Qassab, Director of the Fiscal and Administrative Division for Water and Electricity Affairs.

He said the division has made acceptable progress in cooperating with the university in this respect. Tradesmen who completed their training at the Division's training center at Sitra will, when enrolled in the College of Engineering, be able to obtain their diploma in only 1 and 1/2 years, especially since they will undergo more postgraduate training on site and at the Sitra training center for a period of six months under training programs for technician development.

In another development, the director of the Division's department of human resources and training emphasized that his department has so far enrolled 111 tradesmen and 24 laborers in training programs where

they are still under training. Trade positions are continually being filled with those who complete training at the training center in accordance with this program.

'Isa al-Shaykh says that the rate of Bahrainization has been 100 percent for trades positions and only 52 percent for technical positions. We need at least 10 years to satisfy our continuing demand for technicians and to fully Bahrainize technical jobs, while taking into consideration anticipated technical and fiscal variables relevant to the construction of desalination and power stations, and expected social and economic development over the next decade.

Ja'far al-Qassab, director of the Fiscal and Administrative Division, says the division has difficulty recruiting Bahraini graduate engineering technicians to work in the water and electricity sectors because of low pay compared to the private sector or abroad. Moreover, the division is not free to employ technicians in the numbers needed. There is also a noticeable trend among Bahraini students to boast whenever possible of working towards a B.A. rather than a diploma. He says that even though Bahrainis account for 70 percent of engineers working in water and electricity, we still have need for more engineers—electrical engineers more specifically. We were able to hire 6 engineers this year. Seventy-five engineers are still under training on site. Fifteen engineers have completed training and are actually working on job sites.

Ja'far al-Qassab points out that qualification training is not limited to engineers, technicians, and tradesmen, but is also made available to accountants and administrators and includes short specialized seminars on computers and the English language. In addition, the division, in cooperation with the University of Bahrain, has installed a special program to raise the competence of its accountants. Eight division workers and employees have enrolled in this program this year.

As to the capability for training technicians and others at the Sitra training center for water and electricity, 'Isa al-Shaykh says that the center has arranged for short, specialized training sessions on such subjects as electrical wiring, programs for laborers, and short English language sessions in which 158 trainees have enrolled.

Overall, there are a total of 81 trainees enrolled in all specialties at the Sitra training center. They include 42 tradesmen, 24 laborers, 6 engineers, and nine technicians. Administrative training programs include 94 sessions in cooperation with the Human Resources Department and 26 sessions in cooperation with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

Statistically, the training center implemented 66 training programs and short sessions this year alone. 104 employees were also sent to the Ministry of Education for short sessions in English, computers, etc.

EGYPT

FRG Grants 235 Million Marks in Low-Interest Loans

45000025 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 13 Oct 89 p 4

[Text] An official source at the West German Embassy in Cairo has confirmed the allocation to Egypt of 235 million marks in low-interest loans fluctuating between one and two percent over a 40-year period.

The source also said that a 33 million mark nonrefundable grant was agreed upon, and that the loans were allocated for projects to replace and renovate a number of electric power stations, chemical plants, railroad lines, and railroad cars, and to treat the pollution from the cement factories. The grant was allotted for technical cooperation in the agricultural field, railroad worker training, and water projects.

He added that 81 million marks which were granted in previous years still have not been used.

German Aid for Development Projects Discussed

900A0048C London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 22 Sep 89 p 42

[Article: "Egypt: Second After India"]

[Text] The joint Egyptian-German Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation held its meetings in the West German capital, Bonn, this September. Egypt was represented by a delegation headed by Hasan Salim, under secretary of state for international cooperation, and Germany was represented by a delegation headed by Anton Zahn, under secretary of state for economic cooperation.

The meeting resulted in an agreement on Egyptian development projects financed by German aid to Egypt for the current year estimated at 325 million Deutsche marks [DM] in easy-term loans and about 33 million DM in nonrepayable grants.

This money is used to finance industrial, electric power, sewage water, fresh water, agricultural, and railroad projects.

It is noteworthy that Egypt comes second, after India, on the list of countries that benefit from German aid. As of 1976, it has received aid in the amount of 5.5 billion DM, including 1 billion in nonrepayable grants, and 4.5 billion in easy-term loans payable over 50 years, with a 10-year grace period, at a very low interest rate of less than 1 percent.

Opposition Parties Attempt To Heal Internal Rifts*45000038 London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 17 Oct 89 p 9*

[Text] The Political Parties Committee in Egypt has kept silent in the face of a wave of secessions within some of the Egyptian opposition parties, beginning with the Socialist Labor Party, then the Ummah Party, and finally the Socialist Liberal Party, so that each of these parties has acquired two chairmen.

Already the three parties' fractured fronts have attempted in the past few days to co-opt the support of the Political Parties Committee for their own interests by sending it memoranda and letters urging it to hold a meeting to discuss this phenomenon and adopt a resolution in the interest of the secessionists. In the face of the committee's silence and refusal to discuss the splits, the three parties' divided fronts have decided to resort to adjudication.

The strange thing is that the divided fronts' attempts to achieve a victory for their own interests have not been limited solely to winning over the Political Parties Committee; they have also established contacts with the National Democratic Party leadership.

Ummah Party Faction Leaders Speak Out on Schism*900A0048B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI
in Arabic 25 Sep 89 pp 46-47*

["Papers From the Opposition" Column by 'Abd-al-'Azim Darwish: "Ummah Party Maneuvering for Legitimacy"]

[Text] In a style closer to military maneuvers than organizational measures, Diyab Ramadan Abu-Labdah, who leads the dissidents in the Ummah Party, the smallest minority among opposition parties (67 members), last Thursday evening succeeded in holding what he called the party's sixth ordinary general conference which had been scheduled for the following evening, Friday. During this conference he ousted for the second time in less than 2 months party leader Ahmad al-Sabahi, and elected 16 members from the party, whom he called the National Committee for the Correction of the Party Course, to the party's executive committee membership. This is provided that the executive committee elects 8 new members, representing one-third of its membership, to bring the total number to 24 members.

The party's sixth ordinary general conference added a new chapter to the struggle for legitimacy in the Ummah Party, a struggle that began last July 19 with a communique issued by a group of party dissidents as a "reminder" to anyone interested in the continued existence of the Ummah Party. They declared their success in ousting Ahmad al-Sabahi from the party leadership, thus embarking on a struggle in which both sides, al-Sabahi

and Abu-Labdah, followed to the letter the Labor Party struggle scenario that preceded it a few months before, or last March.

The dissidents' choice of Abu-al-Fadl al-Jizawi's office as the headquarters for their action against Ahmad al-Sabahi's policies and tendencies was no coincidence, but rather underscored al-Jizawi's success in causing "trouble" in the various political parties, the troubles that point to the first signs of his success in putting to rest the notion that "political parties are a private asylum for their leaders," as he himself put it. Al-Jizawi had joined forces with the Labor Party dissidents then lately began to neutralize a number of Liberal Party leaders in order to confront Mustafa Kamil Murad's policies and to correct the party's course!

The dissidents were not content with ousting Ahmad al-Sabahi and electing Diyab Ramadan Abu-Labdah party chief, but also announced the expulsion of 15 party members, including Ahmad al-Sabahi and three of his sons who filled leadership positions on the party office staff.

In citing the reasons for expelling these members and based on the communique they issued after their meeting, the dissidents said: "The members of the general conference were convinced that former party chief Mr Ahmad al-Sabahi and 14 party members who have their hands on the party's properties and documents, have failed to conform to party conduct and ethics and are against the legitimacy that has been reaffirmed by the convocation of the extraordinary general conference and its resolutions, issued by a majority and in a democratic fashion. This does not mean that some of the cofounders among them who shared in the proclamation's legitimacy have the legal right to proceed on other than the democratic road. Furthermore, it became clear to the conference that these members were determined to persist in their opposition to legitimacy and democracy.

In the same communique the dissidents resolved to:

- Notify the Political Parties Affairs Committee of the sixth ordinary conference's minutes and resolutions;
- Ask the Political Parties Affairs Committee to take a stand on the minutes and special resolutions it had received from the extraordinary general conference held last July 19 and the sixth ordinary conference held on 14 September;
- Give official written notice to the committee chairman of the need to reply to everything the committee had received by declaring its approval, rejection, or noncompetency (for failure to reply is considered a tacit approval of all adopted measures);
- Notify the committee of any court action to resolve the matter of legitimacy;
- Affirm the general conference's right to elect the party leader and the executive body.

On the other hand, in a message sent to "Papers from the Opposition," Ahmad al-Sabahi denounced the dissident conference's resolutions, maintaining that Abu-Labdah

did not hold a Ummah Party political conference because he did not have legal status, since he was expelled from the party last 20 June and, therefore, lacked the partisan capacity to speak for the Ummah Party.

In his message, al-Sabahi accused Abu-Labdah of submitting to the official authorities forged papers with false signatures on party letterhead with the party seal which he embezzled from the party during his tenure prior to his expulsion.

Al-Sabahi maintained that he informed the public prosecutor about Abu-Labdah's embezzlement of party letterheads and seal and that the Sayyidah Zaynab chief prosecutor is questioning him in order to bring him to trial on embezzlement charges.

Al-Sabahi maintained that he was still the legal head of the Ummah Party and that he won this position unopposed in the 12 September elections whose results will be ratified by the party's ordinary general conference to be convened by al-Sabahi this 27 September.

Al-Sabahi ended his message with an invitation to "Papers from The Opposition" to attend what he called the great real and legitimate conference so that everyone will know for certain that Ahmad al-Sabahi is the real and legitimate head.

In an interview with "Papers From the Opposition," Diyab Ramadan Abu-Labdah said that Ahmad al-Sabahi did indeed expel him arbitrarily from the party's leadership last 19 July, the day the emergency conference was held, and that he filed a complaint against this decision. However, the central committee so far has failed to resolve the matter in contravention of the party's organizational rules and regulations, thus rendering his expulsion null and void and unlawful.

Abu-Labdah said that the convocation of the emergency conference that removed al-Sabahi was lawful, for it was held at the request of 42 members representing over 50 percent of the party's membership in accordance with party bylaws provisions and, therefore, the resolutions put out by the emergency conference were proper and legitimate.

Abu-Labdah also said that his membership in the party is recent, for he joined the party last March, not out of conviction of the party's orientations or al-Sabahi's presidency, but rather as a means to run for local council elections that were held during the same time frame. He said that he found the Ummah Party easy to join but he was surprised by al-Sabahi's practices.

Abu-Labdah also admitted that current events within the Ummah Party indicate the absence of democratic practice within the political parties, and that the movement he is leading is meant to correct the party's democratic course.

At the end of the interview, Abu-Labdah said: "If there is a struggle for legitimacy within the party, I ask the

Parties Committee to stop both sides, al-Sabahi and Abu-Labdah, until the issue of legitimacy is resolved."

Since the Ummah Party case is not over yet, all indications are that developments in this struggle may reveal in the next few days certain events that might put an end to the state of stagnation that has prevailed over the Ummah party for the last 6 years.

Armaments Authority Head Speaks on Defense Status

90OA0048A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 2 Oct 89 p 4

[Article: "Armaments: Intent on Building Our Armament Strength and Achieving Balance"]

[Text] Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan, head of the Armament Authority, emphasized that Egypt is intent on building up the capacity and capabilities of its weapons systems and on raising its combat ability to meet the growing needs of the armed forces. He also emphasized the importance of achieving equality between the weapons systems we own and those that pose a threat to us, with a view to neutralizing and outmatching them.

He said: "We are working well and keeping a watchful eye on the growing armed capabilities around us in the region in which we live, with which we interact, and toward which we have responsibilities." He added that the region is witnessing a continual arms race, to the extent that the area is full of surface-to-surface missiles, guided munition, and spy satellites launched into space.

The head of the Armament Authority said: "The armed forces, when testing any kind of new weapon, ask for a study of the quality of weapons found in the area of conflict around us and the nature of major threats. They also ask about the suitability of such weapons to the theatre of operations, the topography, the weather conditions, the military standard, and the technological base in Egypt and world development trends, in order to choose the best and most suitable weapons.

"We are always working to achieve a balance of power in the region. The armed forces have adopted the strategy of military deterrence to ward off any attempts or temptations to commit an aggression against us or provoke us, and to assure everyone that we possess the deterrent destructive capabilities. Our diligent efforts to achieve a military balance of power and gain credibility for Egyptian deterrence are not aimed at waging wars but rather at preventing them.

"We have been able to provide many types of sophisticated airplanes; we have had a surge in navy armament; new types of anti-aircraft missiles have been added; the technical efficiency of air defense equipment has been raised; new Egyptian air defense systems have been produced; new types of artillery and guided missiles have been introduced; and Eastern tanks have been developed.

"Specific tasks have been set for the development of production programs and the securing of weapons systems through overhaul and major repairs performed locally with a special focus on spare part manufacturing and extending the life expectancy of these systems. Tasks have also been set for enhancing munition range and penetrability; upgrading radars; overcoming impediments; raising missile accuracy and upgrading warheads; raising the caliber of tank guns; upgrading sighting equipment and conduct-of-fire systems; upgrading plane navigation, armament, and aiming equipment; and enhancing the capabilities and armament of naval equipment."

The chief of the Armament Authority stressed that Egypt's military production is not only aimed at meeting its need for arms and military equipment, but also at helping Arab and African countries. This is in addition to giving Egyptian military production a chance to undergo practical testing in the various fields with a view to highlighting its capabilities and determining essential trends for future development. He said that military production has been honorably displayed at foreign exhibits in Kuwait, the UAE [United Arab Emirates, and Iraq.

Raw Materials Shortage Said To Cost Almost Two Billion Pounds

45000036 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 1 Nov 89 pp 1, 6

[Text] Informed economic sources estimate that public and private sector losses due to a shortage of raw materials and production prerequisites during the fiscal year ending in July were almost two billion pounds. Most private sector companies faced a shortfall of raw materials and prerequisites valued at \$200 million [as published] because of the "priorities" policy that the government implemented in the interest of the public sector. The raw materials shortage led to a drop in production capacity in factories and companies. Some of the public sector companies also encountered a raw materials shortage. Eighty public sector companies failed to plan for required spare parts, tools, and maintenance procedures. Central accounting office experts estimate company losses incurred because of a lack of maintenance and insufficient tools at almost 300 million pounds.

ISRAEL

Minister Gur Warns About Loss of Land to Arabs

44230021F Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Sep 89 p 5

[Interview with Minister Mordekhay Gur by Ora Zarnitsky]

[Excerpt][Passage omitted]

[DAVAR] How did you get interested in this issue?

[Gur] "I became aware of the problems of people living on the border while I was still commander of the Northern Command. In addition to my military job, I dealt with current issues such as education, the economy,

employment, and transportation, and that is how I learned to recognize the socioeconomic problems of settlements, moshavim, and kibbutzim along the border. In the past year I was invited to visit moshavim in the Lower Galilee and western and eastern 'Emeq Yizre'el, where I was conscious of a genuine catastrophe."

[DAVAR] What is happening there?

[Gur] "A huge percentage of land is no longer being cultivated. Much of it is worked by Arabs from the other side of the Green Line and some by Israeli Arabs, and no one knows what will happen with that land in the future. I was invited by the moshav Nitzaney 'Oz in the Sharon to check their situation in detail. The moshav is located near Moshav Sha'ar Efrayim, both of them across from Janin. There you can see in practice how land disappears from Jewish ownership and labor into full or partial ownership by Arabs from across the line, who work it entirely."

[DAVAR] How extensive is the problem?

[Gur] "In the Upper and Lower Galilee, the valleys, Sharon, the Lakhish and Mivtahim areas we are talking about 300,000 dunam designated for Jewish agriculture. That land belonged to moshavot, moshavim, and kibbutzim, while today it is not worked at all. Some fields were abandoned because the State of Israel no longer needs that many farmers. I verified this and it is a fact that members of moshavim, kibbutzim, and moshavot cannot make it as farmers and are forced to abandon the land. What is much worse, they lease land to Arab investors from across the Green Line.

"What happens is that Arabs who lived in the western Negev and are now in the Gaza Strip continue to work their former lands. The same applies to Arabs in the Janin area. This creates a dual problem. Our national ties, which include ownership of the land and the state, are weakened, while their emotional ties and the ties of sons whose families once lived on that land are strengthened. A conflict is created under our very eyes that is very difficult to live with and will be very difficult to resolve."

[DAVAR] What is the difference between moshavim, kibbutzim, and moshavot?

[Gur] "Members of moshavot are the only ones who own their land. They purchased it at the time and it is passed on through inheritance. Some of them sink into debt and are forced to sell some of the land in order to repay debts. They sell to the highest bidders, who turn out to be Arabs, including Arabs living abroad. I have specific examples. They came to me and said that they expected the Israel Lands Administration or the Jewish National Fund to purchase some of their land so that they will not be compelled to sell to Arabs.

"The case concerning kibbutzim and moshavim along the border is more serious because it involves extensive areas. There, there is no question of purchase, because the land belongs to the Jewish National Fund or the

Land Administration; the main question is what to do with it and who will work it."

[DAVAR] What can be done?

[Gur] "The solution with which almost everyone agrees, but which is difficult to implement, is to turn a good number of moshavim located on the border—I stress, on the border—into community settlements. Thus, instead of having 60 to 70 families in one moshav, as the law dictates today, we should endeavor to have moshavim like Sha'ar Efrayim and Nitzaney 'Oz merge and become a settlement with 500 families. To achieve that we must change the use of some of the land, allowing construction within the framework of the 'Build Your House' program. That way, people who now live in Netanya and Hadera, which are close to Sha'ar Efrayim, can move to live in the new community settlement. Some can move to town, others will have farms as a side line, while yet others will continue to farm as before.

"Community settlements can incorporate as many as 1,000 families, in which case they can definitely become industrial areas in every respect. There is no reason in the world that industrial areas like Elqana, Barqan, and so forth can exist across the Green Line, but on this side of the border."

[DAVAR] What about moshavim?

[Gur] "There is a problem that must be solved, namely allowing all moshav members, rather than just one heir, to receive land in the moshav and to build their houses. They must be given the right to build their own farms next to their parents' and to work the land."

[DAVAR] Who would be given priority?

[Gur] "A regulation must be established stating that people coming to live along the Green Line should be given priority. They should be given easier building terms. In that manner we can have 1,000 Israeli families living on the line across from Janin, as settlements like Makabim and Kokhav Ya'ir do now. At least 10 to 15 additional community settlements can be established this way along the Green Line to increase the Jewish population of the area. That can be achieved, if appropriate incentives are offered, which shouldn't be difficult, because they would not be moving farther away from either Hadera, Gedera, Zikhron Ya'akov, or any other municipal center. We're only talking about another 10 km, but the fact remains that currently the Green Line is abandoned and land is being lost.

"Consequently, we must gather all the factors involved in this issue and provide a solution that is satisfactory to both moshavim and their members, and meets security considerations and the need to achieve a balance between Jewish and Arabs inhabitants along the Green Line. This way we can preclude the transfer of land from national Jewish hands into the hands of owners over which we have no control."

PLO Official on Contacts With Israeli Ministers

44230019E Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 19 Sep 89 p 21

[Interview with Halhul mayor Muhammad Milhim, in Amman, by Oren Cohen; date not given; first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Muhammad Milhim was the mayor of Halhul and a member of the Palestinian Committee for National Direction when he was expelled from the territories in 1980. Milhim was elected mayor of Halhul in the last democratic elections that were held in the territories, in 1976. Following these elections, the Committee for National Direction was established, and it included as members nine mayors of West Bank cities. After the murder at Beit Hadassah, it was decided to expel Milhim—in order to calm the settlers, some say. Milhim appealed to the High Court of Justice against the expulsion proceedings. The military commander of the region at the time, Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, notified Milhim that he had to fly to a meeting with the minister of defense. The helicopter that took him ended up in Lebanon. The High Court of Justice held a session next to the Allenby Bridge and recommended that the expulsion decision not be carried out, but Prime Minister Menahem Begin nevertheless decided to carry out the order.

Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin announced last week that he is ready to meet Milhim and Akram Haniyah, another expulsee, and to negotiate with them on the holding of elections in the territories, according to the model of the Government of Israel. Milhim was interviewed by HADASHOT from his home in Amman.

[HADASHOT] Did you expect to be a member of the Palestinian delegation when you were expelled?

[Milhim] I didn't hear about that appointment. No one in the leadership of the PLO said to me that I am a member of a PLO delegation. But if the leadership says this to me, I will consider it.

[HADASHOT] Rabin said that he is ready to meet with you.

[Milhim] I will agree to meet with Rabin when I feel that Israel is willing to talk about peace, and only after the leadership of the PLO officially appoints me as a representative. If Mr Rabin or the Government of Israel is willing to meet with a delegation that is appointed by the PLO, I will be glad to be part of such a delegation. I hope that will be an opening for peace. I hope that what is happening now will bring about a breakthrough. It will be good for all of us. Enough with the bloodshed, enough with the killing.

[HADASHOT] Is what is happening now not a breakthrough?

[Milhim] I know that 'Arafat is now in Egypt and that the leadership is talking. I hope that everything has been done to move towards a solution. I don't think that it is a breakthrough. I am not against the 10 points of

President Mubarak, but they can be called only a station on the way to the destination of peace. It's part of a process, it's not a peace plan.

[HADASHOT] How will the path to peace look?

[Milhim] We will have to discuss many topics. We will have to agree on the form of elections, and afterwards we will speak about an international conference, in which everyone will sit as equals, and where the need of all the peoples in the region to live in security, in peace, and independently will be recognized.

[HADASHOT] The Government of Israel also is talking about elections.

[Milhim] The elections could be an intermediate step or stage. They could be a stage in a comprehensive plan, but they are not something that stands alone, such as your government presents it. The elections must be democratic and free and without any threat to the participants. Freedom and freedom of elections contradict the essence of the conquest. Thus, if someone wants to hold democratic elections, they must be free of the conquest and of any form of repression.

[HADASHOT] If that is the case, what do you think about the Israeli initiative?

[Milhim] There is no such Israeli initiative. There are thoughts about the liquidation of the intifadah. Mr Shamir's proposal should have been made 10 years ago, when they expelled me. We demanded elections then also, but on your side the preference was not to hold them. Now, as well, the elections are not intended to achieve peace, but rather to bring an end to the intifadah. Political elections, were they to be held today, have a different dimension. Every side must obtain its own security.

[HADASHOT] What are the intentions of your leadership?

[Milhim] The Palestinian initiative exists. 'Arafat's peace plan also exists, and it is supported by 95 percent of our population. Now it depends only on whether your government is ready to end everyone's suffering and to sit and talk about peace.

[HADASHOT] Would you have believed after you were expelled that an Israeli minister of defense would be willing to sit with you?

[Milhim] I would have preferred not to have been expelled at all. Rabin knows that, also. Now I am unable to return to my home in Halhul. But if I meet with Rabin, it will only be as a member of a PLO delegation and on its behalf.

[HADASHOT] He who did not want you as mayor of Halhul, accepts you now as a Palestinian representative. Is that not victory?

[Milhim] It is not a matter of personal victory or personal loss. Now we are all losers. What we need to

achieve now is a victory over the enemies of peace and those who want bloodshed and those with bad intentions. We want a victory over those with evil intentions and the victory of the future of our children. We must not seek victory over each other. We are definitely able to talk about peace.

[HADASHOT] It is something new, when a Palestinian leader from the territories, such as Elias Frayj, is allowed to meet openly with 'Arafat.

[Milhim] In general, I do not think that there should be limitations on Palestinians concerning meetings with members of their people, including the leadership of the PLO, in all the states of the region. Frayj and other leaders meet with the PLO all the time, and such meetings have been going on for the last 15 or 20 years. The Israelis and also the General Security Service knew and know that, but they deceive themselves. They always said, "Don't tell us about it." Now is the time to speak the truth without fear, as Frayj has done.

[HADASHOT] Would you be willing to come to Jerusalem?

[Milhim] If the PLO Executive Committee and the leadership tell me to go, I will go anywhere in order to serve the aims of my people. I would have no choice but to agree to such a request.

[HADASHOT] Are direct or indirect negotiations going on between Israel and the PLO?

[Milhim] Contacts are going on now on both levels. On the level of the talks with Egypt, we have no problem, and that is not called negotiations. We are speaking and consulting and coordinating positions with the Egyptians. In general, we have no problem in speaking with Arabs, and also with Egypt, especially now, when it has returned to the bosom of the Arab world. We are definitely coordinating positions with them. On the second level, between Israel and the PLO, negotiations have been going on for the last 2 years or even longer. Already in 1981, when Israel made peace with the PLO in Lebanon, messages were exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel. Now, as well, at this time, messages are passing through intermediaries between Rabin and ourselves. I personally recently received an indirect message from Arens, your foreign minister, who indeed said that Israel would never agree to speak with the PLO. It was a negative message, but definitely a message that I know was meant for me and, I thought, for the PLO by the same route, and I told him that it would be impossible to make peace without the PLO.

Government 'Powerless' To Control Arms Deals

44230002A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 1 Sep 89 p 2B

[Article by Dan Sagir]

[Text] "Among Israelis, nothing is ever black and white, everything is gray; that is how they operate," states an American arms dealer in an interview in the monthly

NEW OUTLOOK, which devoted its February 1989 issue to Israel's arms deals in Central America. The current involvement of Israeli reserve officers occurred, not surprisingly, in a "gray area" such as South America. Although the true scope and seriousness of the "Colombia affair" is not yet known, great embarrassment prevailed in the defense ministry leadership this week.

Contrary to the general world trend, Israel's defense exports have enjoyed an increase in recent years. In 1988, Israel exported weapons, security equipment and services worth \$1.4 billion. The Defense Ministry's forecast for 1989 is for actual exports totalling \$1.6 billion. The portion of Latin America in this market declined in the last decade, and in recent years, only an estimated quarter of Israel's total security exports has been directed at these states. The Defense Ministry has refrained from providing data regarding the volume of the sale of security services relative to total exports, indicating sums "only in the tens of millions." Given the tortuous routes through which these exports are carried out, it is nearly certain that the Defense Ministry administration lacks accurate data.

Against the background of Israel's name being linked to especially big drug dealers, the frustration and anger in the Defense Ministry administration stem mainly from the fact that a comprehensive revision of the entire security export control system was carried out less than 3 years ago. Following the Bar'am affair in 1986, the Defense Ministry cancelled the comprehensive permits for security exportation in the possession of hundreds of retired officers. The new procedure specifies that a separate request must be submitted regarding each security deal or service in order to enter into negotiations.

The identity of the permit requester, the circumstances of the deal, the countries under discussion, the organization which orders the weapon or security service, secrecy considerations, and a long series of other considerations are examined in the offices of Security Export Assistance in Israel (SYBT). At the completion of the checks, the request is transferred to the director general of the Defense Ministry, who signs the permits. In sensitive cases, the matter is decided by the minister. SYBT maintains representatives in the 19 principle states which acquire security products and services from Israel. Six representatives are in Latin American countries, including Colombia. On-location SYBT representatives, or Israel's military attache, undertake an on-location examination of the deal and the elements connected to it (this is done in the United States by a Defense Ministry delegation). In recent years, approvals and export permits have been given to 800 companies and individuals regarding all types of security activity, including protection and training.

A change in the rules and procedures of the SYBT office has made it very difficult to export military equipment and arms from Israel without the approval and knowledge of the Defense Ministry. It would seem that the doors of the stable have been closed. However, another area of activity, no less sensitive, remains very wide

open: The transfer of Israeli military knowledge of combat methods and protection. The SYBT does not maintain an investigations department or any control system regarding what is done in the security exports field. The objective is to export as much as possible to as many states as possible, without embroiling Israel from an international, political standpoint.

Dr Edi Kaufmann from Hebrew University, who studies Israel's links with Latin American countries, states that the activities of Israelis in this part of the world are no different from those of other Western countries. "There is no abundance of morality in military relations between nations in the world; in this respect, we are not the worst," he states. However, Israel, unlike other countries, must preserve a fig leaf of morality and a low profile in these areas because of its special political situation. According to Kaufmann, drug money and political instability in Colombia and Panama have transformed these two countries in recent years into a magnet for arms dealers, mercenaries and providers of different security services.

Kaufmann believes that the problem revealed by the most recent episode is the absence of an internal system of checks and balances regarding everything related to Israel's security exports. The imbalance began in the first days of Israel's security exportation, when elements outside the defense system and the military-industrial complex of Israel, in which everyone knows one another, became incapable of influencing the destinations of security exports. The Foreign Ministry shows absolute impotency in all affairs related to the sale of weapons and Israeli security knowledge throughout the world. Officially, Foreign Ministry officials request to express their opinion on deals pertaining to different areas before they are signed. However, only infrequently, if at all, has a professional element or even the foreign minister managed to prevent a security deal.

This rule also applies to Israeli involvement in Colombia. Toward the end of the week, it emerged that professional elements in the foreign ministry have indeed responded negatively in the past 2 years each time they were presented with a deal to sell equipment or train nongovernmental groups in Colombia. In proper democratic regimes, the parliament also participates in controlling the activities of the government in this area, the most prominent example being, of course, the United States. However, in Israel, the Knesset plenum and the foreign affairs and defense committee have no information or real control capability.

The scope of Israel's security equipment and arms deals with Colombia have reached, in recent years, hundreds of millions of dollars. Many of these deals were exchange deals, in which the Colombians paid the government of Israel with coal. A conspicuous deal carried out last year involved the sale of 13 Israeli Air Force Kfir aircraft to the Colombian Air Force. In Israel, Colombia also purchased cannons, mortars, light weapons, night-vision systems and communications equipment. For the most part, the deals are conducted through business channels, as is acceptable

in South America, and entail the payment of high commissions to local, international, and Israeli intermediaries.

A much more complex and protected business area is the sale of protection services to private individuals, organizations, and institutions, and the sale of intelligence services and military training for civilians in Latin America. There is information on activity of this type on the part of Israelis (in the past and perhaps in the present as well), in Nicaragua (the training of Contra personnel, apparently with the knowledge of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and with American financing), Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. As disclosed this week, Panama and Colombia—where there is big money, whose source is well known—have in recent years become a hit among retired Israeli officers.

The approvals system of SYBT and the Defense Ministry in Latin America was intended to prevent the supply of services and Israeli weapons to underground opposition groups (leftists usually). Deals with criminal elements are liable to embroil Israel from a political standpoint. In the early 1980s, rules were also determined which prohibited the sale of Israeli weapons to countries involved in civil war, or when Israeli combat equipment is liable to be used against civilians in dictatorships. These rules are not always maintained strictly, and the desire to sell and to export as much as possible has overcome them. In many cases—the Hod Hahanit Company being the most recent example—Israeli companies do not hesitate to bypass the Defense Ministry to sell anything to whom-ever will buy and pay well.

Knesset Member Deplores Social Services to Bedouins

44230020E Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 17 Sep 89 p 2

[Text] Knesset Member [MK] Hayim Oron (MAPAM [United Workers Party]) has warned about discrimination in and the threat of collapse of social services to Bedouins in the Negev, and has requested that the standards governing social service agencies to Bedouins be brought up to the level prevailing among similar populations in other sectors.

In a letter recently addressed to Deputy Minister of Labor and Welfare Ze'ev Feldman, MK Oron wrote that currently only 5.5 slots are allotted to the 65,000 Negev Bedouins, i.e., one slot per 12,000 inhabitants, while in other settlements in the south there is one worker per 1,000 to 1,500 inhabitants. For example: the Regional Council of Azata, which has 6,000 inhabitants, has been allocated 4.5 slots for welfare workers; the Regional Council of Merhavim, which has 7,600 inhabitants, has 6.5 slots; the Regional Council of Shapir, 7,000 inhabitants, has 9 slots, and Mitzpe Rimon, 3,000 inhabitants, has 3.5 slots.

MK Oron noted that he was cognizant of the difficulties involved in providing social services to Bedouin tribes, which are not organized in an orderly municipal framework, but he claimed that more than partial services can be provided to that population, too. "The fact that the Social

Services Agency of Beersheba allocates just two social workers and one clerk to deal with 3,000 Bedouins who don't live in towns, reflects a discriminatory policy that cannot be excused by technical difficulties alone. The town of Rahat, which has some 17,000 residents, has been allocated 2 to 2.5 slots including administrative personnel..." Oron wrote.

MK Oron cited a letter that reached him that was signed by all section heads of social services to Negev Bedouins, in which they wrote, among other things: "In view of our long experience, we have trouble believing that this is a case of general oversight; more likely it involves extraneous considerations that cannot be discussed here." MK Oron noted that in talks with social workers, regardless of nationality, he gained the impression that that formulation was a delicate way of expressing a deep and growing feeling of discrimination and persecution.

"I appeal to you to devote due attention to this difficult problem and to take immediate steps to remedy the situation. The Bedouin population of the Negev, which is in the throes of most a problematic change and transition, deserves preferential government aid in support of family and community frameworks at this time of crisis stemming from those processes. Until preferential treatment is possible, the state is duty-bound to adjust social services standards to the level of those customary among similar populations in other sectors. The picture that arises from letters by section chiefs is that the whole system is on the brink of total collapse," Oron wrote to the deputy minister of labor and welfare.

Infighting Reported Within Labor Party

44230002E Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 4 Sep 89 pp 8, 9

[Article by P'er-Li Shahar]

[Text] Confusion currently reigns in the Labor Party thicket, about 2 months after the government's decision on the new political initiative, about a month and a half after the Labor Party forced the constraints placed by the Likud on the political initiative, and a month after the government clouded its decision with a grotesque statement according to which only its decisions oblige its members. It is difficult to understand the choice of timing for this mutual feather-plucking between the doves and the hawks. The statements of leaders of the center hawkish current to the effect that the dovish current is acting contrary to the party's platform are not new. Nor have the doves recently made any new declarations requiring a strong response from the hawks.

It emerges that the leaders of the centrist current decided to raise a storm after it was decided in the central committee meeting of the Labor Party to allow East Jerusalem Arabs to participate in elections, provided that their polling stations are set up outside Jerusalem.

"We decided to act before it was too late," explained Shlomo Hillel, a leader of the centrist current, "because

this decision has a limited meaning and was made without a substantive discussion. There was a committee which attempted to make a decision quickly without sufficient consideration. I want to emphasize that granting an active election right, meaning the right to elect, must be distinguished from granting a passive election right, meaning the right to be elected. It is inconceivable that Palestinians living in Jerusalem, such as Faysal al-Husayni or Sari Nusaybah, could be elected, because the fact that they live in Jerusalem would again call Jerusalem's status into question in the future. I state explicitly: Palestinian activists living in Jerusalem shall not be able to be elected."

Deputy Minister Yosi Beilin, a leader of the dovish group, states that this is not a serious argument: "If we prohibit the election of East Jerusalem Arabs, the proposal to hold elections will have no chance. Elections would not take place given such a condition, because the main activist group vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue is in East Jerusalem."

"If so, let them move," states Hillel.

They Are Distorting the Platform

Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino, also a hawk, emphasizes that the hawks' struggle with the doves focusses on imbuing the Labor Party platform with true content. She states that Labor's platform is being distorted by party leaders, including Shim'on Peres. "We support the 'Elon plan.' Any party representative in the Knesset or the government is obliged to act according to the platform. Each person cannot take the law into his own hands. The activity of 'Force 17' [a group of 17 Knesset members sarcastically named after a Palestinian terrorist group] contradicts the party platform. The so-called dovish group is distorting the character of the party and is damaging its electoral strength. The impression being created is that some of its members who are close to Peres would not dare to express themselves as they are without Peres' backing. Deputy Minister (Beilin) would dare not express himself as he is, if his minister were to express reservations. However, his minister is quiet, and from this quiet, it can be understood that he agrees."

Beilin has reservations regarding these matters and is attempting to soften the impression being created: "Each one of us views himself as one who explains the historical position of the Labor movement. We have not called ourselves 'Force 17.' Someone applied that name to us, along with the meaning which they are attempting to give it."

Arbely-Almozlino is not willing to depict the situation with soft lines. She states explicitly that Peres has changed. "Peres has changed his positions over the years. Once he was a hawk. Today he is a dove, not a white dove, but a dove. He is influenced by his friends who have worked with him all these years."

Struggle Over Positions of Power

The struggles in the Labor Party between hawks and doves are not merely ideological. Members in the centrist current will testify that their personal standing in the party has

been damaged by the positions which they take which are contrary to the positions of the leadership.

"The members who go with the centrist current do not do so to gain centers of influence. It is clear to me that my political positions bear a price, and I am willing to pay," states Shlomo Hillel, who acknowledges that it is probable that the price which he has recently paid for his hawkish opinions is that he will not be elected to head the Knesset finance committee. "I know that had I wished to gain support, I would have found a way. However, I would not then be who I am."

Shoshana Arbely-Almozlino, who found herself outside the government after the last elections, states that "there are a number of reasons why Peres did not appoint me as a minister, and my hawkish positions are one of them."

It is agreed in the Labor Party that the struggle is not just ideological. It also involves an attempt to gain positions in bodies which could constitute foci of power in a future leadership struggle. Mota Gur stated, at the end of the week, after his appearance before members of the centrist current, that "currents in the party identify with neither Rabin's camp nor Peres' camp. Hawks and doves are in both camps. Some of the doves from 'Force 17' declare that they will support a hawkish candidate of the party in general elections, because the public wants that. This is somewhat hypocritical, because positions and behavior should be reconciled. I would need to establish my own force, in which, as in other groups, there would be both doves and hawks."

Asked to respond to this statement, a dove stated that "perhaps this is the reason why Mota Gur, who supported the U.S.-PLO dialogue, appeared before the centrist current, seeking to gain the support of the same doves who are searching for a leader with hawkish stands."

There Will Be No Split

Neither the hawks nor doves believe that their differences of opinion are liable to cause a rend or split in the party. Those who supported the "complete land of Israel" in the past left the party. However, the current situation involves two bodies which support a territorial compromise, but argue over the depth of the compromise. Shlomo Hillel states that if the Labor Party makes a decision which is too dovish, he will obviously need to decide whether to accept the decision and remain in the party, or to leave the party. However, he does not intend to act against the party's decision, even if it is contrary to his views. Yosi Beilin states that "the struggle of the hawks is a rear-guard fight over irrelevant positions, because all decisions made by the party, including those made in the last central committee meeting proved that the opinion of the party's majority is more dovish."

Maintaining peace in the party is entrusted to Knesset Member Mikha Harish by virtue of his position as Labor Party secretary. Defined as a "yonetz" [a combined dove-hawk], Harish heads the political committee that

formulated the party's platform. Neither hawks nor doves are currently demanding a change in this platform.

Mikha Harish emphasizes that the debate is very focussed, because there exists a political initiative not only acceptable to all Labor Party constituents, but also to the Likud. "In my opinion, this is currently a matter of organizing perceptions, which has perhaps been generated by the freeze in the political process. It is clear to me that the situation between the parties will intensify in 1990. Until then, we are giving this initiative a chance to progress. If there is no movement by the first of January, it is clear that the struggle will be between the Labor Party and the Likud, and not within the Labor Party. The struggle with the Likud will erase the differences of opinion between the doves and the hawks inside the party."

East Jerusalem Arabs Reportedly Frustrated by Bureaucracy

44230021C Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 14 Sep 89 p 9

[Article by Betzael Amiqam: "Lady, To Have Your Baby You Must Wait for an Identity Card"]

[Text] This is a real story. A young Arab woman from East Jerusalem, born in the united city, was happily married to the man of her dreams. A short time later she found that she was pregnant. When the time came to have the baby, she rushed to Sha'arey Tzedeq Hospital. "You must bring an amended identity card with the name of your husband," the registration clerk told her. That's when the problems started.

At the Ministry of the Interior things move sluggishly. East Jerusalem clerks have their hands full. The young woman, in advanced stages of her pregnancy, could not secure a new identity card on the spot, as is usual in the western part of the city, and was put on a waiting list. The question now is what will come first, the delivery date or the new identity card.

Amir Hasin, whose official title has for some years been mayoral adviser for East Jerusalem affairs, is aware of the cumbersome system. It is a genuine, modern "Via Dolorosa" that those in need of the services of the State of Israel must travel. He gushes forth stories like a torrent. "On the eve of the opening of the new school year in Jordan, an Arab from East Jerusalem who works as a teacher at the Hashemite Academy came to the office. He had arrived on home leave carrying an old identity card. Now he was required to produce a new card. At the Ministry of the Interior he was told that it would take 2 months to issue him the new card. 'What do I do?' he wailed. 'I'm going to lose my job.'"

"I don't work for the Interior Ministry," says Hasin, "I can try to speed up things, but when all is said and done, my hands are tied. I gave him a note confirming that he had filed a request for a new identity card, maybe that'll help."

The advisory office for East Jerusalem looks out on both sides of the city. On one side is the Old City, on the other the teeming Jaffa Street. During the day the street is full of visitors coming and going to and from the Old City. In the morning the street is filled with Arab workers carrying food baskets and going to work in construction and industry in the western part of the city. United Jerusalem is a daily reality to Advisor Hasin. "I don't feel the Intifadah, with a few exceptions: the Arab mukhtars who used to come to the office frequently, don't show up any more. On the other hand, tradesmen who in the past never came here, do so now. I don't feel any significant change in the field. Budgets flow at the same rate and development continues. Here a road is paved, there a sidewalk is poured."

Hasin often visits his East Jerusalem "customers" at their homes. "When I go to Al-Tur to discuss neighborhood affairs, it's a business visit. I meet with neighborhood management, area workers, and residents. Two days later I ring up and ask to bring a foreign visitor with me. Nothing doing, the same people tell me who just sat down and discussed their problems with me."

The East Jerusalem advisory office serves as a reliable address for Arab residents unused to Israeli bureaucracy and afraid to challenge it. Many complaints arrive at the office, dealing with everyday matters such as requests for sewage linkage, orders for garbage trucks to replace donkeys, and requests for reduced taxes and levies. One of the major hardships is the housing problem, and when people cannot secure a permit, they build without one.

When the family of A., an Arab resident of East Jerusalem, grew, he decided to add a room to his house and thus relieve the crowding. Thank God, his house was on a large lot, so why not? More than 20 years in united Jerusalem had taught him that order was the master servant of the Israeli authorities. There are specific registration procedures, and one has to file a request with the authorities. Which he did. "Sorry, we don't yet have an outline plan," stated the reply to his request. The crowding was bad, and A. began to build without a permit. The room was completed, but the municipal inspection did not tarry. In court, the judge showed understanding and agreed to postpone the demolition order by 1 year, "and by then you bring me a permit." Time passed quickly, the outline plan for northern Jerusalem still lies at the bottom of some drawer, and the permit still didn't come. After 1 year, A. was summoned to court and was fined. He was told that the demolition order would be implemented in 1 year. The new term is about to run out and the confused Arab lifts up his hands in despair.

"It's a vicious circle," shrugs Amir Hasin. "No one cares, and problems become worse." Hasin does not ignore the many dozens of violations of the building law. "But what choice do Arabs have?" He waves away the claim that Arabs refuse to live in high-rise apartment houses. "Go to Nazareth or Nabulus, to Gaza or Cairo, and see for

yourself. There they have high rises, and no one complains." In his opinion, the Arab population will quickly adjust to the new reality of high-rise apartment houses. "Why are no apartments built for Arabs?" he thunders, and blames the Israeli authorities. "When new Jewish neighborhoods were built around Jerusalem they were defined as urban settlements, so high rises were allowed. When it comes to Arab neighborhoods, they are described as rural settlements, calling for low buildings. So pressure is created, and consequently people build illegally."

Hasin, the advisor for Arab affairs, testifies that among East Jerusalem contractors there are more than a few who could carry out projects involving the construction of whole neighborhoods, if only they were offered some of the incentives that are given to their Jewish colleagues.

In recent years there has emerged a class of young Arab intellectuals, high school and university graduates who, having graduated, try to find a livelihood in Jerusalem. They must, however, make their peace with the bitter reality. The Jewish sector is almost completely closed to them, while in the Arab economy, which has long been in a slump, chances of finding something are slim. Hasin knows educated and frustrated young Arab men eking a living out of temporary work, unable to realize their potential. "I am faced with the existential problems of the new Arab generation on a daily basis. There are engineers and architects, Certified Public Accountants, and scientists, and here and there even physicians who cannot find a job. I know more than a few professionals who have to take on menial jobs, something that creates justified frustration and bitterness. City Hall can hire only a few, and we even take on people in excess of slots. If pressure is released in political directions as a result of this frustration, it is directed toward Israel." Hasin is aware of the difficulties and of the fact that an young Arab man, a native of Jerusalem, educated but jobless, may well find himself pushed into the arms of terrorist organizations. Jerusalem Arabs are rooted in their city and will not easily give up living there.

Hasin would like to see the establishment endeavor to make Arabs feel that they belong to the city landscape. Like Arab young people, the Arab affairs advisor finds himself frustrated: "I go to people at city hall, talk to key figures there and elsewhere, and hear the same claim: there is no budget. If East Jerusalem Arabs do not receive the budget slice they are entitled to, the situation will increasingly deteriorate."

Immigration Figures, Forecasts Examined

44230003F Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Magazine) in Hebrew 5 Sep 89 pp 6,9

[Article by Gad Li'or and Dani Qifer: "Immigration: It Will Be the Economic Story of the Next Few Years"]

[Text] What will Israel do with 500 librarians, zoologists, and mining engineers? Who will get job preference—Ya'aqov, who immigrated from Morocco 35 years ago

and has been unemployed for a year now, or Grisha, who will only arrive here this fall?

What will happen if all of a sudden within 2 months 10,000 immigrants arrive in Israel at one time? Will they have apartments or could we see a return of the tent camps of the early '50's? Will they have jobs? Where will the \$3 billion come from, without which we will be unable to absorb 100,000 new immigrants by 1992?

These are not speculative questions. Thousands of immigrants have already arrived, mostly from the USSR, as well as a few from Argentina and other Western countries. Tens of thousands of others are set to immigrate from the depths and breadths of Russia.

How much will absorbing this immigration cost Israel? Are we in any way ready for it? Deputy Treasury Minister Yosi Beilin, the coordinator for budgetary aspects of the immigration, knows that it is a complex task, "but we are pinning our hope on aid from the Jewish people because without it, we will be in a tight spot," he adds.

How was the sum of \$3 billion calculated? Beilin answers: "One billion will be needed for housing, for building thousands of apartments; another billion to prepare places of employment and professional retraining for the immigrants who come; and yet another billion for infrastructure needed to absorb the immigration."

The treasury minister himself is convinced \$1 billion can still be raised from the Jewish people this year. He will try to do just that 2 weeks from now in the United States: "This is one of my principal tasks in my upcoming visit to the United States," says the minister, "and I have to reach an agreement with the Jewish institutions. They have to understand that they must help us absorb 100,000 people in the years 1990-1992."

Peres will propose that the United Jewish Appeal [UJA] take out a special loan from the internal funds of the Jewish congregations in the United States and make it available for the needs of absorbing Israel's immigration. As we said, this mean \$1 billion.

Thus far the government and the Jewish Agency have only managed to raise the first few pennies; last month it was agreed that the Agency would transfer \$13.6 million to the Housing Ministry to move the Ethiopian immigrants out of the absorption centers and house them in apartments. "If we move all the immigrants out of the overflowing absorption centers now and then keep new immigrants there only half a year, we will be able to absorb 20,000 immigrants there a year. That is a good solution. But it is far from the 30,000 to 40,000 immigrants expected to arrive each year, and perhaps more. Therefore thousands of apartments must be built at the same that we set up factories and new workplaces in the vicinity of the apartments to be built," say Beilin.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How much will it actually cost to absorb one immigrant?

At Treasury they say that just the professional training of an immigrant will cost about 15,000 shekels on average. To that has to be added housing and the fulfillment of his initial needs as a new immigrant in Israel. According to Uri Gordon of the Jewish Agency, the cost of absorbing an immigrant family is \$200,000. This sum includes investment in sources of employment, housing, education, health, and communications. "At first glance it seems like an outrageous sum, but that same family will increase our national product by \$50,000 a year and more," Gordon explains.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How many immigrants will arrive?

Between half a million and a million Jews will leave the Soviet Union in the next few years. Optimistic estimates say that the lion's share of the emigres from the USSR will arrive in Israel within 5 to 10 years. At the Jewish Agency they estimate that "only" half a million will come. The Minister of Absorption, Rabbi Yitzhaq Peretz, tends toward a larger figure and talks of a million Jews leaving the USSR in the next 5 years. Several tens of thousands will arrive in Israel each year.

The treasury minister estimates that within 3 years 100,000 immigrants will arrive in Israel. There are those who predict that in 1990 alone tens of thousands are likely to come. Those same sources even gave a breakdown of the population expected to arrive. The expected immigration from the USSR in 1990 is 36,000 families, with 2.8 people per family. That means about 35,000 people joining the civilian work force.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What will their profession makeup be?

According to predictions, 13,056 engineers will arrive; 6,390 people in the service sector; 5,387 laborers; 3,729 technical professionals; 3,158 administrative personnel; 2,935 educators.

In addition: 2,270 physicians; 1,829 artists; 1,979 from the medical profession; 1,742 specialists in particular areas of natural science; 202 professional athletes (their profession in the USSR); 110 scientists; and 62 professionals in special fields including pilots, agronomists, meteorologists, and tour guides. It is important to point out that this is just a forecast, although it was arrived at scientifically through a survey and questionnaires in the USSR.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Then employment will be the main problem?

Apparently it will be the problem. The Israeli economy does not produce jobs at the necessary rate: the rate of increase in the number of workplaces has dropped over the last 10 years by 50 percent as compared to the previous decade. That is, between the years 1967 to

1977, there was an annual increase in workplaces of 3.3 percent. In the years 1977-1987, it was only 1.9 percent.

This growth rate did not even satisfy the growth needs of the Israeli population without immigration.

Therefore the rate of unemployed climbed from 3.9 percent in 1977 to 6 percent in 1987, from 47,000 to 150,000 unemployed.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What will we do with mining engineers and zoologists?

"It may be that among the immigrants there will be more mining engineers and zoologists and fewer TV technicians, for example. Either we will adjust the workplaces to scientists and other workers or we will retrain them," says the treasury minister.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] When will the immigrants come?

According to official statistics, the wave of immigration has already begun. In the first half of 1989 8,350 immigrants arrived in Israel, an increase of 29 percent over the corresponding period last year. The last few months have already seen an increase of up to 50 percent in the number of immigrants as compared to the corresponding period last year. Since the beginning of the year 55,850 requests for reunification of families have been submitted for 198,000 Jews living in the USSR, an increase of 622 percent as compared to the same period last year.

"In August of this year, 13,000 requests for immigration were submitted, a number larger than the total of all requests submitted in the first 8 months of 1988," says Uri Gordon, the head of the immigration department at the Agency, and adds that last month about 3,000 tourists from the USSR visited Israel. By the end of the year 25,000 Jewish tourists from the Soviet Union will visit here.

"Therefore," Gordon continues, "with the arrival of the wave of immigration there will be a need to open new additional absorption centers. The moment Jews in the US see on TV that Jews are landing every day at Lod, the Jewish people will be drafted to help with the absorption of the immigration," he says.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How will the housing problem be solved?

The supply of private apartments is rather limited, and the additional demand will push up prices of apartments for rent and for sale within months. At the last session of the government, Minister Adari warned that the program for war against bureaucracy will cause an increase in apartment costs. It may result in a shortage of construction workers, the companies will have to pay higher wages and the prices of apartments built will go up.

Treasury Minister Shim'on Peres hopes to implement a program of special construction for immigrants in Jerusalem. He initiated contact with the Canadian billionaire

brothers Reichman to try and interest them in building 30,000 new apartments in the capital. That would mean an investment on the order of \$300 million, about a third of the money required to solve the housing problems of all 100,000 immigrants.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Will there be a policy of scattering immigrants all over the country?

The Galilee, for example, is crying out for residents. Over the last 18 months 1,020 new immigrants moved to the Galilee from Latin America. The campaign to settle the immigrants in the Galilee was conducted under the auspices of the department of immigration at the Agency, with the cooperation of the local authorities of Upper Nazareth, Carmiel, Migdal Ha'emeq and Safed, and in cooperation with various immigrant associations.

This would certainly constitute a remedy, albeit a small one, for the Galilee which, over the last 2 years, lost about 23,000 residents.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Is all of this worthwhile?

Israeli society in general has not asked itself whether the absorption of immigration is a "profitable business"; it is part and parcel of our national-political being. Still, high quality immigration like that forecast to arrive in the next few years would be considered by every economist as a highly profitable investment. "It may be that the immigration will cause an additional increase in unemployment in the first stage, until it becomes a factor that accelerates investment and growth," says Uri Gordon and continues: "The economy is not ready, there is a slowdown, unemployment, the intifadah, the cross section of immigrants does not fit the need. But over the long haul the immigration will become an impetus for economic growth. It was never the case that large immigration caused a crisis. On the contrary, every wave of immigration in the country's history resulted in a strengthened, healthy economy."

At the Ministries of Treasury and Industry they also say that it was precisely the wave of immigration that brought the economy out of the doldrums. The increased construction, the interesting professionals who will come to Israel, the sudden flood of absorption centers and perhaps also settlements far from the center of the country will assist in a renewed flourishing and in the process of growth.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How will the absorption be financed?

Even if U.S. Jews participate in half the costs of absorbing the immigration, the other half will fall upon the shoulders of Israeli citizens. How? "I rule out the imposition of an absorption loan," says Uri Gordon.

The bottom line: the absorption of the immigration will immediately mean additional taxes and belt-tightening, followed by several good years of growth.

[Box, p 6] A Confrontation Is Expected With the UJA

In 1988 25,000 emigres from the USSR arrived in the United States. According to the forecast of the U.S. State Department, 50,000 people will arrive this year, most of them Jews and Armenians, who will submit requests to immigrate to the United States from the USSR. In recent years more and more of the monies from the United Jewish Appeal, gathered in the United States, are remaining there for the welfare and local needs of the Jewish community. Now the question arises of absorbing the emigres to the United States, in view of the significant increase in the number of Jews leaving the USSR, who are asking to immigrate to that country.

Uri Gordon: "A new situation has been created: The Jewish community in the United States and Israel are competing for the same budgets for the contradictory objectives of absorbing emigres to the United States, or immigrants from the USSR to Israel. In such a situation the government of Israel must also examine our system of ties to the United Jewish Appeal and to the Jewish federations in the United States."

How Much Does It Cost To Absorb an Immigrant in the United States?

How much does it cost to absorb the emigres to the Jewish communities in the United States? Thus far the U.S. Government has contributed about \$800 to finance the absorption of a Soviet immigrant. Now there is fear that the federal government will reduce its participation.

According to JEWISH WEEK, half of the immigrants reside in New York, especially Brooklyn and the Bronx, and the UJA needs \$2,000 to meet the requirements of each immigrant.

One-seventh of the entire budget of the Jewish Council for Family and Child Services in New York is allocated to immigrants: \$7 million out of \$50 million.

Shomron Discusses Border Security, Intifadah

900L0055A Tel Aviv BAMAHA NE
in Hebrew 27 Sep 89 pp 10-11, 13

[Interview with Chief of Staff Dan Shomron by Yitzhaq Tuniq: "As Far As We Are Concerned, Jordan Is Responsible"]

[Text] [BAMAHA NE] Mr Chief of Staff, after a certain relaxation of tension, it seems that the intifadah is once again escalating. Is that your feeling, too?

[Shomron] "I suggest that we consider the intifadah, with its surges and ebbs, without panic. One must try to understand the phenomenon as a whole and in a more comprehensive manner. First of all, even people in the territories understand full well that they will not succeed in removing either the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] or Jewish settlements. Similarly, they will not succeed in forcing the State of Israel to change the situation if it doesn't want to."

[BAMAHANE] So why do the events continue nevertheless?

[Shomron] "The people of the territories have clear aspirations. They want a Palestinian state. In order to achieve it, they have to set in motion two levers: international public opinion and public opinion inside Israel. In their view, those two levers should bring pressure to bear on the Israeli government. Of course, each time they think the levers are not activated and that there is no pressure, they create some by requesting the people to put the subject on the agenda."

[BAMAHANE] From their viewpoint, when is it necessary to increase the pressure?

[Shomron] "When the business of the intifadah is dropped by international media, especially in the United States, or when a political process is underway that must be accelerated or halted. For example, at the last Fatah congress, 'Arafat clearly called on the territories to make their voice heard and to bring the intifadah back into the news.'"

[BAMAHANE] And was there indeed response to his call?

[Shomron] "Look, the situation is very difficult for the residents of the territories. They suffer. That is why all sorts of groups, called strike forces, which are hard core groups, came into being and are endeavoring to force the people, through terror, to continue the intifadah. They kill people who open stores during strikes, or who go to work when a strike is called, or who, in their opinion, cooperated with the civilian administration. Anyone who doesn't pursue the intifadah according to their intentions falls victim to their violence."

[BAMAHANE] Do they claim that it is collaboration with Israeli security forces?

[Shomron] "More than a few people were murdered who had nothing to do with collaboration with Israel in the intelligence sense. They were simply people who took care of their families, and in so doing found themselves violating the instructions of terror groups."

[BAMAHANE] Mr Chief of Staff, today, after more than 20 months, are we better equipped to deal with the intifadah?

[Shomron] "Nothing has remained the same. The IDF adjusted and continues to adjust to events, but this struggle is acquiring new form or changing form all the time. Therefore, comparisons between stages are often irrelevant."

[BAMAHANE] Nevertheless, things seem different today....

[Shomron] "Different in their nature. While at the beginning of the intifadah groups came out by the thousands, we managed to control that. There are no more events involving thousands, activities are now

carried out by small, isolated groups. Consequently, we adapted our actions to that change. We use different means and methods against specific teams and wanted individuals. Later, they tried to prevent people from going to work. That was dealt with and is finished. As for Molotov cocktails, I won't say that they don't exist, but there are significantly less. Now we have the masked men. In my opinion, by the way, they are hiding from the population, because their actions may provoke revenge. We will overcome this phenomenon, too. New direction will then undoubtedly emerge, and we will adjust to those, too."

[BAMAHANE] In the first year of the intifadah there was much talk of its influence on the army and on soldiers. Is that topic still on the agenda?

[Shomron] "In my opinion, at the time the fear stemmed particularly from the experience of other armies. There was much talk of armies that lost control, in which the basic norms and constraints that maintain army discipline became impaired. Their experience indeed involved deterioration into very serious situations, and those armies were indeed affected for lengthy periods of time. I must note with pride that that did not happen to our army, despite the fact that, at least in the beginning, there were very serious situations."

[BAMAHANE] Do you have an explanation for that?

[Shomron] "First of all, our soldiers understand what it is all about. They understand the dangers that the army runs in such situations, and can thus act accordingly. The situations in which they find themselves are indeed very delicate. The basic situation is that armed soldiers have to stand against civilians, some of whom are armed and some of whom stage violent actions against the army, civilians, and even the local population. The army has managed to steer a path through this delicate complex."

[BAMAHANE] One of the fears dating back to that time was that commanding officers would not want to stay in the army in view of events....

[Shomron] "I have all the 1988 figures and I can confidently say that people continued to reenlist. Moreover, we are managing to keep the good people. It is true that people don't like the intifadah, but they understand that it is a struggle, and they put their shoulder to the task and don't complain."

[BAMAHANE] In keeping with your instructions, good commanding officers are currently selected to serve in the territories. Do you by now have a profile of an officer particularly suited for that job?

[Shomron] "I think that a good field officer, who is good at commanding a unit, must also be a good commanding officer under the conditions of the intifadah and struggle against it. After all, in operations proper there are lots of nuances, too, and one must be capable of discernment. Initiative, leadership capabilities, and the ability to set limits in situations in which that is very difficult are the

qualities required in every situation. They are required of commanding officers both in pursuing enemies, in battle, and, of course, in the intifadah. We want good commanding officers to fulfill all those tasks both in order to ensure that they are well done, and to give them an opportunity to acquire experience."

[BAMAHANE] With your permission, let us now talk about Lebanon. Here there seem to be two kinds of news, good and bad. The bad news is that there have been more penetration attempts, and the good news is that we have been able to thwart all of them. Is there a connection between the intifadah and increased attempts to cross the border?

[Shomron] "There is undoubtedly a connection, at least partial. First of all, the people frequently involved in these incidents are Palestinians belonging to the 'Rejectionist Front' within the PLO. There is no doubt that increased attempts to cross into Israel are part and parcel of their efforts to put the intifadah back into the news. This is an additional means of activating the levers I mentioned before."

[BAMAHANE] Do you attribute the fact that we are successful and that those teams are apprehended to correct approach to defending our northern settlements?

[Shomron] "Our defense of the northern border often amounts to real war. It has produced many successes, but it is not easy. At the same time, our approach to defending the northern settlements has proven itself. The struggle against terrorist groups begins north of the security area. Hundreds of terrorists were killed in our operations north of the security area, while they were preparing to go into action. Fewer were eliminated while attempting to cross the security zone. A few reached the border fence and were eliminated on that line, which we view as the halting line."

[BAMAHANE] In this connection, what is the status of Shi'ites in South Lebanon?

[Shomron] "The entire area north of the security zone is populated mostly by Shi'ites belonging to Amal. That organization is interested in the same thing we are, namely in preserving peace and quiet."

[BAMAHANE] What is their motivation?

[Shomron] "They simply understand that if there is no peace on our side, there won't be peace on their side, either. Consequently, although we are enemies from many viewpoints, we do share one area of common interest."

[BAMAHANE] What was the effect of Shaykh 'Ubayd's kidnapping there, if any?

[Shomron] "The kidnapping particularly affected the willingness of Hizballah members to act against us. Their actions included Katyusha fire toward the Galilee headland, the blowing up of a booby-trapped car, and various other attempts against us. Our reactions were tough and

frustrated their objectives. Our air raids, which were only one element of our reaction, were very effective, but they were not the only ones. Generally speaking, all the elements of the security concept together, namely: joint interest with the Shi'ites, capability to operate north of the security area, excellent intelligence on what is being organized, where, and when, this entire system permits us to protect our northern settlements and to prevent border crossings and attacks."

[BAMAHANE] The past month was characterized by extensive Syrian activities in Lebanon. How do you view that?

[Shomron] "Most Syrian activities in Lebanon are not directed against us. They are directed against Christians and, because Damascus views Lebanon as part of Syria, the Christian enclave led by General Michel 'Awn constitutes a 'thorn' that doesn't allow it to take over the area."

[BAMAHANE] By the way, how do you explain the fact that they cannot seem to be able to eliminate it?

[Shomron] "The Syrians are not going at it full force. In my opinion, they don't mean to conquer the Christian enclave. They know that were they to try that, such resistance and international pressure would build up as to make it all not worth it. The Syrians would actually like to win the Christians to their side, too. The differences between the various Lebanese Christian factions are very deep. Their assumption is that were Gen Michel 'Awn to suffer a heavy blow, the already existing rifts among Christians would widen and break up the block, and then the Syrians would be invited to come in and rule by none other than Christians. That would give them the legitimacy to take over Lebanon and the Christian enclave without having to face international and Arab disapproval with everything that it entails."

"The Syrians indeed activated all sorts of organizations connected to them in Lebanon, such as Palestinians, Druze, and others, which were intended to act against 'Awn and to make gains against him. The unity around him will survive as long as he remains undefeated. Consequently, Syria's objective is to stage small-scale military operations designed to create a rift among the Christians."

[BAMAHANE] Is there any point or stage at which Israel may have to react to events?

[Shomron] "I'll put it this way: The only way out for the Christians is by sea. The Syrians have to activate naval forces to block it. The very fact that Syrian naval units move in such proximity to the Israeli Navy, which patrols against terrorists coming from the Lebanese coast, the very fact of this proximity poses a potential risk of clash between us and them."

[BAMAHANE] Let's turn to events along the Jordanian border. In recent months there have been several violent attempts to cross the border from that direction, which

claimed victims on our side, too. What is it that we actually expect from Jordan, and can it deliver?

[Shomron] "We expect countries who want to have good-neighbor relations with us to ensure that groups don't attempt to cross into our side and don't fire on civilians and troops at the border. At the Jordanian border there is de facto peace. I want to note that Jordan is making enormous efforts. They genuinely try and they do prevent some incidents. They do often catch men."

[BAMAHANE] The recent incidents—the soldier who crossed the border and took a hostage in the Arava, and the terrorist who fired and killed two soldiers near Kfar Rupin—will they compel us to amend our deployment or to change our approach to the Jordanian border?

[Shomron] "In my opinion, the Jordanian border is at this stage a safe border. Having said that, there are dangers there, just as there are dangers within the territories and even within the State of Israel. I would say that the border area is not more dangerous, perhaps even less dangerous than any other area in Israel."

"The IDF of course is ensuring that the border is not crossed. However, as far as we are concerned, the responsibility for that rests with Jordan. Jordan must ensure that there are no border violations and no firing at us from across the border. I know that Jordan indeed makes sincere efforts along this line. The same goes for Egypt, with whom we are at peace."

[BAMAHANE] The press recently published details about Iraqi flights over our border with Jordan. Do the Iraqis have renewed interest in this area?

[Shomron] "Generally speaking, I can state that Iraq is in the process of winding up the Gulf war. We, of course, follow—with concern—to see in what direction they will direct their energies. Those flights over Jordan, close to the border, definitely do not bode well. However, it is yet too early to judge where Iraq is going."

[BAMAHANE] With your permission, may we return to the topic of Shaykh 'Ubayd. His kidnapping was followed by a great hue and cry, which has by now died down. What is your assessment of the affair so far?

[Shomron] "To begin with, this shaykh is a sworn terrorist, and that must be kept in mind. As a leader and a commander he was involved in terrorism against us, as well as against other Western countries. Consequently, we first of all wanted to bring him here as a terrorist, whom we wanted to remove from his organization. An additional target was to change a situation that had become known and almost acceptable, in which Hizballah was freely staging actions against all the states of the Western world and against Israel. They kidnap people, kill them, and do whatever they please. Bringing 'Ubayd here, aside from the fact that it was a successful military operation, created a new situation, in my view."

[BAMAHANE] To what do you think this will lead?

[Shomron] "A new situation has the potential for new chances and opportunities. At the moment it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what will happen, but there are new chances. I hope that in the end it will bring about desirable results for us and for the entire Western world that is struggling against the same terrorism."

[BAMAHANE] This week you presented to the government a long-term program on the IDF's build-up. How will the IDF look in the 1990's?

[Shomron] "The IDF will not be a larger army in the 1990's and onward to the year 2000. It will even be somewhat smaller. At the same time, it will be modern and will have advanced and effective weapon systems. In our plan we put great emphasis on manpower quality. We are developing service tracks and intensifying the training of commanding officers, including academic education. The level of military courses and training will be higher, and they will permit encounters between good commanding officers with the newest weapons."

[BAMAHANE] If you had to point out two major improvements featured in the plan, what would you name?

[Shomron] "Human advantage and technological superiority. In the final analysis, those are the two relative advantages—the only ones—that we have. In all other areas, states that are still at war with us have the advantage. I am, of course, referring to the size of the area, the population, and resources, and even to sensitivity to human losses. Consequently, as I said, we will make efforts to completely capitalize on the two areas in which we have relative superiority."

"Generally, the plan is designed to ensure that in the next century, too, the IDF can win, should war be forced upon us. We cannot be satisfied with anything less than victory. I believe that with the help of this plan, which is based on situation estimates, that is what the IDF will be like in the 1990's."

[BAMAHANE] In the past, too, the army tried unsuccessfully to stress long-term plans. Why is this plan different from others?

[Shomron] "This plan is a closed plan in all its elements. In the past we were not able to go into a closed plan."

[BAMAHANE] Why, actually, and what has changed now?

[Shomron] "The army has always had plans. One must, however, remember that plans definitely depend on available resources. One long-term plan was thrown out of kilter when the Peace to Galilee campaign began. Then there was another one. The trouble was that we were short too much money to achieve a minimum and to ensure that the army can win in difficult situations. That is why the plan was not closed. The fact that the plan could not be closed in the end caused the cancellation of the Lavi project. In the wake of that cancellation

we were in a position to now enter a closed plan in all its stages, objectives, and means. That is the difference."

[BAMAHANE] As chief of staff, how positive are you that this plan, as it is, indeed will be followed, despite all the unexpected factors that may lie ahead? I am referring especially to resources.

[Shomron] "Long-term plans must not be closed like monthly or even yearly plans. One cannot secure every last corner. Long-term plans determine with what major projects the army will deal in the coming years and which projects must unfortunately be dropped. It determines the size of stockpiles, future weapon systems, etc. Such planning is necessary because each project takes years from inception to completion. That is the major significance of a long-term plan.

"Now, within the plan there is enough room for flexibility. We will have sufficient freedom to take advantage of technologies that may emerge in the meantime and that are not known today."

[BAMAHANE] To conclude this chapter, a more personal question. More than once in the past you expressed your view on what the IDF should look like in the 1990's. Are you satisfied with the plan in light of your views of what is needed?

[Shomron] "Look, I will never be entirely satisfied...."

[BAMAHANE] Nevertheless, does it come close to what you had in mind?

[Shomron] "The plan reflects the real capability of the State of Israel regarding what it can and is willing to allocate to defense within the framework of national requirements. Objectives are, in any event, preserved. The intention was not to achieve a balanced program. The intention was to come up with a plan emphasizing the major elements that can secure the necessary quality for the IDF while giving up others."

Patrol Activities Increased at Expense of Training

44230003C Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 4 Sep 89 p 6

[Article by Alex Fishman: "Increasing Regular Patrols on the Borders"]

[Text] The common denominator of the Katyushas fired from Lebanon, of the intifadah, and of the border penetrations from the Jordanian sector come down to one thing—regular patrols. Regular patrol activity. In other words, the daily war against the continuing security opposition. In each of the sectors there are particular reasons for the flare-ups of recent days. The Katyushas from Lebanon are the product of Air Force attacks on Hizballah strongholds. In the Jordanian sector, the Palestinian organizations are trying to open a new front in order to strengthen and encourage the intifadah, which has been stalled at the same pace for several long

months. On the southern border, too, there have been penetrations, but mainly against an economic backdrop.

The common denominator to all of them is the atmosphere in the area, the feeling that really nothing is moving, and, therefore, the next move is to pull the trigger. Expression to this feeling appeared in the decisions of the last Fatah convention in Tunis.

When things warm up on the borders, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has to increase its patrols, to stretch the short blanket to cover as much territory as possible. That short patrol blanket is first of all monetary. Increasing patrols means less training and more expenditure of funds. Already at this point, the IDF is spending close to 200 million NIS [new Israeli shekels] on regular patrols in all sectors. This represents financial hardship since that sum is taken from the small budget pot in local currency. This is direct expense only. The overall financial damage is much greater.

According to the multiyear work program submitted to the government by the IDF, it is unclear how it will contend with overhauling the infrastructure for regular patrols, which, for example, is obsolete for the central command sector. Security fences, illumination, highways, etc. must all be overhauled. One kilometer of regular patrol infrastructure costs \$150,000. Every year the army needs 15 million NIS to reinforce the existing infrastructure. Regular elite units are concentrated on patrols in problem areas in the intifadah and in the Lebanon sector. In the rest of the sectors, reservists fulfill a dual function—regular patrols and maintaining the army's system of readiness.

In the past, regular patrol activity on the part of reservists was exploited in part for training. In recent years the portion of regular patrols allotted to training has grown shorter and shorter.

The multiyear work program submitted to the government by the army yesterday establishes investments in the future battlefield at the expense of training. The regular-patrol paragraph in the program remains a paragraph that could change with circumstances and take a further bite out of the readiness budget.

West Bank Casualties Attributed to IDF Orders

44230020C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Sep 89 p 13

[Article by Danny Rubinstein: "Larger Portions"]

[Text] The steep increase in the number of injured in the territories—including many children—may be explained by intensified IDF [Israel Defense Forces] activity. An Arab journalist from East Jerusalem some time ago said that the Israeli administration can exist in the territories only in the footsteps of soldiers. That was meant literally, not as a metaphor. When soldiers leave one street in Nabulus or Gaza to go into the next, the Israeli administration and government move with them at the very same time.

The defense forces have decided that 700 men wanted for uprising activities must be caught as quickly as possible in the West Bank (the chief of staff talked about that some 3 weeks ago). Under the orchestration of the new commander, Yitzhaq Mordekhay, extensive operations are being carried out for that purpose. It is a bit difficult to believe that apprehending 700 young men will change anything in the picture. There are already 13,000, if not more, Arab prisoners and detainees from the territories in prisons and detention centers (including pre-intifadah prisoners). It's difficult to see what difference a few hundred, or even a few thousand more prisoners can make.

The attempt to seize the wanted men is accompanied by new instructions, which allow soldiers to open fire on masked men. While it is true that among the masked men are intifadah activists who murder people suspected of collaboration and who set up stone-throwing ambushes and roadblocks for army patrols, there are also among them young men who distribute leaflets and paint slogans. There are thousands of those. On a tour of Gaza hospitals I once saw a large group of youths, their faces covered with kufiyahs, distributing leaflets. There is not one wall in the territories that is not smeared with endless colorful slogans. The appearances of houses in the territories have changed beyond recognition (one 8 year-old-boy who came to a Tel Aviv clinic with his parents could not understand how you could have houses and fences not covered in huge technicolor writing).

The defense forces have tried almost everything possible to stop the intifadah: mass arrests and deportation, prolonged curfew, economic siege, gravel-spraying machines and clubs, cut telephone lines and gas supplies, tax burdens, and a massive military presence. And indeed, the intifadah changed character several times; one of its latest marks—and the ugliest of the lot—is the murder of people known in the territories as "collaborators." IDF activities also contribute to increasing the number of dead and injured Arabs. In a few cases—especially in the Jinin district—there are armed militias of collaborators, headquartered in the town Ya'abad, made up of 25 men from Silat al-Harithiyah, Jibah, 'Arabah, and Al-Yamun. Under IDF protection, they shoot and beat up people to both help the army arrest and suppress intifadah activists, and to defend themselves from the fury of residents.

By the way, the campaign against "collaborators"—some of whom, according to security sources, are not even known to the Israeli authorities—has created a situation that makes it very difficult to conduct journalistic surveys in the West Bank and Gaza. Inhabitants are afraid to meet and talk with strangers, including journalists. They fear that such meetings and talks may raise suspicion against them that they may be reporting or passing on information to Israeli security men, who use clever stratagems to collect data and trap intifadah activists.

In the Gaza Strip, violence has escalated particularly since the implementation of the ban on going to Israel

without magnetic cards. The popular committees, who declared war on the cards, confiscated them from residents. IDF sources said that there have been dozens of cases in which they beat up, injured, and even killed people that refused to relinquish their cards. Army units in Gaza are trying to apprehend committee members. There are more frequent clashes and hostilities, and more young men are killed, even children who help the youths in intifadah activities: stoning, setting up barricades, distributing leaflets, flying Palestinian flags, and so forth. After many hundreds of dead, the defense forces have become less sensitive to numbers of wounded.

The most disturbing fact is that there is no sign that the number of killed and injured by shooting may drop in the near future. The struggle around magnetic cards continues in Gaza. Israeli administration officers in Gaza say that the number of card holders who go to work in Israel is steadily growing. Gaza residents and foreign newsmen, who attempted to verify that, claim that most workers are still not going to work. The majority said that about one-half of Gaza workers have returned to work in Israel, while fewer estimated one-third or even less. Without work in Israel and with such an ongoing struggle, Gaza has become a chaotic place of mass unemployment, bitterness, and, if not outright hunger, humiliating poverty. It is fertile ground for worse violent outbursts than we have experienced so far.

The situation may further deteriorate in the West Bank, too. The administration there plans to issue new identity cards. As in Gaza, there, too, there will be special cards without which people will not be allowed to enter Israel. Such an operation will not pass in silence. Many (thousands?) West Bank youths will almost certainly hesitate to go to administration offices to pick up new cards for fear of being arrested. They will hide out—as many do today—in crowded villages and neighborhoods, which they flee as soon as soldiers appear, and where they devote most of their time to plotting stone-throwing ambushes and Molotov cocktails, attacks on collaborators, and other intifadah activities.

Shooting, large numbers of victims, and violence have become a routine to which many are already accustomed. Like anything bad that one becomes inured to, it can be endured in greater portions.

IDF Reportedly Firing on School Children

44230020B Tel Aviv DAVAR (Weekly Supplement)
in Hebrew 15 Sep 89 pp 12,13

[Article by Ya'el Fishbein: "The Illiteracy Punishment of Intifadah Children"]

[Text] In a village near Jinin, someone wrote the slogan: "The response to the illiteracy punishment is to turn each house into a school," thereby expressing the inhabitants' widespread fear that the Israeli Government means to deprive the intifadah generation of education. Being around schools during, before, or after school hours is viewed as provocation, as initiatives dictated

from "above," or as pretexts to once again close down the schools. Teachers, parents, students, and people in general will tell you that "Israel reopened the schools only because of international pressure," and that "Israel wants illiterate Palestinians." Clashes between students and IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers are examined under a magnifying glass and always given the same interpretation: "They are looking for a reason to shut us down."

A group of Israeli education officials who meet with their colleagues in the West Bank for professional and humanitarian reasons have become the recipients of complaints about army treatment of schools. Two weeks ago, at a meeting with Jinin educators, they were told that IDF soldiers fired plastic bullets into the yard of a boys' school in a refugee camp, wounding five children. I went to check on the educators' claims through the intermediary and with the translating services of Erna Mar, a retired special education teacher and a communist who has become an institution on everything to do with aid for Palestinian children hurt by the intifadah.

Erna Mar, former wife of politician Salif Khumays and mother of actor Giuliano Mar, is a familiar and respected figure among the residents. She seems to be lacking the enzyme that makes Jews fear and hate Arabs. She treats them as humans, speaks fluent Arabic, is familiar with their customs, and is wholly dedicated to the aim of "preventing and alleviating the suffering of children in the world." At her own initiative and expense, she distributes self-taught reading and math books that are enormously popular in the territories.

The safest means of transportation these days are the taxis that take workers to and from Jinin. In the taxi were workers from the village of Al-Yamun who knew Erna Mar by reputation. When they heard that we were going to meet with teachers and students, they begged us to come to their village. A 16-year-old boy had been killed there the previous day. The boy had been on his way home from school. His friends claimed that he was hit in the head by a gas bomb. The IDF spokesman reported that the boy died of heart failure while running away from soldiers.

Erna Mar tried to escape, but in vain. They offered to come pick us up; it was important to them that the Israeli public should know how its army treats students in the West Bank. They thought, that is to say, they were convinced that not everyone supports such actions. Erna Mar shrugged in agreement.

At the taxi stand in the center of Jinin we were awaited by a private car which took us to our meeting at the refugee camp on the outskirts.

The teachers who attended the meeting asked to have their names changed. Their freedom is very tenuous these days and, as we know, they can be given up to 1 year of administrative detention. A teacher from the UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] boys elementary school expressed their feelings most

aptly: "I have the impression that the IDF wants to once again close down the schools in the West Bank. Otherwise I cannot explain the provocations that soldiers offer our students during, before, and after school."

"Two days before schools were opened last month, Jinin teachers were invited to a talk with one of the Civil Administration officers and were asked to cooperate in preserving order. The teachers asked that soldiers not be posted near schools during hours, in order to avoid provocations. The officer's response was that the army will do all it can, but that's not what happened."

"Already on the first day of school, on 22 July, soldiers were present near the school during the 10 am break. Since then the army has been there every day, sometimes when children go in, sometimes when they come out, and sometimes during the school day."

"The very presence of soldiers near the school causes excitement and tension among students. We are talking about 6 to 12-year-olds whom the army scares and distracts from their lessons. During army patrols you can see children cowering in corners of classes or corridors, shouting, 'Teacher, soldiers!' We have complained about it to the base commander, but nothing has changed."

"On Tuesday August 8th at 10 am, while the children had recess, an IDF patrol went by our school; three soldiers climbed up on the school wall. The children began to shout and we hastened to ring the bell for them to come in. We have classes in shifts. Children on the second shift come in at 11; some arrive early. When we rang the bell, everyone went into class, and those of the second shift who were there early stayed outside. The principal opened the gate and one of the soldiers asked him why there were children outside after the bell rang. He explained that we teach in two shifts and those were second shift children who had come to school early. His answer was: 'If I once again find children outside I'll tear their up asses and screw them one by one.' He threatened to arrest all the teachers and take them to the administration. He was told that the problem was not the children's presence, but the army presence, and they left."

"On Wednesday there was no school because of a strike."

"On Thursday at exactly the same time, the same soldiers came again to the gate. Once again, second shift children were outside. On the western side of the school stood a military vehicle, from which rubber bullets began to be fired at the students. There was a great commotion. The children began to yell and run. We rang the bell and all the children came in. We put the second shift children on the second floor. One of the soldiers who was standing on the wall and looking into the class in which I was, aimed his gun at me and shouted: 'Teacher! Come out of the class!' I answered: 'I can't, I'm teaching.' He was probably getting ready to shoot at me, when something happened that stunned me: another Israeli soldier pushed aside the gun barrel and saved me from being injured."

"The soldiers kicked at the gate and the principal went out to them. Three of them came in and asked again why there were children outside. Once again they were told about the second shift. One soldier went into one of the classes and told the children what he had told me, the same vulgar threat that I don't want to repeat. Another soldier went into another class and kicked a desk over. Then they went down into the yard. The Red Cross showed up and they left. Five children were wounded by rubber bullets fired into the school yard and were treated at the camp infirmary. Everything was recorded.

"I don't believe that the Israeli authorities are really interested in keeping the schools open. Israel came under international pressure to open the schools; it gave in for the sake of appearances, but it means to close them down soon. There are intentional provocations designed to provide reasons to close the schools again. Otherwise, how can you explain the fact that soldiers run around schools. Don't they know it's a provocation? Don't they know what effect it has on the children?

"We are required to compress the material of an entire school year that was lost because of the intifadah into 4 months. Each day is important, and each wasted hour is a loss. Doesn't the army know that? Out of 26 weekly school hours, 6 hours which in the past were devoted to students' relaxation, music, art, and sports are now used to teach. The teachers are under enormous pressure to cover the material. We must teach first grade children how to read in 4 months, while every day the army distracts them. How can you explain that, unless your army wants us to be illiterate? If they really want the schools to stay open, there is no need for an army."

'Abd-al-Qarim, a third grade student at the boys school who was injured in his hand from rubber bullets fired by soldiers into the school yard, expressed the same thing as all the other children with whom we talked later: a fierce desire to study. "On Thursday there were soldiers on the school wall; they fired rubber bullets at us. I was standing near the first grade and was wounded in the hand. I didn't cry. It hurt, but not too badly. The little ones yelled and cried, but I didn't. I was afraid they were going to fire live bullets. I was afraid they would kill us. There are children at school who run home when soldiers come. I don't. When I grow up I want to be a teacher. Studying is the most important thing, and the best is to be a math teacher. It's worth learning how to solve problems. It's certain that there will be a Palestinian state. I will be a teacher in the Palestinian state and I will teach peace. I don't know how you teach peace. I think that not all the Jews are bad. There are Jews who feel sorry. I would tell Jewish children not to be like their parents who fire rubber bullets and gas bombs at us."

Firaz, 13, a sixth grade student, was also wounded by rubber bullets: "I don't want my picture in the paper. I'm already a grown-up. When they started firing rubber bullets at us, I wanted to throw stones at them to defend my school. But I didn't. I was wounded in the leg. We were told to disperse and not to throw stones so that they

wouldn't close down the school. I don't want our school closed. I don't want to be illiterate."

Samir, 13, was wounded in his leg 2 months ago by a live bullet fired by a soldier. He proudly showed us where the bullet had gone in. Among his friends he is viewed as a hero because he was injured by live fire. "It did hurt some. I didn't suffer too much, and I don't mind suffering. I don't want to be illiterate, either, and I don't want them to close down the school either."

The medical report handed by the village doctor to UNRWA provided details of five children wounded by rubber bullets on the day of the schoolyard incident. In addition to the description of the children's injuries, the report carries the doctor's description of his brutal treatment at the hands of IDF soldiers. According to him, the soldiers prevented him from treating a 17-year-old boy injured in a street incident, fired at him, came into his infirmary, and treated him in a humiliating manner: "The army had been in my infirmary before and, despite the presence of a UNRWA representative there, they cursed us in every possible way. They told us, 'You are all of you animals and dogs.' I told them they should be ashamed of themselves, there were foreign representatives present. His answer was: '[Expletive] in my ass, you and the United Nations together. This is the State of Israel, and I don't care.' The UNRWA representative had a walkie-talkie in her hand, and the soldier told her: 'It's all [expletive]. You can all kiss my ass. She can talk to that [expletive] United Nations as much as she wants.'"

When we took our leave from the Jinin refugee camp teachers they asked us to convey their appreciation to the teachers who come to educators' meetings. "It makes us feel that there is a chance that we will be able to live in peace together; it gives us a feeling of confidence facing the soldiers' insulting behavior," they said as they were escorting us to the taxi sent to take us to Al-Yamun and the family of 16-year-old Nasir Hasan Avhari.

The front of the house was decorated with flowers and Palestinian flags. Inside were seated the men of the family and visitors in mourning. No one was crying. We were told that the youth was thought of as a fighter who had fallen in battle, and according to Islam there should be no weeping over fallen fighters. A classmate of Nasir's told those present how the incident happened: "Every day, some 10 minutes before the end of the school day, soldiers come to the gate.

"Yesterday, when the soldiers came, everyone left by the side gate, and they fired gas bombs at us. We started running. One bomb hit the boy and he fell down. I was some 100 meters from him and I saw how soldiers went up to him and hit him with their gun butts. He was lying on the ground and they hit him in his head and body. When the soldiers left, we came back for him. He was not moving. We brought him to the infirmary and the doctor tried to revive him, but he was dead." The others said that the family took the body home from the hospital,

because when the army takes a body, they force the family to bury it like a donkey, without honor, at night, in the presence of family only.

Nur al-Din Hasan, brother of the deceased, showed us the plaster cast he had to have after escaping from soldiers outside the school, and said: "I will continue to go to school even though they killed my brother on the way from school."

Another eighth grade student, son of the dead boy's sister's, told us what happened to him coming out of school a week before: "I was escaping from soldiers, but I stumbled against some branches and they caught me. There were six of us, and they beat our legs with their gun butts. I was taken by car to Jinin where they questioned me and beat me. The investigator wanted to know who was throwing stones in the village. They beat me so much, I gave them all sorts of names of boys in my class, so they asked me to sign a paper that said: 'We don't want school, we want the schools to be closed, and that's why we throw stones at the army.' I wrote down what they told me and signed my name. But that's not true. I want schools to stay open. They want to close them down. I want to get an education and be like everyone in the world. I used to talk to Nasir, who was my friend, and we said we wouldn't throw stones because we wanted to go to school. Now that he's dead I will continue to go to school."

IDF Uses Helicopters To Apprehend Terrorism Suspects

44230008C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Magazine) in Hebrew 10 Sep 89 p 17

[Article by Dani Sadeh]

[Text] On Friday, in the first air-borne operation of its type, a NAHAL [Fighting Pioneer Youth] force raided a village next to Nabulus. Seventeen wanted persons were captured. Some of them are suspected of having carried out terrorist acts, and others are thought to be leaders of the uprising in the area. Our military correspondent participated in the raid.

The residents of Judaea and Samaria have recently begun to become accustomed to a new word frequently stated by IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers engaged in operations in their villages: "Bingo." When this note is harshly sounded, one sees immediately how a suspect being checked by the soldiers understands that he has been apprehended.

"Bingo" is a list containing the names of residents from the territories who are wanted by Shabak [General Security Service] and the IDF on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activity, or because they are known as leaders of the uprising in the territories. When a suspect is apprehended, his identification card is compared to the list. "Bingo" is shouted if a correspondence is found. Last Friday, "bingo" was shouted many times.

Seventeen wanted persons and uprising leaders in the village of Bayt Dajan near Nabulus were apprehended in the first air-borne raid carried out by the IDF in the territories since the intifadah began. Dozens of Palestinian flags, posters, slogans, and pictures of 'Arafat and Abu-Jihad were seized in this raid. However, above all, this was the first time satisfaction could be seen on the faces of participating NAHAL soldiers. "Finally, we are performing a military action as we learned to do during our entire service, and not a police action," they say.

The operation was preceded by extensive intelligence work. "This was a task combining observation posts, intelligence, field work, and searches," explains Lieutenant Colonel 'Amos, the commander in the sector. "This is not a minor task. It is a lot of work, in which you join together elements and information until a complete picture is formed."

A short time after midnight, the NAHAL soldiers are concentrated at the exit points. With the arrival of the helicopters, the entire force receives a final briefing. Lt Col 'Amos checks each detail. For him, it is important that each soldier know precisely what he must do at each stage.

One force moves toward the entrance of the village to prevent the exit of workers. This force is accompanied by Shabak personnel and is supported by Golani soldiers. The main force moves out in helicopters toward the hills, valleys, and caves surrounding the village. This is actually an operation based on a different system than that used previously. Here, mobile, highly flexible forces created with the aid of helicopters are used.

"This is actually pursuing and being on the tail of those who flee when we enter the villages. They operate in open areas, and areas which have until now been difficult to reach due to their character. They operate in wadis, caves, and ravines, which infantry forces previously had difficulty reaching," explains Lt Col 'Amos.

We enter the village. The surprise of the residents is complete. All of them are in their houses. A Palestinian flag flutters from every utility pole. Almost no house is without walls covered by slogans. Pictures of 'Arafat and Abu-Jihad are flaunted in every place.

Civil administration personnel use megaphones to inform all men of ages 16 to 45 to assemble at the local school. In several minutes, hundreds of men begin to leave their homes. No rocks are thrown, there are no curses, and no one is waving their hands in the "V" sign. Frequently, soldiers stop a resident and send him home to bring a ladder to take down flags and posters from the walls and the utility poles. The current has been shut off to prevent accidents. The young people of the village already know the rest. They emerge from their homes with buckets of paint and begin to paint over the posters on the walls. Meanwhile, the helicopter force begins its operation. NAHAL soldiers are put down on the hills. The helicopters and observation posts direct them to where several youths are seen fleeing from the village.

The soldiers pursue and successfully apprehend them. They then radio details pertaining to those apprehended. "Bingo," calls one of the soldiers, whenever an identification card number matches one on the list.

The soldiers walk carefully on the hills, entering every ravine and cave, searching behind every hiding place. Their skill in the field is testimony to appropriate preparation work having been undertaken before the operation. One says: "Now, I really feel like a soldier; this is like the pursuits carried out in Lebanon. Here, we are fully applying what we have learned."

Concurrently, the house-to-house search continues in the village. The soldiers are searching for flags and incitement material. A resident attempting to flee is pursued and apprehended by soldiers. It emerges that he is a big fish by local standards, suspected of carrying out many actions against the residents of the valley. In the school, all the men sit in the classrooms. One by one, they are called to be investigated by administration and Shabak personnel. At the end of the investigation, they release those who are not sought. The others find themselves in prison.

Lt Col 'Amos concludes: "The operation was successful. People who carried out attacks against the Israeli civilian population here in Samaria and the settlements of the valley were apprehended. Their actions included damaging the agricultural infrastructure, burning fields, and damaging pipes and water lines. From this standpoint, this is without doubt a success. These people have been wanted for a long time. Today, we managed to put our hands on them. A number of people thought to be uprising leaders in the village were also caught. It is they who actually have created fear in the local population and in the nearby environs."

'Amos explains that this will not be the only system used henceforth. "We need to constantly change, and not operate in a routine manner. We have many ways and possibilities to carry this out. The moment we possess the initiative, we will also apprehend them. This will turn into a situation in which they are defending themselves and hiding, and we are pursuing them. They will not be able to plan the next attack, the next throwing of a gasoline bomb. They will need to find a cave in which to hide, and there, too, we will find them."

Giv'ati Soldiers To Be Pardoned as Part of Deal

44230021D Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 19 Sep 89 p 7

[Article by Avi Binyahu: "Pardon as Investigation Relief Valve"]

[Text] Next week, on the eve of the New Year, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is expected to pardon the three Giv'ati Division soldiers accused of seriously mistreating Palestinian detainee Hani al-Shami who died at the Jabalyah military detention facility in January 1988. A decision has already been made along this line and

most reliable sources verified this item, which was carried in 'AL-HAMISHMAR yesterday.

The pardon (or amnesty, as it will probably be called), will be granted in the wake of a deal struck between the soldiers' attorney and the military authorities in exchange for not appealing the verdict and sentence handed down by Judge Colonel Imanu'el Gross, who gave them prison sentences.

It may be assumed that the hand of the pardoning general will tremble when he comes to sign the amnesty. That in view of the fact that the right to pardon, which is given to the chief of staff and to IDF generals, will this time be implemented not as a result of objective considerations, but within the framework of a deal designed to prevent the opening of a "Pandora's box" concerning the issue of clearly illegal orders to soldiers in the Gaza Strip in the first months of the uprising.

The Giv'ati soldiers began serving their sentences in military prison only last month, having been at home on leave since their indictment (another term of the "deal"). After deducting from their imprisonment the detention they served before being convicted, they have only a few weeks or months left to serve, and that is precisely what makes the implications of the pardon that the IDF is about to grant them so serious.

IDF officers and soldiers and local and foreign media followed with great interest the trial of the four Giv'ati soldiers, which became almost a symbol of the abuses revealed in the course of the uprising.

According to court testimony by the chief of staff and other senior officers, the IDF indeed supports its troops in the field, but will not do so in special cases in which illegal orders were carried out and in which soldiers were convicted in a court of law.

The "deal" under which the Giv'ati soldiers will be pardoned carries a dual message to IDF officers and troops in the territories at a difficult time when, on the one hand, they are instructed by the chief of staff to refrain from using force, while on the other hand they are ordered to open fire on masked men.

The four Giv'ati soldiers are likened to "masked men" on our side. They cruelly beat up the detainee and abused him in front of his children. We learned about the soldiers' behavior from an article published 1 month ago in HA'IR, which quoted one of the men convicted in the affair, Corporal Ron Ekhal. The convicted soldier, who at the time worked in a pub (during the leave granted as part of the "deal"), spoke of how local residents were beaten up and how they operated in the Gaza Strip at the time. He talked to the correspondent with the superiority and insolence accompanied by the self-confidence of one who already knows that he will be pardoned, and why.

The policy established by the defense minister in the territories in the first months of the uprising, which was called "club policy," is still to this day haunting IDF

commanding officers. The trial of the Giv'ati soldiers, as well as the case of Colonel Yehuda Me'ir, revealed some things and the IDF knows that sentence appeals by the Giv'ati soldiers or putting Col Yehuda Me'ir on trial will drag the defense minister, the chief of staff, and the top army leadership into the witness box, and that is what the IDF is trying to avoid. The question is whether such pardon of the Giv'ati soldiers, who were convicted in public trial, does not dash to the ground the efforts of the chief of staff and the chief education officer who urge observance of the law even in the difficult conditions prevailing in the territories.

About 1 month ago I argued with a senior IDF officer about the right to pardon invested in the chief of staff and IDF generals by military law. The senior officer defended the law and claimed that that right is absolutely necessary to a commanding officer in a body like the army. He explained that as a commanding officer he will give an officer or soldier the maximum punishment he deserves in a military court, especially where there are considerations of precedent-setting and deterrence, but at the same time he wants to preserve the prerogative to implement the right to pardon in certain cases in which there are clear extenuating circumstances that constitute grounds for pardon. On that occasion I became convinced that the discussion should not revolve around the prerogative of the chief of staff and generals, but around the cases that it involves.

The chief of staff, the commander of the Southern Command, and the chief judge advocate still have time to withdraw unilaterally from the deal whose implementation will make a mockery of the IDF and its judges in the eyes of the public, and primarily in the eyes of its commanding officers and troops.

The Giv'ati soldiers must serve out their entire sentence as pronounced by the military court, and the judge advocate must hasten to complete the investigation concerning commanders' responsibility for issuing illegal orders during that same period of time. Otherwise, all talk of "looking at oneself in the mirror with respect" will be perceived as hypocrisy and paying lip service to the media.

Effectiveness of IDF Image in Territories Examined

44230021A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 14 Sep 89 p 11

[Article by Uri Nir: "Tough Image, Restrained Policy"]

[Text] "Mordekhay, Mordekhay, 1 goes, 10 come in his place," was the slogan that the "guys" used to shout at demonstrations in the Gaza Strip until recently.

There was a good deal of inaccuracy, misunderstanding, and injustice in the article published this week in NEWSWEEK about the commander of the Central Command, Yitzhaq Mordekhay. But it also contained a grain of truth. The truth was that Mordekhay so far has failed to

achieve peace in the West Bank, just as his predecessor Amram Mitzna failed, and just as he failed in his previous job in Gaza. It is hard to assume that another Israeli officer, working under the same government instructions, would have done better.

However, NEWSWEEK's grain of truth was greater than that. The article was right in asserting that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]'s forcible actions in the West Bank, which are becoming increasingly more so under Mordekhay's command, go in tandem with Palestinian unrest and violence there.

NEWSWEEK's mistake stemmed precisely from General Mordekhay's only relative success in his present post, namely in creating images. "The new, tough Israeli general in the West Bank," as he was described in the NEWSWEEK title, has so far managed to create a "tough" image. Yitzhaq Mordekhay has in fact initiated few new tactics, in contrast to media headlines, and truth to tell, even those that he did do not carry much weight.

There is nothing new in the IDF's raids and ambushes designed to catch "wanted" individuals in Gaza, whereby the "wanted" are placed in the category of dangerous terrorists. There is nothing new in the use of helicopters to help chase after the "wanted" in Gaza. This method was used in the past, too. There is nothing new in the establishment of observation points along the Jerusalem-Hebron road. There is nothing new in closing down for long periods of time streets in which Israelis came under attack, or in closing down stores on such streets. There is nothing new in organizing extensive arrests or other actions designed to identify wanted activists. The only qualitative innovation that may be culled from the stream of reports on new steps in the West Bank is the positioning of military points on the troubled road crossing Samaria, designed to intensify military supervision and presence along the road. The contribution of this measure to military tactics is negligible. The observation range possible for the soldiers manning those positions is rather narrow because of topographic and terrain conditions. The real contribution is in fact the army presence at sensitive points along the road.

However, Yitzhaq Mordekhay was clever or perceptive enough to grasp the importance of a system of images in the territories, especially the importance of the media in this connection. In the past there were others, too, who understood that creating an image of power and deterrence can make a real contribution to efforts to subdue violence. Such an image can be created through increased military presence, by emanating an atmosphere of public law and discipline, through controlled use of military power, and to a lesser extent, by using the media and harnessing it to the task of creating images.

However, creating an image of power and deterrence does not necessarily entail translating power into forcible actions. Moreover, when forcible actions lead to losses

among Palestinians, that only contributes to exacerbating the violence. Feelings of protest and revenge lead to actual protest and revenge and engender violence. The threat of bloodshed may serve as a deterrent, but the spilled blood serves to increase unrest. It calls for violence and, in the last analysis, it achieves the opposite effect of what was intended. Consequently, a wise policy refrains from bloodshed, especially killing. This fact does not stem from moral considerations regarding lethal attacks on Palestinians in the territories. Shooting at civilians in situations that are neither real war nor guerrilla fighting is another matter.

What we are considering here is the effectiveness factor. If the purpose of the IDF's mission in the territories is to endeavor to achieve peace and quiet, then lethal shooting that claims lives is not an effective means. Senior officials in the IDF, the Defense Ministry, and the military administration have already made this point publicly in the past.

A tough image presents a dual risk: on the one hand, if it is not accompanied by tough actions, there is a danger that it will elicit scorn and will come to be disregarded by the population of the territories. On the other hand, if it is accompanied by actions that are too tough, it will elicit increasingly violent outbursts. Although the tough image is intended to have a deterrent effect on the people of the territories, it seems that what it is achieving is one of actual hardening of IDF forces in the field. This may be difficult to prove, but a feeling of the nature of events in the West Bank and of the army's treatment of those events give one the impression that officers and troops are not interpreting it correctly.

Here lies Gen Mordekhay's most vital role. He must act so as to demonstrate to the men under him that the tough image he has recently adopted will not open the door to loss of restraint, change in firing instructions, unchecked killing, or to worse treatment of the population in general.

The IDF can capitalize on the chaos and internal hostilities currently prevailing among the West Bank population. This atmosphere contains valuable elements for the Israeli government, such as disappointment with and anger at the "Uprising's United Command," fear of terrorism by bands of masked men, and frustration with the PLO's powerlessness to achieve political gains. To this reality the IDF can turn a moral, fair, and restrained face that does not detract from the image of power that it is trying to create for itself.

In this manner the IDF can signal that it is not being swept into the irresponsible dynamics of the street gangs that are now active in the West Bank and are hurting many people due to lack of self-control and discipline.

Precisely at this time of inwardly directed Palestinian violence in the West Bank, the IDF can harvest ripe fruit in the area of image-making.

However, if the population has to deal with an unrestrained IDF, too, whose actions against street gangs entail daily killing of children and wounding old women, babies, or innocent bystanders, the army commanders will achieve exactly the opposite effect: on the one hand, ferment and increased violence, and on the other hand, diminished faith in the authorities and less fear of them.

Professor Urges New Military Concept for IDF

44230003A Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 4 Sep 89 p 21

[Article by Efra'im Rayner: "Professor Amnon Yugav Forces the Establishment To Think"]

[Text] Professor Amnon Yugav, a professor of physical chemistry at the Weizmann Institute, a full colonel, for several years the head of the research and development unit for the defense system, is attempting the impossible—to force the establishment to think, to adopt for itself a new defense concept that musters for Israel the scientific potential to prevail in the next war.

Practical people tend to view academics with suspicion. No one doubts their loyalty, but the way it is applied in life is another story. Even if it is true that modern civilization is a result of scientific thought, applying it—putting together the material wealth and building it into military power for defense—depends not on scientists but on the talent for initiative and the fertility of the imagination of practical people. How far can you depend on a scientist, inventor, and developer to be responsible for the realization of his dreams?

When it is a matter of scientific development for civilian purposes, even if there is risk involved, it isn't existential risk. High-tech industries have made a lot of money (and also lost a not inconsiderable sum), when they put together groups of scientists and relied on their talents. Taxpayers have contributed their part to the press of "tax shelters" for investment in the commercialization of inventions, and the financial community has made a great deal of venture capital available to them. In order to emphasize the element of risk, the profit pages of the prospectus carried warnings such as: "Anyone who purchases the proffered securities puts his money at risk." The Americans have gone even further than that and obligated all issuers of private securities to make sure (and bear the responsibility for the accuracy of their checking) that the private buyer is strong enough to bear the damage of financial collapse.

Despite the risk, billions were found for the development of high-tech scientific development (a large concentration of gray matter cells in every unit that leaves the production line). A huge amount of cash has, indeed, been poured down the drain, but the modest percentage of success has been sufficient to enrich investors and to raise human society up the ladder of wealth and prosperity.

The market test, however, cannot establish the value of scientific thought when applied to matters of defense and war. In university history departments they teach the consequences of wars, and history is not a Wall Street that publishes the results of investment deals in research and development quarterly to enable investors to buy and sell.

Futile investments in national security cannot be bought and sold, so Prof Amnon Yugav is presenting the Israeli establishment with an unprecedented challenge: he claims ("Israeli Defense in the 90's," 'ALPA'IM, 'Am 'Oved publishers, 33 shekels—must reading for every literate person) that the existing defense concept is a prescription for the destruction of Israel. He calls for an end to the endless armor formations equipped with more and more tanks, more heavily defended that move ever faster; to put an end to the offensive concept of carrying the war to the enemy and destroying him there. What does he propose instead? A strategy of defense (which contains a political land mine—Israel can give up territory without losing its ability to defend itself) based on systems of precision-guided armament, armament systems that will surprise the enemy because they are of Israeli manufacture and there is nothing on the world market to match them; the destruction of the enemy, if and when he tries to come here, as a substitute for a breakthrough in which we present ourselves for negotiation at the gates of Damascus or Bagdad. This is what Professor Yugav wants the bureaucracy to consider and authorize—no more and no less.

Yesterday the government already began its discussion of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] multiyear program for the years 1989-1997. It would be interesting to know what and how much of what Professor Yugav claims was to be found in the program presented to the government—his claim could be rejected, or it could be accepted, or there could be some sort of compromise, but it cannot be ignored. This is the big battle over the "concept," but this time it is a scientific and philosophical battle before the event rather than after it; compare the meaning of the term "concept" in the Agranat Commission's investigation of the Yom Kippur War.

In his civilian life, Prof Amnon Yugav is now engaged in the construction and operation of a "sun tower," a device embodying future industrial technology—the direct exploitation of solar energy without the polluting side effects that characterize modern civilization since the industrial revolution.

As we said, it is not at all clear to what extent scientists can be relied on to be not just brilliant, but practical. However, if the investors who support Yugav, enabling him and his colleagues at the Weizmann Institute to set up and operate the industrial scientific solar tower, are wrong—well, it is just a matter of money. God forbid that the leaders of the defense establishment ignore him just because he seems to them more of a brilliant scientist than a practical man.

Residents in Territories Equipped With Weapons for Self-Defense

44000048 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 6 Nov 89 p 2

[Text] The Civil Administration has recently been making efforts to encourage residents of the territories who have cooperated with Israel, by equipping them with weapons for self-defense and their cars with protective material. The Civil Administration has also been helping those who have sustained damages, primarily through financial remuneration. According to defense sources, those who cooperate with Israel have of late been feeling more secure, partly because of ongoing IDF [Israel Defense Force] activity and the severe punishment of those who attack people who cooperate. A decision has been made to open 10 new Civil Administration offices in the territories in order to strengthen the presence of the Civil Administration and the IDF in the area.

Settler Units To Be Mobilized in Territories

44000049 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] Central Commander Yitzhaq Mordekhay confirmed yesterday that a regional defense company from the Binyamin region will be mobilized for service in the territories. Speaking on Israel television's Arabic-language program "Encounters," Mordekhay refused to say where the company would serve. A senior military source, who also confirmed the report, stated that "it was agreed that the company would serve in Hebron, but after the furor in response to the publication of the information, it was decided to speak in vague terms, and to disseminate reports that it would serve in Jericho. There were those who tried to claim that the agreement on activating the company had not been brought to their attention, but they have already retracted their statements, and the company will serve as planned, and will be mobilized on 8 November 1989." Military sources have stated that Chief-of-Staff Dan Shomron "is not happy" with the decision to mobilize the company, and that Mordekhay and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin are the backers of the plan. Mordekhay stated yesterday on "Encounters" that "the entire unit being activated, since it is a military unit, will work within the framework of the army, and will be subordinate to the system of commands and laws of the military."

Reservists Describe Arab Detention Facility

44230020A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Sep 89 p 3B

[Article by Uzi Benziman]

[Text] Reservist M., who has just finished a tour of active duty at the Military Administration base in Hebron, is very concerned about the hatred evinced by rank and file soldiers toward Arab detainees held at the detention facility in the base yard. They did not maltreat the detainees, did not hit them, and did not break their

bones, but they hated them with a passion. In point of fact, the soldiers are utterly indifferent to the fate of the imprisoned Palestinians, to the point of not caring whether they're alive or dead. M. said that the enlisted men's resentment of Palestinians is greater and more concentrated than is the case among civilians.

He told us about kitchen workers on base who refused to give the prisoners a big pile of omelets left over from the troops' breakfast. The cook and his helpers chose to throw the food into the garbage. He also remembered a medic who was summoned to tend to a man with diabetes who needed medication, and who replied: As far as I'm concerned, he can die.

Palestinian detainees are held at the Military Administration base in Hebron in a building that not many are aware of. It is a concrete 7 by 4 meter cube covered with an undulating tin roof. In the Hebron area the building is known as "hashbayya," the hut, or, in the local lingo, the chicken coop. The Military Administration gave it an official name: "Holding facility." In the past, the Central Command publicly reported that invention and explained its purpose: to serve as an interim stop for a few hours for Palestinian detainees before they are brought to the official prison in Al-Zahiriyyah. In the West Bank and Gaza there are at least 13 such facilities. The present article deals with the actual use to which the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] puts the cube, as opposed to its declared purpose.

Various types of prisoners are brought to the holding facility: young men caught in hostile actions (stoning and throwing Molotov cocktails, or suspected of belonging to underground organizations), people arrested at the request of internal revenue and other tax bodies for tax violations, and bingo prisoners.

"Bingo" is an expression that was apparently coined by the security forces. In any event, it is used by Palestinians to designate a person whose name is on a list of suspects. It seems that the expression came into being because of the random nature of this arrest method: soldiers, policemen, border police, and general security circulate through the territories with lists of suspects. On the lists are people suspected of serious crimes, as well as relatives of suspects and people wanted by the internal revenue service. During routine searches and identification of cars and passengers, policemen and soldiers check identity papers against their lists. Stumbling upon a suspect is like winning at bingo, hence the name.

The macabre experience that gave rise to "bingo" also created the term "hashbayyah," the concrete cube that reminds inmates of a chicken coop. The building was not meant to hold people for long periods of time. After all, it was devised to meet an urgent problem, namely to allow the security forces to guard prisoners for a few hours until they are transferred to a proper detention facility. In practice, however, because of time pressure

and the nature of events, the chicken coops have become unofficial detention facilities in which prisoners spend days and even weeks.

Ahmad Bahis, 38, a building contractor from Yata, a village near Hebron, spent 13 days in the chicken coop. He was sent there by the Hebron military court in response to a request by tax authorities to arrest him on suspicion of income tax evasion and other irregularities concerning his bookkeeping. Together with him were his two friends, Samir Samirat and Jibril Barkat Mor, also contractors, also suspected of income tax violations. Bahis, the father of eight, spoke fluent Hebrew. With professional pride he stated that he had measured the cube: 28 square meters.

Reservist M. came up with approximately the same figure. On some nights, Bahis said, up to 72 people were crowded into that square. He had counted; 40 square cm to a man. They slept on their side, one man's feet pushed into another's face. They had no shower, only a tiny toilet with a cold water tap in it. They had no change of clothes, only underwear. According to him, the daily menu featured three meals made up of too little bread, eggs, margarine, and jelly. Only when they complained to "Abu-Nur," the General Security man, did the food improve for 2 to 3 days.

M.'s description differed somewhat. He confirmed Bahis' details concerning housing and hygiene, but disagreed about the food. M. said that the detainees received the same food as the soldiers on base, or, to be more precise, leftovers of the same food. While Bahis told how a kitchen worker refused to increase the number of bread loaves allotted to the detainees ("You can all die, for all I care"), M. recalled his refusal to give them fried eggs that the staff had left on the table. Both agreed that the medics were indifferent to the health of detainees who had problems, and only when warned that they may be held personally responsible if the condition of sick detainees deteriorated, did they do anything. Both confirmed that detainees' families were allowed to send them cigarettes without limitation, that they were not subjected to any physical maltreatment, and that the officers directly in charge of the facility treated them fairly.

M. said that the Central Command is aware of one aspect of the problem, while ignoring the other. The command knows that the facility was not intended for the purpose for which it is used. The command housing officer, who visited the base and was asked to comment on the conditions in which the prisoners were held, said that the entire facility was illegal. The command is aware that the Red Cross has asked questions about holding facilities in the territories, and that there are serious disputes between it, the IDF, and the Defense Ministry about it. The command knows that the chicken coops are not suited for long-term imprisonment and that the crowding there is unbearable. What the command does not know is that despite all the regulations and the good

will that it emits to the field, rank and file soldiers ignore its instructions and the spirit in which they were issued.

The good will of the rank and file soldiers is to a great extent decisive for the treatment of the detainees; whether they receive more food and blankets, whether a medic will listen to their problems, and whether they will be treated in a neutral or hostile manner. We must recall that not all chicken coop detainees are intifadah suspects. More than a few, like Bahis and his two friends, were suspected only of income tax violations (others were arrested on "bingo," and not every "bingo" is a terrorist).

Attorney Ya'akov Qastel, who specializes in income tax issues of residents of the territories, said that military courts must use better judgment when responding to authorities' requests to send suspects from the territories up for detention. He also complained that detention decisions may not be appealed in the territories. The attorney's claims were reinforced by the discovery that the detention facilities to which some suspects are sent are security chicken coops, so that in fact, detention in them becomes a punishment or a means of pressure, rather than what it was originally intended: short-term detention to permit preliminary investigation.

Knesset Member Dadi Tzucker, who about 1 month ago appealed to the defense and justice ministers and to the attorney general about the holding facilities, has yet to receive a response to his appeal. Tzucker clarified several elements of the issue: military police bear no responsibility for those facilities, they are not subject to any compulsory court regulations, and they are not under supervision by the prosecutor's office. In point of fact, detainees in holding facilities find themselves in a sort of no-man's land which, contrary to the law, is not under Red Cross supervision either. This week Tzucker stressed that prisoners sent to holding facilities are left to the arbitrary treatment of the base soldiers in which the facility is located. As a rule, those soldiers are in services that are not among the IDF's elite. In any event, there is no doubt that they were not trained to take care of Palestinian prisoners. Were the facilities used for their original purpose, i.e., as a transition stage not longer than a few hours, there would be no need to dwell on the conditions prevailing there, but since they have become prison cells for lengthier periods, the required and normal laws and regulations must be applied.

Just how bad the situation is is testified by the case of two minors, 14 years of age, Yasir Yusuf Na'man Sharbat and Pars Jamil Hamid al-Amar, who spent 2 whole months at the Hebron holding facility. The two were suspected of serious crimes (tossing Molotov cocktails and terrorist organization), but because of red tape (missing forms), the official Al-Zahiriya prison did not take them in and they were put in the hashbayyah.

Life in the chicken coop is like life in official prisons: all the detainees pray five times a day, they have internal leadership that decides on daily life, and when educated

prisoners happen to be detained they conduct national and religious courses and lessons. The authorities appoint a "shawish," who is responsible to them for the prisoners' good behavior. The building is particularly crowded on weekends, when most investigators in charge of sorting out and allocating prisoners are on leave.

The IDF spokesman issued the following explanation: holding facilities are designed to serve for preliminary detention, especially for field detainees, before they are transferred to prison facilities. According to regulations, prisoners are not to be held more than 96 hours in a holding facility, but once in a while there are exceptions to this rule because of circumstances and because of crowding at other facilities. As a rule, however, the time limit is observed. In cases of extensive disruptions of the peace and numerous arrests, temporary crowding may occur at those facilities. Holding facilities are under the direct supervision of the base commanders in which they are located, and are subject to visits by court officials. The Red Cross has visited the holding facility at Ramallah and is expected to visit others.

The IDF spokesman added: The food at holding facilities is regulation IDF food, prepared in the same kitchen as soldiers' meals. The IDF does not provide clothes for detainees because they are at the facility on a strictly temporary basis. As for the two above-mentioned minors, that was an exception to the rule, in the wake of which one officer was put on trial and removed from his post at the facility. The IDF spokesman is not aware of the Central Command housing officer's statement concerning the legality of the Hebron holding facility. IDF sources said in this connection that had there been anything illegal in those detention proceedings, the High Court of Justice would long since have been requested to look into it.

It is not difficult to perceive that the IDF spokesman's report contains something of an admission. From the experience of reservist M. we know that for 30 days the hashbayyah was crowded beyond endurance. That cannot be described as "temporary crowding." More than a few detainees were not "field detainees" but income tax suspects. According to the testimony of M. and of Palestinian detainees, there is a gap between the command's official supervision of the facility and the de facto situation created by the soldiers' behavior. It is also odd to hear that the IDF does not provide clothing to detainees because they are there "on a temporary basis," when the IDF spokesman himself verified that there are exceptions to that rule.

Worth noting is the spokesman's remark concerning the Red Cross visit to the Ramallah holding facility and the intention to permit it to visit others in the future. The unspoken message is, "Everything is in order, we have nothing to hide." In point of fact, the IDF for a long time evaded allowing Red Cross representatives a peek into holding facilities. Only after a protracted struggle that reached the highest levels of the international organization and the Israeli Government, did the facility gates

open last month to the Red Cross. Red Cross officials in Israel do not share the serenity with which the IDF spokesman described conditions in holding facilities, nor the use he made of the one and only visit allowed them. Proof of that was the willingness displayed by Frederick Morris, head of the Red Cross delegation to Israel, to be interviewed on this issue.

As a rule and in keeping with the traditions of his organization, Morris avoids speaking publicly about topics being handled between himself and the government. But he was so concerned about the situation at holding facilities that he deviated from his custom. His information came from a public announcement issued by the Red Cross last June during a visit by the president of the organization, Mr Sommaroga. After his meeting with Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin it was reported that one of the issues discussed was the situation at holding facilities and the Red Cross' request to visit them.

Morris recalls that holding facilities were opened immediately after the outbreak of the intifadah. Since April 1988 the organization has been trying to gain access to them, and it has even appealed to the chief of staff and the defense minister in this connection. The organization was prompted to do so in the wake of complaints by residents of the territories about detention conditions at those facilities and the treatment received there by their relatives held there. "The official response we received was that the facilities are temporary," Frederick Morris said this week. "We repeated our request several times. We prepared a whole file on the subject and sent it to the chief of staff. Last June the defense minister informed us that we will be permitted to visit the facilities. Since then we have met with difficulties trying to do so, and so far only one visit was allowed, at Ramallah, last month. We believe that the defense minister's promise in this respect will be kept. We expect clear regulations to be established to allow us to immediately make regular visits and to talk freely with the detainees, in accordance with the Geneva Convention that governs our activities. This is in keeping not only with the interests of the detainees and their families, but also of the Israeli Government, along the line of proving that detention conditions at such places are satisfactory. We hope that a procedure will be established whereby we will be permitted to carry out serious work in this important area concerning Arab detention."

When Morris talks about the importance that his organization attaches to regular visits to holding facilities, he touches the IDF's soft spot as it appears from the testimonies of M. and of Ahmad Bahis and his friends: "Because the facilities were meant to be temporary, they are not run by professionals. There are facilities where detainees arrive immediately after being arrested. Some of them may be wounded. We are flooded by appeals from families from the territories to provide information about their arrested relatives. We want to help them. If we had access to those facilities we could improve the atmosphere. Rightly or wrongly, those places have acquired a bad name. People are afraid that detainees are beaten and injured there. We want to verify that each detainee has a blanket and that

people are not kept there too long. International experience shows that the first hours of detention are fateful for a person under arrest. Consequently, we are trying to gain access to those places at critical times."

A much needed note: Hani al-Shami, the victim of maltreatment for which four Giv'ati soldiers were brought to trial, met his death in one of those facilities, not exactly an official holding facility, but something of the sort. In their verdict, which was also meant to sound the alarm, the military court judges expressed their horror and apprehension about the phenomenon revealed to them and about the fact that the behavior of the accused was not an exception. The conditions and the atmosphere in which they acted in those fateful moments seemed destined to lead to that dreadful end.

Statistics Given on Uprising's Effect on GNP Growth

44000050 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] Deputy Finance Minister Yosi Beilin has told the Knesset that in 1988, the intifadah prevented growth in the GNP [gross national product] of 1-1.5 percent new Israeli shekels equalling 0.8 billion dollars. He added that this is not the entire cost of the intifadah. Beilin was responding to a parliamentary question by MK Rafa'el Pinhasi (SHAS).

Study Forecasts Inflation Rate Under 10 Percent

44230003E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Magazine) in Hebrew 5 Sep 89 p 5

[Article by Gad Li'or: "How To Stop Inflation With the Aid of a Document"]

[Text] New research conducted by the budget branch at Treasury shows that "inflation is in a process of clear decline since the end of 1985." The research completely negates the notion popular among economists that "Israel is locked into a rate of inflation of 15 to 20 percent a year, has not succeeded, and apparently will not succeed in the coming years to drop to a lower rate."

There were three conclusions to the research:

- The rate of price hikes in Israel (apart from housing prices), has been steadily declining since the implementation of the stabilization program of July 1985, except for two short periods of time: the beginning of 1987 and the beginning of 1989, and even that was only due to a correction in the exchange rate.
- In the second half of 1988 as well as in the last few months, February to June 1989, the rate of price increase in commercial products (industrial products that can be imported and exported) and noncommercial products of the business sector reached about only 10 percent in annual terms.
- At the same time there was a steep increase in housing and in controlled goods that, apparently, will continue throughout 1989 and will reduce the effects of the falling rate of other prices.

This opinion is based on the behavior of the change of the consumer price index over the last 3 and ½ years: 1986, 19.7 percent; 1987, 16.1 percent; 1988, 16.4 percent; the first half of 1989, 12.0 percent.

Economists have also expressed amazement at the rate of inflation in 1988, which slightly exceeded the inflation of 1987, even though there was no devaluation at all in 1988, and which was even moderate from the point of view of demand in the economy.

On what are the branches relying? A check of the various components of the index show the following data: prices for fruits and vegetables are subject to strong oscillation: in 1986 they increased by 65 percent and in 1987 dropped by 7 percent. In the first half of 1989 prices of controlled products rose by 21 percent, especially because of the world increase in fuel prices. In the years 1986 to 1988 prices only rose by 15 to 17 percent each year. Housing prices have gone up continuously since 1986. Especially since the sharpening of the slowdown in 1988-89, housing prices have gone up in real terms: there has been a drastic reduction in construction starts in 1989; there were expectations of a devaluation and after it occurred, there was no dollar drop in housing prices. There has been a considerable drop in the rate of increase of service prices since 1986. The rate of increase of prices of all commercial products and all local and imported industrial products, which make up 44.1 percent of the index, has also been in decline.

In 1988 this sector rose by only 13 percent. Despite the devaluation, it rose in the first half of 1989 by only 9 percent as compared to 10 percent in the first half of 1987, in which a similar devaluation was instituted. In the last 4 months, commercial products went up at a more moderate rate—only at about a 10 percent annual rate.

Why does the index go down and not up according to the budget people?

While the consumer price index, without vegetables and fruits, rose in 1987 by 18 percent, and by only 16 percent in 1988, the rate of housing price increases went up by 50 percent in 1988 as compared to 1987, an added contribution of 1 percent in the index. The rate of price increases for consumer and nonconsumer goods dropped most significantly; the cost of industrial labor, with reduced productivity, went up by 15 percent in 1988. This cost followed from the sharp updating in the level of the minimum wage, a cost of 70 percent indexing and salary bonuses in the public sector.

All these things lead those who conduct research in the budget branch to the conclusion that the economy is constantly lowering the inflation rate, which strengthens the forecast of the Treasury Minister that in a few more months we will be at a single-digit inflation rate, i.e., less than 10 percent.

University Study Predicts 18 Percent Inflation

44230008B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Magazine) in Hebrew 10 Sep 89 p 22

[Article by Gad Le'or]

[Text] The predictions of senior treasury officials that inflation will decline in coming months to an annual level of less than 10 percent will not be realized. Furthermore, we are expected to have an inflation rate of at least 18 percent in the coming year.

This emerges from a survey of expectations conducted at Bar-Ilan University. The survey is based on the predictions of 120 senior economists from all branches of the economy, including industry, commerce, and banking.

The survey, which is intended to predict the dimensions of inflation and devaluations in the economy, is conducted once every 3 months at Bar-Ilan University by Dr Me'ir Unger and Dr Ben-Tziyon Silverfarb from the department of economics and business administration. Silverfarb is also a former director of the economic planning authority in the Economy Ministry.

According to the expectations of participants in the latest survey, which was conducted in July, inflation in 1989 will total 21.4 percent, mainly because of the abnormal price increases which occurred in the first half of the year. The inflation rate in the second half of 1989 and in the first half of 1990 (a total of 12 months) will be lower, totalling 18 percent, but still higher than 1988's 16.4-percent inflation rate, and 1987's 16.1-percent rate.

Survey participants do not expect a decline in the inflation rate in the last quarter of the year, again, contrary to the treasury's predictions.

Regarding devaluations, survey participants believe that devaluations will lag by at least 4 percent behind the inflation rate. The dollar exchange rate at the end of December 1989 will reach 2.11 shekels, and at the end of June 1990, it will reach 2.27 shekels. Only 8 percent of the participants see a devaluation of 10 percent and more in the first half of 1989. Only 20 percent predict that the rate of devaluation will not reach 10 percent in the course of the coming year, i.e., through to the end of June 1990.

Monopolies, Cartels Blamed for Rising Inflation

44230020D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 17 Sep 89 p 1

[Article by Nehemya Strassler: "The Index Begins With Coffee and Pencils"]

[Text] According to Shim'on Peres' original promise, we should already today have been enjoying an inflation rate of 10 percent, but the August index made it clear that that objective is still far off. It is also clear that the rate will not drop in the coming months, but that it will stay at a 1.5 percent monthly average, which is very similar to the inflation rate that has been with us since the July 1985 economic program.

The great mystery is why, when demand is so low, the economy is in recession, and unemployment is rising, there are those who still dare to raise prices. We were entitled to expect that in conditions of such deep recession, prices will remain frozen or would even drop. Even salaries cannot be blamed for inflation, because they have been eroding since the beginning of the year. Consequently, the explanation is not to be found in macroeconomic, but microeconomic variables.

The Israeli economy is suffering from an excess of monopolies and cartels. Some 35 percent of market products and services are supplied by monopolies, cartels, and restricting arrangements. Those large bodies take advantage of their power and raise prices above and beyond the average. Examination of the price index will verify that. The same monopolies also fail to lower prices in justified cases. For example, the Elite Company has not yet lowered coffee prices although prices fell in past months throughout the world. Had there been, for example, five instant-coffee producers, the price would have already dropped, as recently happened in Europe.

Israeli producers also enjoy excessive protection that allows them to raise prices. This protection is provided by the Industry Ministry, and examples of it are numerous. Not long ago Ari'el Sharon issued a new order instructing importers to stamp on each and every pencil, in Hebrew, the name of the manufacturer, country of origin, name of distributor, and destination. So if that's how we help avert competition from imports, why should the local monopoly, Jerusalem Pencils, not raise its prices?

Another domestic problem is that prices are not marked on supermarket items. This is a bad habit that has stayed with us from periods of hyperinflation. Since prices are not marked and there are only codes, consumers, although they may have been buying the same product for years, don't know its price. That allows producers and marketers to raise prices without having consumers up in arms.

True, this year the treasury has carried out devaluations and has even raised the price of subsidized items at its own initiative. Those were inflationary moves, but they were also inescapable and timely. Nevertheless, the explanation lies not with macro-measures, but with micro-problems. In order to solve those problems we must change all the rules of the Israeli economy. Until then we will continue to be plagued by inflation.

Rising Unemployment Said To Indicate Serious Recession

44230002B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 1 Sep 89 p 7B

[Article by Uri'el Ben-Hanan]

[Text] A phenomenon characterizing developed economies in the West in the past 2 decades is an increase in the rate of unemployment in relation to total manpower in an economy. So far, there has been little success in curtailing inflation while maintaining development

momentum. For more than a decade, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium have experienced inflation rates between 5 percent and 10 percent, which are considered high by the standards of the 1950s and 1960s.

Last week, the deputy finance minister was strongly criticized for stating that "Israel must become accustomed to an unemployment rate of 6 to 7 percent." Actually, the deputy minister was indicating matters already known to those who monitor the publications of the Central Bureau of Statistics, and to economists who analyze the Israeli labor market. In the past 4 years, the economy has experienced an average unemployment rate of 6.5 percent, distributed as follows: 6.7 percent in 1985, 7.1 percent in 1986, 6.1 percent in 1987, and 6.4 percent in 1988.

The unemployment rate relative to the total civilian labor force in Israel during 1980-84 was 5.1 percent. The data cited above require us to conclude that the rate of hard-core unemployment in the economy in the second half of the 1980s increased by about 25 percent from about 5 percent to 6.5 percent. It thus seems that the Israeli economy has already become accustomed to a hard-core unemployment rate of 6.5 percent.

What caused the increase in the unemployment rate in Western, developed economies? There is no theoretical, unequivocal answer to this question. It is known that the rate of natural increase in developed countries is constantly declining. In some of them, it has even reached a negative rate during certain years. Therefore, the increase in unemployment rates does not stem primarily from the influence of natural increase on the employment-seekers market. Some of the increase in the number of unemployed can be explained by the growing number of women entering the work force outside the home. In Israel for example, the rate of female participation in the job market grew from an average 30 percent during 1965-70 to 41.5 percent in the first quarter of 1989.

Another reason for the increase in hard-core unemployment in developed economies lies in the technological changes in them. Technologically developed economies require less manpower; unskilled laborers are ejected from the labor market and replaced by robots.

Another reason which economists customarily enumerate lies in social and structural changes in the developed economies after World War II. The ascent of the welfare policy with its socioeconomic underpinnings ensures relatively high income for the unemployed and paves the way for an entire class of unemployed to continue to be dependent on the state. Some claim that real unemployment rates in developed economies are lower than officially-stated rates due to the development of "a black economy." In addition, the easy movement of workers from developing countries to developed countries creates a market of unskilled laborers willing to

work for wages which are much lower than the minimum wage in the developed countries.

These Western phenomena can explain the increase in the rate of hard-core unemployment to 6.5 percent in Israel, but they cannot explain how unemployment reached 9.6 percent in the second quarter of 1989.

In several respects, the 1989 recession is more severe than the 1966-67 recession. First, it is almost certain that if we also emerge from the current recession, the employment rates which we knew in the distant past will not return because of the increase in the hard core. Secondly, one of the prominent characteristics of the current recession is its massive damaging effect on principle wage-earners. Dan Zakay of the research department of Bank Le'umi compared the two recessions and found that in the earlier recession the percentage of youthful workers between 14 and 17 was high among the unemployed. The peak rate of unemployment in the earlier recession occurred in 1967, when the annual average was 10.4 percent. Subtracting unemployment among youthful workers between 14 and 17 indicates that the unemployment rate among principle wage earners was only 8.9 percent. In other words, about 1.5 percent of the unemployment rate in 1967 is attributable to youthful workers.

By comparison, in the first quarter of 1989, the general unemployment rate was 8.3 percent, while the unemployment rate without the 14-17 age group stood at 8 percent. Working youth thus contributed only 0.3 percent to unemployment. It is clear that the increase in the general unemployment rate in the second quarter to 9.6 percent comprises mainly principle wage earners. Thus, the current unemployment rate and the peak unemployment rate during the 1967 recession are more or less similar. Moreover, if we compare the first quarter of 1989 to the beginning of the recession in 1966, we find that 8 percent of principle wage-earners were affected by unemployment in the first quarter of 1989 compared to 6.1 percent in 1966, a much higher rate.

In addition, a comparison of the number of days of unemployment per month of an unemployed person in 1966-67 and in the first quarter of 1989 shows that current unemployment is much more serious than in 1966-67. In 1966 and 1967, the number of unemployed days per month per unemployed person stood at 7 days compared to 14 days in 1989.

Another characteristic indicative of the depth of the current recession is the process of its spread. A comparison between development towns and large cities shows that the rate of increase among employment seekers and those unemployed for 6 or more days is currently higher in the large cities than in the development towns. In other words, unemployment, which began in development towns and on the periphery, is creeping to the center, indicating that we are at the beginning of a recession process which we are doomed to be with for a prolonged period.

Unemployment 'Responsible' for Israeli Mercenaries

44230002D Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 4 Sep 89 p 7

[Article by Yo'el Ben-Porat]

[Text] Whoever labels the boys involved in the Colombia affair mercenaries is mistaken and unjust toward them and to himself. A mercenary sells his body and combat ability to fight for foreigners and foreign objectives. In our case, it is a matter of selling knowledge and experience pertaining to the organization and training of people.

As is known, the state of Israel has done similar work for 30 years through its official mechanisms in many locations, especially in Africa and Asia, beginning with the NAHAL [Fighting Pioneer Youth] experience in Uganda and ending with the training of Mobutu's personal guard. However, such work was performed openly through government contacts, whereas it is being done in Colombia with the underworld and cells whose nature is unknown to anyone. While the first type of activity is justified, and sometimes vital to maintain relations with friendly nations, training ranchers in Colombia is unjustified in most cases. It is at the margin of the law and is liable to degrade those who engage in it and Israel.

I do not know what motivated these fine boys to become involved in the Colombia affair. Klein's televised claim that he was doing only what he knows how to do, i.e. teaching foreigners how to shoot a rifle, is childish and vacuous, and it puts his rank to shame. A regimental commander or paratrooper can also work in construction or be a truck driver. His statements, if they are honest, testify perhaps to the quality of this officer's judgement.

Accordingly, it is permitted to suspect that the motives which led him and others like him are neither ideological nor do they stem from not knowing another profession. Rather, they were motivated simply by unrestrained greed, riches, and the prospect of a small bit of adventure perhaps.

Who are the dozens, perhaps hundreds, of senior officers roaming about dark jungles, luxury hotels, or the offices of foreign governments, peddling their war merchandise? The majority of them further the cause of the state, assist in marketing Israeli products and fill the treasury. They sell mortars, cannons, Dabur [naval ships], communications and radar equipment, and even aircraft. Few of them are considered to be in the class of the big dealers, i.e., officers, usually major generals, who are also high-ranking businessmen and the owners of consulting and marketing companies. The big dealers are not involved, but they are few. The rest are "peons," the unemployed with ranks from private to colonel, who, lacking an alternative, hire themselves out to the big feudal lords. They are instructors, liaisons, mediators, representatives, and agents who do their work for little money, far from home and family, as if continuing their service in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces].

Most of them would not do this if they had employment after their retirement from the service, and if society would not hit them with insulting disregard. Most of them—as is the case with all unemployed, regular army retirees—feel rejected, degraded, and unrewarded for their efforts. If that is not enough, the hypocrisy reaches its peak when they are hit with: "You are mercenaries."

In treating crime in society in general and juvenile delinquency in particular, we customarily seek to blame society. This is the case here as well. When the State of Israel, with its institutions and elected officials, does not make the slightest effort on behalf of its officers, including senior officers, and does not provide them with employment, these officers are pushed into the arms of the Colombian band.

What then is the oversight? Regular army officers are considered state employees regarding the determination of their salaries and their conditions of service. They constitute a special type of state employee, working 12 hours a day and more, usually far from their families. Many eat sand, are burned by the sun, and endanger their lives. Not a few of them have fallen so that the citizens of Israel can sleep in peace and complain. Moreover, they are state workers in a state which is neither able nor interested in employing them in their profession after the age of 40 or 50. At this age, they are sent into the desert of unemployment or the drug jungle in Colombia.

It is precisely because they are a special type of state employee that society has a moral obligation to see to their employment until the age of 65. This is the right of every employee. The is not only a moral obligation, but also state and civic wisdom. Unemployed regular army retirees send a simple, fatal message to their surroundings, children, relatives, and friends: Whoever has an ounce of intelligence will not serve in the regular army.

Why is the well known phenomenon of sons choosing their fathers' profession not widespread among sons of regular army personnel? You will find many physicians and lawyers who followed in the footsteps of their fathers. You will not find many children of brigadier generals serving in the regular army. From their earliest childhood, they have heard their mothers complain about their fathers' occupation. They have spent many nights, sabbaths, and holidays without their fathers at home. This negative message will lead to a regular army in which only the mediocre—those lacking alternatives—serve. Unlike them, engineers, lawyers, and physicians choose to serve in the regular army, because their service will qualify them for subsequent employment in the civilian market. With all due respect to them and the need for them, they do not bear state security on their backs. Regimental and unit commanders and pilots have no civilian work and are thus, in part, pushed toward the jungle.

The argument that the state grants them a generous pension does not solve the problem. Unemployment at

the age of 45 to 50 is difficult for anyone accustomed to working under great stress who has managed large-scale organizations, made decisions, and born great responsibility. They are not used to being idle. It drives them out of their minds. The state can offer thousands of jobs to unemployed regular army retirees in government ministries and companies, municipal authorities, corporations, universities, and anything sustained by the treasury.

Diamond Exports Drop Sharply

44230008A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Magazine) in Hebrew 10 Sep 89 p 22

[Article by Edna Eis]

[Text] The recession hitting the diamonds branch worsened in recent weeks, and dozens of diamond polishing plants were closed due to a lack of work.

According to Moshe Schnitzer, the president of the diamond exchange, "expectations of an improvement in the situation of the branch after the break in August have proven false. Diamond producers continue to lose money, hundreds of workers are out of work and a recovery has not yet appeared on the horizon."

According to him, since the disturbances in China, Israel's sales to Hong Kong and China have declined by about 50 percent. Because these markets acquire about 20 percent of the Israeli export, this means a decline of about 10 percent in total sales.

It is estimated in the diamond branch that the situation will improve in September following the start of diamond purchases for Christmas and the renewal of activity in the markets of Hong Kong and China, despite the shock of the disturbances there. However, according to Schnitzer, these are false hopes: "The world market is currently at its weakest. The market in Hong Kong has not recovered. The Japanese are currently not buying diamonds because of the strengthening of the dollar, and business is likewise pretty bad in the American market, because big money in the United States is currently invested in company takeovers, and diamonds are no longer a top priority for investors."

Schnitzer added that diamond merchants in Israel are showing great caution (they are avoiding the accumulation of stock that can cause complications, many have closed their plants until the market recovers, and others are continuing to work on a small scale despite losses).

The diamond exchange, for its part, has toughened the penalties for diamond merchants who owe money, and is reacting toward them quickly, to the extent of dismissal from the exchange.

Unemployment Blamed for Attrition in Dimona

44230020F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 14 Sep 89 p 4

[Text] One-quarter of Dimona's entire population left town in the past 3 years and moved to central and northern areas, it was yesterday reported to six Alignment Knesset members who were touring the Negev. Dimona's population dropped from 31,000 to 24,000 in the past 3 years.

Dimona City Hall sources said that the mass exodus continues and that, in fact, whole town neighborhoods are being abandoned. In Dimona this is attributed to high unemployment, lack of industry, and disregard by the government.

The six Alignment Knesset members—Amir Peretz, Michael Bar-Zohar, Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, Hagay Merom, Gedalia Gal, and Eli Ben-Menahem—sent the finance minister an ultimatum to develop the Yeruham reservoir projects, in exchange for which they would support the 100-projects bill.

According to Michael Bar-Zohar, some 1,200 jobs can be created by opening the Yeruham reservoirs. The Knesset members added that if steps were not taken to develop the project they would oppose the 100-projects bill. The Yeruham project is a major one that has been delayed for months.

Polish Workers Employed

44230021E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 19 Sep 89 p 7

[Text] A country-wide campaign to identify aliens working without legal permits was opened today by Employment Services. Hundreds of inspectors and employees specially recruited for the task will participate in the campaign.

An investigation carried out by the agency revealed that recently there has been a sharp increase in the number of alien workers in Israel, especially workers coming from Poland. The agency estimates that over 1,000 workers arrived from that country in recent months, some of whom are replacing Filipinos as housemaids.

Study Reveals Serious Pollution Problems in North

44230021B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 14 Sep 89 p 5

[Article by Ely Eli'ad: "Pollution Beyond Warning Signal"]

[Text] Supporters of "development at any cost" and politicians struggling against bureaucracy, who for years tended to scornfully dismiss repeated environmentalists' warnings that growing pollution will have the most serious cumulative effects, are now forced to deal with an ecological study done in the Acco Valley by scientists

from the Nature Preservation Research Institute of Tel Aviv University. The figures cited in the report justify the fear that north of the Haifa Gulf (Acco Valley) pollution is already beyond the warning signal.

Perusal of the data presented by the researchers also gives rise to fear that the local population is exposed to serious health hazards and that long-term medical studies and tests must be carried out among the locals, especially children, youth, and workers employed at the large, polluting plants north of the Haifa Gulf.

The data presented by scientists of the Nature Preservation Research Institute of Tel Aviv University must bring about a change in attitudes toward ecological-health problems in the aforementioned area. A modern neutralizing system must be established, above and beyond the local facility in the area of the Protrom plant, for example, which has allowed consistent observation of environmental pollution and the establishment of substantial measures designed to reduce and prevent emanations.

The multidisciplinary research was carried out in the field by a group of scientists of the Nature Preservation Research Institute of Tel Aviv University led by the chairman of the institute, Prof Lev Fishelsohn. The environmental-ecological study sums up data gathered between January 1988 and June 1989. Other scientists who worked on the study were Dr Avital Gazit, Dr Ya'akov Gerty, Dr Aharon Dotan, Dr Aminadav Yavetz, and Zohar Tzuq-Rimon.

In the wake of the presentation of the report to the Environmental Protection Ministry and of a visit to the area by ministry Director General Dr Uri Marinov, the ministry stated that a program was agreed upon with members of the Western Galilee Urban Association to expand monitoring and to bring pressure to bear on plants, especially through local authorities and under the business registration law. The Environmental Protection Ministry also stated that it will get involved in every case in which local authorities do not fulfill their mission according to the law. The ministry is also considering options to establish an authority to clean and prevent pollution of the Na'aman River.

In the introduction to the study, Professor Fishelsohn claims that the Acco Valley is indiscriminately populated by human habitat, industrial plants, and natural sites. Numerous international studies have shown that industrial sites and settlements together create pools of negative impact, stemming from human activities, on the population living around such centers and on the local flora and fauna.

Similarly, in order to verify the existence of metal traces in animals, various wild birds were gathered in the study area, between the Protrom plant and the Haifa Gulf towns, including sicklebills, herons, and sparrows, as well as house mammals such as cats, dogs, and rats. As "human companions," those mammals can provide relative information on the human condition. The report

claims that some of the results are very alarming. The main concern was that various concentrations of elements were found in parts of the bodies of whole species and of individual animals; the values were found to differ from one animal to another. This phenomenon does not occur in normal conditions and it indicates a physiological imbalance caused by environmental stress.

The report also states that a high level of tin was found in several animals. This element is not required by the body and its presence in animals, even in minimal quantities, always indicates infection. Tin is an aggressive metal that can affect various physiological processes. Professor Fishelsohn pointed out in the report that scientific literature provides evidence of a link between the level of tin in the brain and the development of intelligence.

In contrast to tin, potassium is a lighter metal. It, too, was revealed by tests in alarming form. As is known from scientific data, potassium can influence body acidity and the blood system, and can thus disrupt the physiological and hormonal balance of organisms.

High levels of zinc, too, were found in various body parts. Its appearance in large quantities can affect normal physiology, especially by penetrating cell walls, building various enzymes, etc.

Professor Fishelsohn warned in the report that the simultaneous appearance of the three metals, tin, potassium, and zinc, in large quantities can lead to chronic stress and in the long run can have various effects on human development, growth, and health in the area. Adding to that, data testifying to relatively high levels of sulphur, iron, and copper, it becomes clear that the human population in the Acco Valley lives in a very dangerous environment. Particularly worrying were findings concerning very young children growing up in the area.

PCBs are multipurpose organic compounds containing chlorine, used in the chemical and plastics industry, generators, accumulators, etc. They are known to be dangerous carcinogens even in minute quantities in animals.

Professor Fishelsohn claims that those findings are very serious and that many studies have made it clear that they can lead to serious and dangerous conditions. Test results have shown that those elements cause changes in hormones and the elements that produce them, including the production and discharge of sex hormones. It is therefore immediately necessary to expand medical-environmental tests in order to be able to efficiently fight the leakage of poisonous elements.

The study also conducted tests on major bodies of water in the area: the sandy sea shore, which forms a natural environment and vacation spot for many people, and the Na'aman River, which is the only sweet-water reserve in the area and is unique. The Protrom chemical plant is located close to the coast, and its waste is spilled, at least in part, directly into the coastal waters, which are very

shallow. Waste-water tests showed that it reaches the sea shore after being used for chemical processes.

The report claims that the study also found contaminating chemical elements on the shore that serves as a natural resort for inhabitants of the area. The Na'aman River system, which is partly fed by the En-Nimfit springs, is part and parcel of a special natural reservation. The study showed that waste water from Arab pig farms, from the Milvaot plant, from fishponds, and from household sewage networks is spilled into the river almost without any processing. As a result, the river is most heavily polluted. Thus, the organic load of the water is 10 times higher in the lower than in the upper part of the river. The report also claims that in order to ensure proper functioning of the water system in the reservation, spillage of waste water must be stopped and it must be ensured that its water level remains steady throughout the year.

Indifference to Environmental Issues Discussed

44230008D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ

in Hebrew 10 Sep 89 p 11

[Article by 'Amos Ben-Vered]

[Text] How many citizens in the state of Israel are aware that a strict air quality standard of 780 mg of sulphur per cubic meter was instituted last year, compared to a previous standard of 1,560 mg per cubic meter? Do they know that gas with an octane rating of 96 contains 0.15 gm of lead per liter compared to 0.42 gm per liter not so long ago?

These are very important issues affecting everyone. However, the above-mentioned changes were determined in discussions and struggles within the government and its institutions without public involvement.

Concern with environmental protection does not descend to the level of the individual. The littering of sidewalks with paper and peels is not controlled. No one tends to self-activated store or car alarms, or dogs barking the entire night on balconies in residential areas. No penalties are imposed on drivers who herald their approach by happily blaring their horns nonstop to their heart's content. Citizens continue tending to their own affairs. Only up there, above, are things happening—power struggles, victories, and defeats.

Environmental Quality Minister Roni Milo' has held his position for more than a year and a half. The first months of his tenure were entirely taken up with transferring authorities from other ministries to the Environmental Quality Ministry. In terms of the Israeli bureaucracy and power struggles, Milo' achieved much. Six months ago, the very idea of the health minister agreeing to relinquish control over water quality, for example, would have provoked laughter among government insiders. The same applies to the nature preserves, the meteorological service, comprehensive authority over

sewerage systems, air monitoring, and many other areas which were previously dispersed in different government ministries.

In recent months, Milo's ministry has managed to overcome the economic considerations of the electric company to set strict standards, which translates in practice to less poisonous smoke hovering over Neve-Sha'nán in Haifa during a heat wave, because the electric company is required to use low-sulphur fuel. In another round, Milo' overcame local economic interests: The two large, new power station units will be built in Hadera, and not in Haifa. In addition, they will be operated with coal and not with Solar [heavy oil], which in itself will assure better air quality. Even a reduction in the percentage of lead in gasoline is an important gain for air quality.

Milo' will also doubtlessly oppose trends damaging to the environment in Finance Minister Shim'on Peres' 100-projects program. A clear example in this regard is the expansion of the Ogen Factory next to Ashdod. Residents of the nearby moshav of Nir Galim are already living behind closed shutters to keep out the odor. There will doubtlessly be no hasty approval of another public nuisance here, in addition to the already existing one.

But these are wars between institutions. When a fight is waged inside a huge body such as the electric company, or in an industrial plant, the individual does not feel it.

Perhaps a somewhat Western European character is needed in order to enhance public awareness of environmental quality. There, one cannot throw litter in the street without being reprimanded. A car horn cannot be blown without people staring and becoming angry. The rebuked person knows that he did something unacceptable. He does not respond in anger as would a typical Israeli, who is unable to listen to remarks about his behavior.

The two main laws which the Knesset passed regarding these subjects were a private, not a governmental, initiative. One, which prohibits noise and air pollution, was initiated by the late Dr Shim'on Kenovitz, and the other, a law to maintain cleanliness, was initiated by present and past Knesset members Shoshana Arbeli-Almosilino, Amnon Rubenstein, Aharon Nahamiyas, and Me'ir Shatrit. The agreement of the government was given after the event, and the implementation of the laws is very partial and lame.

It is probable that, like muses, friends of the environment are also quiet when the cannons are thundering or the stomach is growling. The intifadah, unemployment, and disquieting news every hour do not encourage thinking about what would happen in 7 or 8 years if, for example, the salinization of the underground water supply is not prevented. Perhaps, for this reason, the environmental quality minister is also busy solving internal Likud problems on behalf of supporters of Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, and serving as a liaison between the government and the Knesset, in which capacity he responds to no-confidence resolutions regarding political matters.

However, recognizing that our current actions determine what will ultimately happen to us and our progeny requires penetrating to the level of the individual. Life is not only prettier and more comfortable without public nuisances, it is also healthier and increases endurance, which is very important given the stressful conditions under which we live. It is to be hoped that the prime minister, who created the environmental quality ministry, did so based on these considerations, and not merely to grant a portfolio to Roni Milo'. Milo' would do well to take advantage of the multiparty power that helped him transfer entire departments from other ministries to his control, in order to take action in the area with which he is entrusted, based on the cooperation of the entire population.

Study Surveys Development Towns

44230020G Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 14 Sep 89 p 4

[Text] The findings of a study carried out by the Jerusalem Institute of Israeli Studies in fact deny the comprehensive approach to development towns favored by policymakers.

The study was carried out by Dr Gabriel Lifshitz and dealt with "Socioeconomic Differences Among Development Towns as Basis for Policy Planning." The researcher performed a comparative study of all settlements defined as development towns by various government offices and researchers. He found significant differences among development towns regarding the social and economic variables characterizing their population, levels of unemployment, and government aid.

Concerning education, the level of some development towns was found to be higher than the national average (over 22.9 percent of 15-year-olds and older finished 13 or more school years). Among those towns are Arad, Carmiel, and Beersheba. Six settlements were found to be at the bottom of the education scale, especially in the central part of the country: Rosh Ha'Ayin, Qiryat Eqron, Tirat HaKarmel, Or Yehuda, Kefar Yona, and Bet Dagan.

Significant differences were also found to exist from the viewpoint of car ownership. The level of development towns in the north and south was higher than those in the center. A higher percentage of car ownership than the national average (which is 126 cars per 1,000 inhabitants) was found to characterize successful and tourist development towns such as Elat and Nahariya, while the lowest level (under 65 cars per 1,000 inhabitants) was found in small development towns like Yeroham, Shlomi, and Hazer in the Galilee.

Concerning housing, relatively good conditions prevail in northern and southern development towns as compared to towns in the center.

The study showed that while no significant change has occurred in the area of higher education and car ownership in the various settlements, in the area of housing, improvements have been made regarding crowding in all development towns in the past 30 years.

The study also showed that per capita government aid was considerably higher in the north and south than in centrally located development towns. On the other hand, unemployment rates were higher in the north and south than in the center. In Rosh Ha'Ayin, for example, the unemployment rate is among the lowest due to the town's proximity to metropolitan employment markets.

One of the conclusions that the study author pointed out in his summary was that there was no uniform definition of development towns. Every government agency has a different list of development towns compiled according to different criteria. The study findings showed that from the viewpoint of welfare, certain settlements defined as development towns do not deserve that description and, consequently, should not be given preferential government aid, while others, which are not defined as development towns, deserve to be included in that list and to enjoy government support. The researcher emphasized that development towns in the central area of the country should be given greater aid than those in the north and south in order to raise the socioeconomic standard of their populations. He also stressed that "Urban and communal settlements in Judaea and Samaria, defined by various government agencies like the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Housing Ministry, and the Labor and Welfare Ministry as development towns, do not deserve that status because their socioeconomic level is among the highest in the country." In that group the researcher also included some Galilee moshavot, which are sometimes included among development towns for the purpose of securing governmental grants and advantages.

QATAR

General Infrastructure Discussed

90WT0004Y Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 3 Sep 89 p 8

[Article: "Communications Sector: Modern Network for Progress"]

[Excerpts] Qatar's excellent location in the midst of the western gulf coast has helped focus attention on the communications and telephone network that has accompanied the progress made by Qatar in all fields.

The Ministry of Transportation and Communications is currently implementing several projects and modernizing meteorological facilities, sea and airports, and postal services in order to keep pace with the requirements of developmental expansion and the goals of social growth.

Domestic Communications Network

The Qatar General Organization for Wire and Wireless Communications, "KIWTL" [as published], operates, maintains and develops the system of wire and wireless communications. The organization has recently reorganized its internal affairs so that they now include the Bureaus of Financial Affairs, Engineering Affairs, Administrative Affairs, Commercial Affairs, and Operations. The country currently uses an integrated network of telephone communications, with a capacity of 118,000 lines covering all parts of the state.

The organization is carrying out several projects, the most important being increasing the number of lines for the vehicular telephone network from 3000 to 4500, completing the installation of the al-Khawr electronic telephone exchange, and opening direct telephone lines with a number of nations.

Communications Land Stations

Three land stations for satellite communications are operational in the country. They are Doha 1, Doha 2, and the ARABSAT station, in addition to microwave lines between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and the underwater cable that links Qatar with the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Bahrain in a network of direct, high-quality communications with a capacity of 1200 telephone circuits. These are the most important accomplishments achieved by Qatar in the field of communications and transportation. Qatar is now linked by direct communications with approximately 165 nations of the world.

Postal Services

The Central Post Office, located in the western Gulf area, "al-Dafnah," offers all postal services, such as letters, packages, and first-class mail. This organization has been provided with the most modern postal equipment in the world. Moreover, there are many branch post offices in and outside of Doha, amounting this year to more than 25.

Gulf Airlines and Air Transportation

This company is the national carrier for Qatar, the UAE, and Oman, and occupies a privileged position on a level with older world airlines. It has also expanded its routes to include several new international ports of call.

Doha International Airport, located three kms from the center of Doha, with a 4572 meter runway, has the most advanced and highly efficient navigational equipment and meteorological computers for computerized landings. The latest statistics indicate that the Doha airport has handled about 10,000 aircraft, carrying approximately 488,511 passengers.

The airport's development plan includes a new fire department building and a new air cargo building.

Sea Ports

Doha, Musay'id, and al-Ruways are considered Qatar's most important ports. Doha specializes in the commercial sector, while Musay'id handles oil tankers and the super tankers that carry raw materials. The second stage of building Doha harbor's tower to monitor and control shipping has been completed, and the port administration also intends to construct a new administration building to meet future needs.

Construction Activity and Roads

The Ministry of Public Works implements the tasks assigned to it through four main bureaus. They are Financial and Administrative Affairs, Civil Engineering, Architectural Engineering, and the Bureau of Mechanical Equipment.

Because the Ministry of Public Works is technically responsible for governmental construction and public facilities, it implements the requirements of the ministries and official agencies. It endeavors to give the construction projects it carries out an Arab and Islamic architectural style derived from Qatar's heritage.

The most prominent projects implemented during the past year include constructing several schools, electricity substations, and generator rooms, refurbishing the Khalifah Olympic Stadium, and making alterations to museums and the radio station. As for road projects completed in the past year, they include the Salwan road in the industrial zone, the main road in the western Gulf, the al-Rayyan-al-Muna'i road, entrance and exit roads for the Khalifah Bridge, and the fifth ring road. This is in addition to the completion of 36 villas in the senior officials' housing project, with 94 villas under construction.

Moreover, the Ministry of Public Works intends to implement the following future projects: the construction of 15 schools; 6 squash and tennis courts; 17 electricity substations; and approximately 40 projects involving mechanical and electrical work for sewage water pumping stations and dwelling hookups. [passage omitted]

Electricity and Water

The Ministry of Electricity and Water Resources provides electrical energy and potable water to the citizens and residents through three principal stations. They are the Ras Abu 'Ubud station, which generates 210 megawatts, the al-'Uwaysh station, whose production is 8.5 megawatts, and the Ras Abu Fantas station, which produces 618 megawatts.

It is expected that work to implement the final stage of the al-Wasil station project will begin soon. This will include four commercial generating units, and eight water distillation units. Total energy produced by these stations after completion will total 1500 megawatts of electricity and 100 million gallons of water daily.

With regard to water production and distribution, the Ras Abu 'Ubud station now produces 8 million gallons

per day, while the Ras Abu Fantas station produces 38 million gallons of water. The daily average for water production totaled 57.5 million gallons through the middle of last year.

SUDAN

Relief Commissioner on Supplies, Refugees, Corruption

90OA0063A Khartoum AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH
in Arabic 17 Sep 89 p 5

[Interview with Muhammad Kamil Shawqi, General Commissioner for Relief and Reconstruction, by 'Affaf 'Abdallah: "We Aim To Discourage Reliance on Food and Nutrition Relief"; date and place not specified"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH] Based on the visit you made to the three Nile southern regions—Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal—can you please shed light on the food situation and the amount of foodstuffs available and how long it will last?

[Shawqi] From the time Operation Lifeline got under way in April until 1 August, 27,000 tons of relief aid had been transported to Equatoria. This amount, 103 percent of estimates, exceeded expectations. There are shortages, however, in Yei, which is west of Equatoria, brought about by delivery problems and security considerations.

As of 1 August, Upper Nile received 8,500 tons of relief aid, or 60 percent of the assessed amount, in addition to 20 full loads of 8,000-ton barges delivered after the above date. This means that the Upper Nile region got more than its allotted share.

As for Bahr al-Ghazal region, it has received about 10,500 tons of foodstuffs, or 54 percent of the assessed amount, in addition to the train that arrived after the above date carrying 1,500 tons. Another train is on the way as well.

The Relief and Reconstruction Commissioner went on to say: "The food situation in Equatoria has definitely improved a lot after my visit over what it was 2 months ago. Away from statistics and tests, we find this development reflected in the radiant and happy faces of the people and the noise and play of children who no longer suffered hunger."

Relief From the North and Neighboring Countries

The relief commissioner explained that these food supplies to the southern regions mostly came from the north to the south and a portion, 10 percent, came from neighboring countries to the south of Sudan. They were distributed to the southern regions, be they under government or movement control, because they are all Sudanese citizens.

The major part of this relief was transported by train or ship, but a large part is moved by car or plane, which makes for very high transportation costs. That is why the commission is switching more and more from air to land and fluvial transportation. Consequently, one of the projects that was discussed after our return from the Malakal-Juba-Wau-Aweil trip was aimed at running scouting ships between Malakal and Juba with a view to reopening this route. An agreement was also reached to try to repair the 100-kms railroad track between Aweil and Wau, which had been shut down because of rain and events, and to reopen the Uganda-Kaia-Yei-Juba road. The reopening of all these roads requires full cooperation between the armed forces, the relief commission, the donors, and the UN, under the banner of the Sudanese Operation Lifeline.

Based on the latest agreements, Operation Lifeline will last until November and perhaps until the end of the year. Relief is distributed in the combat zones under the UN flag in accordance with the agreement concluded between the UN and the International Red Cross Committee. Other regions receive their shares under the aegis of the armed forces and other security forces.

The quantities of food available under this operation amount to 75,000 tons, while additional needs are estimated at 20,000 tons. This puts us in a good position in terms of food availability, but the harder part is the actual transportation due to the long autumn season, rough roads, and the need to establish law and order.

Falling Emigration

[AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH] It has recently been rumored that there is fraud in the relief aid. How true is that and what controls has the commission instituted to stop any kind of fraud that may occur in the short or long term?

[Shawqi] The commission has a strong and solid system, and allegations of wrongdoing pertained to relief outside the framework the commission has outlined in the various other departments. Serious efforts are being made to put a stop to all past excesses. Furthermore, certain legislation reform is still needed to avoid the conflict of responsibilities and powers created not only by excesses, but by conflicting laws as well, and endeavors are under way to amend them.

[AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH] What plans has the Relief and Reconstruction Commission drawn up vis-a-vis emigrants in the capital and other regions in Sudan?

[Shawqi] The relief commission has maintained all along that emigrants in every region are the responsibility of the host province under the aegis of the governor, who is vested with all the necessary power and authority from the standpoint of security, territory, health, etc. The commission is cooperating fully with the governors and the donors in mobilizing all the necessary resources for emigrants everywhere, in cooperation with the emigrant commissioner. Government policy on emigrants is aimed at discouraging reliance on food relief and total nutrition in the

camps, discouraging migration to the cities, and not forcing emigrants to return to their hometowns or anywhere else. The Sudanese government's policy is intended to improve the lot of emigrants living in camps; to set up camps in production areas for those who wish to transfer there; and to set up camps in border areas between combat and safety zones, so that emigrants may be close to their hometowns and may work toward hometown reconstruction.

Mr Andrew's Visit and Conference

[AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH] Can you please tell us about the visit of Mr Andrew Mathews, director of American emergency relief?

[Shawqi] Andrew Mathews is the director of American emergency relief worldwide. He was accompanied by his deputy and I think that his visit to Sudan was successful. Mr Andrew reaffirmed the continuation of American aid in this framework, and stressed the gradual consolidation of reconstruction by bolstering reconstruction operations that are under way, along with the restoration of relief in terms of providing seed, manual agricultural equipment, serum to protect animals against deadly diseases, fishing nets and other equipment, as well as medicine and health services to the camps.

[AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH] We ask your excellency to please shed some light on the Donors International Conference for the Building of Southern Sudan?

[Shawqi] The UN secretary is in the process of preparing a report on the Sudanese Operation Lifeline which he will submit to the donors in a meeting to be held this coming November, during which requests for donations and grants will be made for the second period. Upon our return from the visit to the south, and in light of reports prepared by the regions, the commission representatives, and the donors and their cooperatives, needs were assessed and a meeting was held on the 3rd of this month to discuss needs for the rest of the year. It became clear that the available supply is sufficient. Another meeting of donor representatives in Khartoum will be held on the 3rd of next October to assess the 1990 needs.

Counselor Discusses Security Agency, Domestic Situation

900A0052A Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 10 Sep 89 p 4

[Interview with Staff Brigadier General Ibrahim Nayil Adam Idam by 'Abd-al-Salam Hamzah: "South Kurdufan Panel Formed To Hold Peace Talks"; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Passage Omitted]

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] The revolution has listed the reasons why it was undertaken, the most important of which is the dreadful deterioration of the country's security. How do you perceive security under the revolution?

[Idam] The revolution was undertaken to save the country. Unfortunately, we say save because the country was on the brink of ruin in all domains. Security and development are the basis of stability. Perhaps the most important form of deterioration is security and the economic and political ramifications, not to mention rampant corruption everywhere on the part of the previous government and the disbanded parties.

Our sense of responsibility made us realize that the country was rapidly going downhill, and silence vis-a-vis such wrong practices is in itself a cardinal sin of which we, as citizens and armed forces entrusted with the safety of the country's soil and property, including the citizenry, cannot be absolved. These factors prompted us to remove the sectarian partisan regime in order to put the Sudanese house in order in a somewhat disciplined fashion, and to make people feel that they are receiving all the care they need from the government, which holds all citizens equal in rights and duties by putting forth national goals to save the country.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] In what sense does the revolution associate security with peace?

[Idam] As we know, the revolution's most important cause is to restore a just peace. The issue of peace is the other side of the development process. In other words, God said in his revelations: "For the covenants of security and safeguard enjoyed by the Quraysh, their covenants covering journeys by winter and summer, let them adore the Lord of His House who provides them with food against hunger, and with security against fear of danger [Koran-106/1]." Therefore, development is the basis of construction and is linked to security.

Consequently, it was inevitable that war be the foremost issue because it has been going on for several years, and the people of Sudan are fighting among themselves, inflicting heavy losses, be it in lives, property, construction, or progress toward a decent life.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What is the security perspective with respect to the peace process?

[Idam] The revolution sent a message to the Popular Movement in which it spelled out its vision for a just peace and ways for putting a stop to the bloodshed in Sudan through direct peaceful negotiations. This message was followed by a delegation headed by Staff Colonel Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, member of the RCC for National Salvation, who held talks with a movement delegation in Addis Ababa. The two sides have worked out an agreement to continue the dialogue and to open the channels of communications for the exchange of ideas and views.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] The insurgency has expanded its activities to include South Kordofan and, as a consequence, some tribes have armed themselves and are fighting one another. What is the revolution doing to contain the situation in Kordofan?

[Idam] I, in my capacity as the security advisor, and Staff Colonel Faysal Madani, Kordofan's political supervisor, have been commissioned to seek peace in South Kordofan and we have actually begun to contact the people of the area who are represented by the Nubah clan with all its various tribes, and the Hawazimah and the Masiriyah clans. We all discussed ways to achieve peace in the region, taking into account that the special circumstances in South Kordofan are radically different from what is going on in South Sudan. The insurgency's penetration into this part of the country has done much damage. People have deserted their villages and farms, schools have been closed, and children and students have been displaced and are living in subhuman conditions in haphazard housing around the cities and the national capital. This is a disgrace and an affront to man's humanity, something no official in a position of authority can sanction. These meetings and encounters were marked by a positive response. Points of view came together and ideas became crystallized. God willing, a universal meeting for the people of the region will be held with the chairmen of the political committee and the information committee, whereupon it will be up to them to form a secretariat for this grouping so that we may speak to the people of the region throughout Sudan to keep them apprised of the ideas and views that have been exchanged regarding the restoration of peace in the region. After that, the committee, headed by the political supervisor and myself, will sit with the region's ruler in his capacity as the competent side, because ultimately this matter concerns the people of the region, for the restoration of peace is what guarantees stability for development.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What has the revolution offered in the way of ensuring success for such action?

[Idam] In this regard, area residents whom the former government threw in jail without trial because they expressed their candid and clear opinion on what was going on in the party leadership, labelling the people of region as rebels, have been released. These people have declared their full cooperation with respect to calling others to peace.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] How and why was the former State Security Agency disbanded?

[Idam] The former State Security Agency was disbanded under pressure by some political factions. Because that agency posed a threat to their suspicious movements, they sought to break it up. In doing so, a security vacuum was created, tempting foreign agencies to enter the country to embark on their activities, aided by the then-political climate with its multiple parties and orientations. It got to a point where anyone planning to commit any kind of crime would go to Sudan to carry out his criminal scheme because of the lack of security. Some examples are the murder of al-Hakim and the Acropole Hotel incident.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] How and when was the Sudan Security Agency established?

[Idam] This agency was not established in a vacuum, but rather in the wake of drastic security violations. When officials felt that their very existence was threatened, they were persuaded that a security agency ought to be established to fill the vacuum left by the disbanded State Security Agency. At this point, a Sudanese citizen group was selected after thorough examination, bringing together some of the former agency's capabilities, who are known for their honesty and efficiency. The Sudan Security Agency was established and it assumed its functions under a law enacted by the former Constituent Assembly. This agency has not been subjected to any partisan pressures and is manned by a staff of nationalists with no partisan tendencies. They all work for Sudan and for the interests of the entire Sudanese people, as underscored by the agency's law, bylaws, and terms of its mandate.

A technical committee had been convened under the former government to study the functions and jurisdictions of various security agencies with a view to setting specific tasks and powers for each security agency operating in the arena. We are in the process of submitting a report on setting jurisdictions to avoid conflict and ensure that everyone is working in full coordination until such time as a decision is reached on the jurisdiction issue.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] Are the Sudan Security Agency authorities responsible for the arrests?

[Idam] Precautionary arrests are made by Interior Ministry authorities. Any person who shows any kind of hostility toward the revolution or does anything to resist it will be arrested. Such people have to be detained, interrogated, and brought to trial.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What are the agency's jurisdictions?

[Idam] The agency has all sorts of jurisdictions, most important of which is monitoring economic issues that have a direct impact on the country from a security standpoint.

Prison Official Details Problem, Cure for Supply Sector Crimes

900A0075C Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 17 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by 'Umar Musa Mahmud, prison warden with M.A. in law and police sciences: "Influence of Supply Crimes on Economic Growth"]

[Text] One of the most significant reasons leading to the eruption of the national salvation revolution was the comprehensive economic deterioration emanating from the high inflation rates which resulted from falling productivity rates and led to reducing the national income and the per capita share of this income. This situation generated a number of negatives in society, of which we will mention the insane rise of prices, the declining value of the currency

vis-a-vis the dollar, and the proliferation of the black market. There is no disagreement that under such circumstances, and in the absence of official and popular control, certain economic phenomena, such as fabricated inflation, proliferate through the control of the supply of consumer goods to the market, use of the means of storage to create a scarcity of goods and, consequently, increase their prices manifold. Under such circumstances, commission agents and middlemen find the right climate to create intermediate links that reap marginal profits which are added to the cost of the commodity, thus creating fabricated inflation.

The cure to this problem is a two-part cure. The first part is embodied in eliminating the causes of the fabricated inflation by issuing deterrent laws in the supply area.

The second part is embodied in eliminating the real causes of inflation, namely low productivity and the lack of consumption rationalization. The most important givens of fabricated inflation are:

- The absence of deterrent and effective economic laws.
- The lack of commodity prices (floating and inflexible prices and failure to base prices on clear economic studies and planning).
- The weakness or absence of effective administrative control over prices and the lack of control over implementation.
- Weakness of the criminal or administrative penalties provided for by local decrees, supply laws, and by the economic laws generally.

We will analyze here the economic laws, particularly the supply laws, and the extent of their contribution to solving the fabricated inflation problem and to eliminating the abovementioned negatives. We will try to make specific proposals and to envision the main features of Sudan's supply laws.

Supply Crimes

Supply crimes belong to the group of economic crimes regulated and governed by the special penal code. Economic crimes are crimes of a special nature. They are different from normal crimes in that they are organizational crimes by force of the law which seeks to protect certain economic interests that concern the state. This is because they are connected with the state's general economic system, regardless of the policy embraced by the state.

The concept of economic crimes and their penalties has taken root in most modern states. All agree on the extent of the danger of these crimes and on the serious economic and social consequences they create. An economic crime is incompatible with the rules of ethics because it entails the violation of an essential interest which is now understood and whose importance is appreciated by society's members. Historically, the concept of the economic penal code emerged in the wake of World War I (1914-19). This war generated consequences which harmed the economies of the commercial countries and

this led to the emergence of certain systems, such as the system of ration cards for consumer goods and foodstuffs. The importance of this economic law to the world is confirmed by the fact that the crisis extended to the world's various countries, thus forcing them to adopt strict economic regulations to protect currency, to prevent unemployment, and to reform the economic system. The importance of economic laws grew with the outbreak of World War II when the need arose to tighten control over prices, and when the ration card system expanded to include foodstuffs, fuels, clothing, raw materials, and production means. Countries established criminal penalties to insure that restrictions are observed.

Concept of Supply Crime and Its Objective

In its legal definition, a supply crime is any action or abstention from any action entailing a violation of the state's economic system in the supply sector. With this definition, a supply crime is different from numerous other crimes prosecuted with the purpose of protecting the state's economic system, such as the crimes of looting, embezzlement, and betrayal of trust. These are crimes prosecuted with the objective of protecting both individual and collective ownership.

Supply crimes are prosecuted to protect the planning and management of the national economy, as well as the laws, regulations, and decrees issued by the government to implement its economic policy. If we seek to establish social justice by organizing the production process, the national income and all the goods and services, then the presence of the supply law becomes an inevitable must for achieving these objectives.

Legal Nature of Supply Crimes

It is agreed by legal jurists that the supply crime is a danger crime. In other words, it is not required that actual damage be inflicted by this behavior. As soon as the behavior materializes, it is considered a threat to the interest that merits protection. In this case, the interest is the state's economic system. This crime is like any other state crime in which it is not conditional that the criminal act be completed and that it produce consequences. The behavior on its own is a complete crime punishable by the law with the same penalty as when the crime is completed. This is why it is called a danger crime. It is the same whether the behavior is positive or negative, as in the case of refusing to sell a certain commodity. The danger intended is a general danger aimed at the state's economic system, and it may result in a special danger threatening the individual interest of the victim. Selling at a price higher than the compulsory price constitutes a general danger that poses a threat to the national economy and, simultaneously, a special danger that undermines the buyer's direct interest.

Penalty in Supply Crime

Because of the serious nature of the supply crimes and because they incorporate the concept of danger, in addition to harming private interests, the penalty for these crimes

may encompass both the penal and the administrative dimensions. The economic penal code has a penal character and an administrative character, thus assuming a dual nature. The most significant reasons justifying this duality are: Litigation procedures before the executive authority are faster than those before the judiciary authority; the executive authority has an important role in creating economic crime (supply crimes in particular). The law always entrusts the executive authority with setting and modifying commodity prices and with defining the commodity and crop standards, and so forth. It is futile to consider supply crimes administrative infractions on which laws are issued by the executive authority concerned (regulations and administrative decrees) for numerous reasons, including:

1. Administrative infractions are always characterized by punishment with relatively weak penalties. These penalties don't take into account the supreme economic interest. Selling a commodity at a price higher than the compulsory price must not be viewed as a violation of the governor's administrative decrees and must not be confined to the small value of the commodity involved in the violation.

2. Executive decrees do not include complementary penalties, such as confiscation and shop closure.

3. Executive orders are tied to changing commodity prices. It is difficult to issue decrees dealing with speculation by commission agents and middlemen.

Special Courts and Supply Crimes

In the absence of a complete economic law, eliminating the consequence of the abovementioned shackles can be accomplished by the formation of special courts to demonstrate the following:

- An immediate and deterrent impact, especially in the case of economic crises.
- Eliminating the complexities of the procedures of the ordinary courts and of the varied appeal methods which nullify the immediate and effective impact of the penalty for these crimes. The element of general deterrence in these penalties has the greatest influence on the success of the economic policy.

We will later discuss proposals for developing the Sudanese economic penal code.

Revamping Public Sector Suggested To Regulate Commodity Flow

90OA0075B Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH in Arabic 17 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by 'Abduh Mahjub Muhammad al-Qadi: "Role of Cooperative and Commercial Institutions and of Cooperative Unions in This Phase"]

[Text] The public sector represents an important part in the life individuals, groups, nations, and peoples. It is a means to secure food for the domestic front and to protect combatants in the battlefield in time of war

because the government controls the distribution channels and reexamines them constantly, carefully, and in a disciplined manner. It is a completely successful means to win war, defeat starvation, disease, poverty, and monopoly, and control prices. The public sector is compatible with the capitalist and socialist systems and with the spirit of Islam because its objective is the fair distribution of income among the people's various classes with their various beliefs and faiths, considering that the objective of the divine religions is to disseminate social justice and noble ethics among people.

Numerous organizations have been founded in our country, such as the dairy and fish establishments, Coopteride Company [as published], cooperative unions and associations, the local workers cooperative union, the Cooperative Agency and its branches, and the commercial and cooperative banks, such as the National Import-Export Bank.

The purpose behind setting up these organizations was to supply goods, insure fair distribution and stable markets, eliminate the ordinary citizen's hardship, employ the largest number of workers, and create a better and a more disciplined market away from the black market through collective cooperative action. This is to be created with government support and under direct governmental supervision, with facilities given to some of these organizations to expand and establish more projects, provide more benefits, achieve constant success, and enhance and develop the commercial services. This is in order to create a consolidated and united society that seeks perfection, and to create free competition between the public and private sectors, as in the other countries that have been successful in this regard. But all these organizations, companies, and banks have failed to supply essential consumer goods to the ordinary citizen satisfactorily, constantly, and at the legal price. What has commonly been prevalent is the scarcity of goods and their insanely high prices that have created a serious problem. Perhaps the reason is due to the scarcity of goods, administrative causes, the absence of capable, effective, well-studied, and advanced control, the lack of deterrent laws, and the unavailability of free currency or manpower, due to natural elements or the factories' failure to produce satisfactorily. But these organizations can operate in a better manner now that the negative and inadequate aspects, whether in distribution or production, the lack of distribution controls, or in the lack of storage facilities, have been checked.

All the losing organizations and banks operating now should be reexamined by the strong and wise salvation government which stems from the will of our patient people, thanks to their strong and valiant army that emanates from God's will, may God's might be praised. Throughout long years, the people have undergone the experience of deprivation, starvation, weak control, and weak laws which have had clear effects on all. Now that the faulty practices are being exposed by our print and broadcast media, that the revolution, with its genuine faith in the people, has drafted solutions to all these

problems, (solutions embodied in the pricing courts, the appeals committees, and the fight against the black market and in cleaning up the capital), and that normalcy has been restored, I propose:

1. Approvals given to all business licenses, be they for bakeries, grocery shops, or factories, should be reexamined so that no individual may be given a business license until his place of residence is verified, so that the leasing of grocery shops by their owners to unknown individuals who do not live in an area permanently should be prevented. Licenses should be granted in two stages: an initial license and then final approval after a shop is inspected by the engineer concerned, so as to prevent the manipulation of business licenses and the issuance of licenses to imaginary businesses, such as the licenses for imaginary bakeries and imaginary factories issued under the previous administration. Under colonialist rule, licenses were issued in the past to foreigners and to Sudanese citizens after verifying their place of residence.

2. Transform the wholesale trade into retail trade or permit wholesalers to sell in retail in order to facilitate deals and eliminate all complications between buyer and seller, provided that daily supervision is exercised to insure sound distribution, because the wholesaler dealing in consumer goods may engage in indirect hoarding. He gets goods, such as sauce cans, soap, lentils, rice, oils and other goods, from local factories, or through importation, and he may conceal these goods while waiting for his customer, i.e. the retailer. These goods may continue to be concealed by some wholesalers. Meanwhile, the ordinary citizen is unable to find a single pound of oil at the retailer. This creates scarcity, and the wholesaler may take the opportunity to sell the commodity he gets from the factory at a greater profit than he should. It is easy for the government to check on the companies, organizations, and banks through their bills because they are small in number and because they do not have a variety of storage facilities.

The alternative is for the government to take over the companies, organizations, and banks from the public sector, put their commodity stores under direct government supervision, and control and impose penalties, up to the death penalty, for manipulators, counterfeiters, and those who exploit their jobs for personal interest or for the interest of friends. Laws and prices should be reviewed periodically to find out who benefits from these organizations. We have great hope that the military establishment, jointly with the other institutions, will control consumer goods by varying degrees, that accredited agents will be appointed in the various quarters to distribute essential consumer goods according to the pattern employed by al-Jazirah Services Company, and that the distribution activity will be expanded to include fruits, vegetables, and meats.

3. I propose that the number of grocery shops in the quarters be rationed, with only one shop established for

every 500 or 1,000 citizens, so as to control the distribution channels and to find out what the citizens need. To rationalize consumption and eliminate the surplus number of grocery shops, the licenses of these shops should be withdrawn so that their owners may devote themselves to work activity other than commerce.

I appeal to the information media and to the economic experts to contribute their opinions, proposals, and expertise on the experiments of other countries, especially in the areas of trade management and organization. I appeal to them to contribute their observations on the need to stamp the official consumer price on goods, their studies on developing Sudan economically through cooperation and self-denial, and to put the country's interest above all considerations, far from partisanship, sectarianism, racism, tribalism, and personal interest. We appeal to the private sector to fully cooperate with the tendencies of the national salvation revolution, not to close its shops out of greed for big profits, and to respond to the pricing laws. We should not forget to note what factory owners have done by displaying their products at the national products fair to lift hardship from the shoulders of the ordinary citizen and to deliver consumer goods directly to the consumer at cost price. They have our thanks and praise for this national sentiment and for this great and constant effort, made with government encouragement and with the spirit of loyalty and cooperation, remote from the harmful hoarding and the black market merchants and middlemen. This has been a successful experiment for the consumer and the producer, and it is one of the means of prosperity, security, peace, and social justice in the distribution of income among the citizens. March forward. Victory comes from God alone and to God we pray for success.

Editorial Says Low Prices Aid Consumer, Supplies Inadequate

900A0075A Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH in Arabic 17 Aug 89 p 3

[Editorial by Dr Muhammad Salih Muhyi-al-Din: "On Price Comparison"]

[Text] I watch nearly every day the column from which you look out at the people under the title of "Followup." What attracts me more strongly to this column than to others is that it puts its finger on the ailing spot and probes the "pains" of the people. The people have suffered extensively in their lives, and they are now looking forward to a change in their lives that makes this life desirable and befitting for the citizen of the late 20th century. This change comes under the umbrella of a revolution guided by God, to select the name of "national salvation"—a name for which the people would have chosen no alternative had a referendum been conducted among them—for a movement that has risen on the debris of destruction that surpasses imagination.

Brother 'Awadallah, I read your column of Monday, 7 August 1989, on the drop in commodity prices and the effect of this drop on the incomes of this country's

patient citizens. "Followup" compared prices under the exgovernment of the parties and the salvation revolution government, and made the sound conclusion that setting, reducing, and stabilizing prices has enabled the citizen to save a considerable sum of money that helps him get life's necessities. While I agree with what you have said, I have noticed that 1 or 2 days after they had been set, the prices of the commodities you mentioned, excluding meat, were completely altered in the markets, and that shops in the quarters carry nearly no priced goods. Yesterday, I toured the markets of Umm Durman and Khartoum Bahri, but could not find a single can of powdered milk of any size to buy.

What does this scarcity indicate?

In my opinion, it indicates two things: The people's unjustifiable panic and their fear of the disappearance of goods, or fear that the revolution will back down on the prices it has set for goods, is the reason the citizens have rushed to purchase and hoard goods in a manner that has led to their disappearance from shops. If true, this behavior does not indicate popular awareness or any sort of civility. Rather, it is a selfish, narcissistic behavior, as a result of which the rich get everything, taking advantage of the revolution's decrees that are intended primarily to serve the country's poor, because the rich can afford to buy what they want. This inhuman behavior also results in depriving the poor of life's necessities because the poor cannot buy and hoard.

The second thing indicated by the shops' shelves that are empty of foodstuffs is that the merchants have concealed these goods because they have become accustomed to excessive profits which they cannot get with pricing. In doing this, the merchants expect that under the impact of need, people will buy the concealed goods at the price the merchants want, as was the case prior to the revolution.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

1989 Trade Statistics Provided

900L0049A Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 8 Sep 89 p 2

[Article by 'Ali Lashin: "Between January and May 1989, Dubai's Trade Amounted to 14.6 Billion Dirhams"]

[Text] Dubai's foreign trade for the first 5 months of 1989 amounted to 2,686,923.882 kgs, valued at 14,659,606,828 dirhams.

Imports alone amounted to 2,029,643.534 kgs, valued at 11,153,481,828 dirhams while exports and re-exports amounted to 757,280,348 kgs, valued at 3,506,125,000 dirhams, or about 32 percent of imports.

Statistics put out yesterday by the Dubai government Bureau of Statistics show that cars and transportation equipment are first in importance among the key commodity groups. Car and transportation equipment

imports accounted for 3,044,778,460 dirhams, while the value of exports and re-exports was set at 654,825,801 dirhams, or 21.5 percent.

Classified industrial commodities ranked second with 2,894,354 dirhams for imports and 283,477,481 dirhams, or 45 percent, for exports and re-exports.

Unclassified industrial commodities ranked third, with 2,216,451,664 dirhams for imports and 212,861,331 dirhams, or 19 percent for exports and re-exports.

Foodstuffs and live cattle followed, with 1,392,765,996 dirhams for imports and 593,853,840 dirhams, or 42.5 percent for exports and re-exports.

Cigarette, tobacco, and beverages accounted for 119,647,778 dirhams in imports and 57,264,456 dirhams, or 48 percent for exports and re-exports.

Chemical products and derivatives accounted for 676,491,447 dirhams in imports and 138,282,665 dirhams, or 20 percent, in exports.

Mineral fuel and derivatives accounted for 318,799,222 dirhams in imports and 57,953,484 dirhams, or 18 percent, in exports.

Raw materials accounted for 296,595,819 dirhams in imports and 86,061,390 dirhams, or 29 percent, in exports.

Edible oils accounted for 131,198,851 dirhams in imports and 72,611,908 dirhams, or 55 percent, in exports.

Finally, other miscellaneous commodities and deals accounted for 148,193,464 [as published] dirhams in exports and 12,398,567 dirhams in exports.

Statistics Show Decrease in Trade Surplus

90OL0070A *Dubayy AL-BAYAN*
in Arabic 17 Sep 89 p 2

[Article: "UAE Foreign Trade Statistics: Trade Surplus Drops to 13.7 Billion Dirhams and Imports Go Up 20 Percent in 1988"]

[Text] Last year's balance-of-payment surplus amounted to 5.92 billion dirhams, a drop from the 1987 level of 6.24 billion.

The Central Bank report on the country's foreign trade attributed this drop to the large rise in the value of imports to 31.3 billion dirhams, compared to 26 billion, or 20.4 percent, for 1987. As for exports, the slight decline in other oil exports revenues notwithstanding, nonoil exports and re-exports made up for this decline, allowing oil and other exports and re-exports to maintain last year's level of 45 billion dirhams. The report showed that, as a result of the great rise in the value of imports, the balance of trade surplus dropped from 19 billion for 1987 to 13.7 billion for 1988.

With regard to the services sector, private remittances, and official grants: They have maintained last year's level of 4.4 billion, influenced by the rise in the value of imports. The current account surplus amounted to 9.3 billion dirhams, compared with 15 billion for 1987.

The Central Bank report said that the capital monetary movement has been affected by these developments. The value of capital outflow dropped from 8.26 billion for 1987 to 2.93 billion for 1988 because of the decline in the commercial account surplus on the one hand, and overseas investment wariness on the other hand, especially in the wake of the world capital market crash and the boom in local investment opportunities.

The report noted that balance of payment changes in 1988 reflected the region's economic boom and economic expectations due to the termination of the Iraq-Iran war, when the values of both imports and re-exports reached a level high enough to make up for declining revenues from oil whose price dropped sharply in 1988, before the OPEC countries succeeded in bringing prices back under control in December of the same year.

Likewise, the lower capital outflow volume pointed to the investor tendency to take advantage of local investment opportunities created by the economic boom and the steady growth that began in 1987. With regard to nonoil exports, the report estimated their 1988 value to be about 5.4 billion, a 2 percent increase over 1987. The nonoil export figure includes petroleum product exports from Abu Dhabi, commodity exports from Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and al-Sharjah, and other UAE [United Arab Emirates] export estimates, in addition to Abu Dhabi's fertilizer, oil, chlorine, and other exports.

As for actual nonoil exports from Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and al-Sharjah, it was natural, in view of the 20 percent drop in 1988 crude oil prices compared to the 1987 levels, that the prices, and consequently the value of petroleum products, should fall. This was particularly true since 1988 export levels were roughly equal to those of 1987, because the value of petroleum product exports from the Ruways and the Abu Dhabi National (ADNOC) refineries declined by 12 percent. However, the commodity structure of this type of exports was the same in 1988 as in 1987, but was different than in 1986, when the relative importance of fuel oil exports rose at the expense of oil and gas exports, and lower 1988 petroleum product exports led to a drop in the relative importance of mineral fuels and lubricants to 61 percent from 70 percent in 1987.

Nevertheless, the total value of nonoil exports did not drop as a result of the higher values of all the other commodity group exports. This was with the exception of the inedible raw material group, save for fuel in general, and the increase in the value of manufactured goods exports brought about by higher world aluminum prices. In 1988, these prices rose by 25 percent over the 1987 level, and by 44 percent over the 1986 level, while the 1988 exports went up by only 6 percent and 4 percent

over the 1987 and 1986 levels, respectively. As a consequence, the group's relative importance went up from 21 percent in 1987 to 27 percent in 1988. Japan is the number-one importer of Dubai aluminum, accounting for 65 percent of total export of this substance, followed by the United States with 12 percent.

Furthermore, the value of various manufactured goods exports rose by 78 percent over the 1987 level, and this rise is basically attributed to higher readywear exports from factories scattered throughout the emirate, which in a short time have been able to compete in quality and price. This has compelled the United States, which receives the greater part of the exports, to create the import quota system for its readywear imports from the UAE.

As for the re-exportation industry, the 1988 value of commodity re-exports rose by 13 percent, to 7.499 billion dirhams, compared with 6.638 billion for 1987. This rise is attributed to the stable security situation in the region after the termination of the Iraq-Iran war, and the ensuing economic optimism and economic revival in the nonoil economic sectors, in the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries in particular.

Trade With Romania Increases, Further Growth Expected

90OL0047A Dubayy AL-BAYAN
in Arabic 29 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by Sa'id al-Sayyid: "Marked Rise in Volume of Trade With Romania: 36 Million Dirhams in Romanlon Exports to Dubayy in First 6 Months"]

[Text] Trade between Romania and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] has recently risen markedly. The volume of trade between the two countries rose from 1.7 million dirhams in 1986 to 27.5 million dirhams in 1987, then jumped last year to 46 million dirhams, according to Ion Pancho, Romanlon commercial counselor in Dubayy.

He predicted that the figure would double this year, since the volume of trade between the two countries from January through the end of this past July has already reached 36 million dirhams.

Ion Pancho said Romania exports to the UAE several products including chemicals, fertilizer, transport equipment, tires, steel products, household goods, and textiles.

The Roman commercial counselor added that the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries would help bolster all aspects of relations between them, especially in the commercial and economic fields.

He said that several agreements on cooperation and joint ventures have been concluded between the Romanlon Chamber of Commerce and the chambers of commerce and industry in Dubayy and Abu Dhabi.

Romanlon know-how also contributes to several projects in the country, especially in oil refining. The first oil refinery in the world was built in Romania in 1857, [he explained].

He added that the Romanlon economy has, since the early fifties, enjoyed steady growth in the field of cooperation with all countries of the world. Romanlon trade with the rest of the world has grown 45 times over during this period.

The Romanlon commercial counselor pointed out that since 1945, his country's industrial output has increased 135 times over, its agricultural output has increased ten-fold, and its national income has increased by more than 36 times over.

Ion Pancho said that trade with the socialist countries represents 50 percent of Romania's foreign trade and that his country maintains diplomatic and commercial relations with 155 countries.

The Romanlon commercial counselor said in conclusion, that the 45th anniversary of Romanlon independence has been celebrated this 23 August after the restoration of full diplomatic relations with the UAE. He also said that relations between the two countries, especially in the economic and commercial fields, will develop steadily in coming years, as high officials of both countries visit each other, as more commercial and economic accords are concluded, and as the feasibility of joint projects is studied.

Statistics for Trade With South Korea Provided

90OL0043A Dubayy AL-BAYAN
in Arabic 15 Aug 89 p 5

[Article: "Trade Between Korea and the UAE at 3.7 Billion Dirhams"]

[Excerpt] Korea today leads other countries of the world in terms of the depth and extent of its stunning change and development. It has successfully passed through a stage of accelerated development to emerge at the forefront of distinguished, newly industrialized nations.

South Korea experienced three decades of brilliant development to become one of the strongest and most distinguished newly industrialized countries of the world. Its per capital share of national income rose from \$80 per year in 1960 to more than \$4,000 at the present time.

Such an economic miracle was the result of tremendous effort and ambitious plans to develop the industrial sector, especially electronics and autos that are Korea's most important exports to the world in general and the Gulf region in particular.

Korea has excellent trade relations with countries of the region in general and with the UAE [United Arab Emirates] in particular. Its volume of trade with the UAE rose about \$1 billion last year (3.7 billion dirham),

compared to \$800 million (2.9 million dirham) in 1987. Korea is the UAE's fifth largest supplier.

The UAE still maintains a favorable balance of trade with Korea even though its exports to the UAE have risen sharply by about 51 percent, while its imports [from the UAE] increased by only 28 percent. Total exports rose from \$300 million in 1987 to \$454 million in 1988. Korean imports from the UAE, on the other hand, increased from \$502 million in 1987 to \$645.8 million last year.

Crude oil and its derivatives account for 97 percent of UAE exports to Korea. UAE imports from that country include textiles valued at \$208 million; construction and building materials valued at \$90.5 million; electronics valued at \$49 million; autos, machinery, and equipment valued at \$53.2 million; and plastics valued at \$23.8 million.

The UAE is considered the second largest Gulf market for Korean exports. Saudi Arabia, whose imports from Korea amount to \$1.1 billion, ranks first followed by the UAE, then Kuwait (\$341.7 million), the Sultanate of Oman (\$25.8 million), Bahrain (\$19.3 million), and Qatar (16.8 million).

Furthermore, Korea treats the UAE market with special consideration as a regional center for trade with neighboring countries.

Seoul was so successful in increasing exports to Dubai that Korea jumped last year from 12th place to fourth place among suppliers of the emirate. This is a rare occurrence in Dubai because of keen market competition.

Dubai's imports from South Korea jumped from 464 million dirhams in 1984, or 2 percent of the emirate's total imports, to 1.4 billion dirhams last year, or 6.3 percent of total imports.

Machinery and transport equipment, followed by manufactured goods, headed the list of Korean products that accomplished remarkable progress.

Seoul's interest in Dubai is indicated by the fact that Korea was among the first nations to operate commercial centers in Dubai. Its center was established in 1976.

Pak Sok-hun joined Korea's trade center in Dubai last 23 Jul as its new director. He succeeds Pak Beung [as published].

In view of the notable growth of the UAE economy and the increasing importance of Dubai as a commercial center in the Gulf, the Korean commercial center added an employee for research and marketing and became a regional center for the Middle East.

Korea's commercial center in Dubai is active on several fronts to bolster trade relations between Korea and

the UAE. Its efforts include trade promotion, economic cooperation, trade fairs, and the supply of information to local businessmen.

This year, the center plans an exhibit of Korean products in Abu Dhabi during the 11 to 13 September period, and a similar exhibit in al-Sharjah on 7 to 8 Oct. It also plans to organize a visit by a group of UAE businessmen to the Korean trade fair scheduled in Kuwait for the 15 to 19 October period.

The domestic market has witnessed increasing activity by local agents for such Korean firms as Samsung and Gold Star, as well as for Hyundai cars which have recently become very popular.

Proven to be competitive and of good quality, Korean products have been successful in acquiring domestic market shares thanks to pricing policies suitable to the various segments of society.

Imports of Korean electronics, widely available on local markets, jumped by 63 percent from some \$27.9 million in 1987 to \$45.5 million last year. [passage omitted].

Project Investment Allocations Enumerated

90OL0047B Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 3 Sep 89 p 2

[Article by 'Ali Lashin: "Investment Program To Cost 3.2 Billion Dirhams: Actual Outlays at 34 Percent of 1988 Allocations."]

[Text] Projects of the federal investment program cost a total of some 3.2 billion dirhams in 1988 for an 8 percent drop from 3.5 billion dirhams in the previous year. Actual outlays amounted to 127.7 million dirhams, or 34 percent of the allocated 372.6 million dirhams. Works physically completed that year are valued at 118.4 million dirhams or 31.7 percent of allocations.

A recent follow-up report by the Ministry of Planning indicated that allocations, expenditures, and completions varied from one emirate to another. Abu Dhabi was in the forefront, followed by al-Sharjah, then Dubai. Actual outlays in Abu Dhabi amounted to 29.2 million dirhams, or 45 percent of the allotted 64.9 million dirhams. Abu Dhabi accounted for 17.4 percent of aggregate federal allotments and 22.2 percent of federal expenditures.

Al-Sharjah ranks second with actual expenditures of 14.9 million dirhams or 34.9 percent of 42.7 million dirhams in allotments. It accounted for 11.5 percent of aggregate federal allotments and 11.7 percent of total expenditures.

Dubai ranks third with allotments of 33.4 million dirhams for a 9-percent share of aggregate allocations. Of that, it spent 17.4 million dirhams, amounting to 52.1 percent of its allotment, and to 12.6 percent of aggregate federal outlays.

Ras al-Khaymah came in fourth with allotments of 22.5 million dirhams and actual expenditures of 11.8 million dirhams, or 48.2 percent of allocations. It accounted therefore for 6 percent of aggregate allocations and for 9.3 percent of total expenditures. Al-Fujayrah ranked fifth with allocations of 20.2 million dirhams and expenditures of 12.3 million dirhams, or 61 percent of allocations. Of all the emirates, it has the highest ratio of outlay to allotment. Al-Fujayrah accounted for 5.4 percent of federal allocations and for 9.7 percent of federal spending.

'Ajman was allocated 17.5 million dirhams, of which it spent 43.4 percent or 7.6 million dirhams. It accounted for 4.7 percent of total allocations and 5.9 percent of total spending. Umm al-Qaywayn received allocations of 12.2 million dirhams, of which it spent 41 percent or 5 million dirhams. It accounted for 3.3 percent of aggregate allotments, and for 3.8 percent of total spending.

Projects that serve more than one emirate were allotted a total of 159.2 million dirhams, of which 29.7 million dirhams, or 18.7 percent, were actually spent. These projects account for 42.7 percent of aggregate allocations, and for 23.3 percent of aggregate outlays. Investments planned for the various emirates varied in size according to their various sites, areas, development, and the availability of raw materials and human and natural resources.

WESTERN SAHARA

Former Official Interviewed on Polisario Organization

45040529 London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 19 Sep 89 pp 22-24

[Interview with Maalainine Mourabi Rabbou, former head of Polisario's Information Department, by 'Ali Anuzla in Rabat: "Polisario Kidnapped Me and Kept Me Underground 2 Years"; first paragraph is AL-MAJALLAH introduction; date not given]

[Text] Fourteen years after the establishment of Polisario, splits developed in it internally. These were followed by military setbacks on the field of confrontation. A loss of political credibility by the front was the result. Two African countries changed their mind about recognizing the front, after the list of recognitions had risen to 70 countries. Another result of Polisario's present situation is that many of its military leaders have abandoned their assignments and joined with Morocco. In 1987, Abderahman Ould Lennas, who served as ambassador to Addis Ababa of the so-called "Saharan Arab Republic," returned to Morocco. In the same year, the leader of a military battalion returned. On 17 January of this year, the chief of Polisario's information department, Maalainine Mourabi Rabbou, known as Mourabi Rabbou Ahmed Hiba, made his way to Morocco, as did a battalion commander in the "Saharan Army" and two members of the same army. Recently, Omar Hadrami, a

founding member of the front and its representative in Washington, went over. AL-MAJALLAH met with one of these returnees, Maalainine Mourabi Rabbou, and conducted this interview with him about the reasons for returning and the splits within the ranks of Polisario. The following is the text of the interview.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How did your return to Morocco take place? What were the reasons that moved you to it? Why did you wait so long to return?

[Rabbou] Before one speaks about returning, one should speak about the manner in which one joins Polisario. In my case, I joined as a result of a kidnapping operation from the city of Dakhla on 15 October 1975. (Dakhla is located south of the Sahara; Morocco did not regain it until 1979.) After spending 3 days unconscious, I found myself in an underground bunker near the city of Tindouf. I spent about 2 years in it—from 15 October 1975, until March 1977. During that time, I performed hard labor. In February 1976, they offered me release in exchange for silence about the kidnapping operation and the conditions of imprisonment. I rejected their offer and remained in prison until March 1977. They again offered me release from prison in exchange for my silence.

The reasons for my kidnapping relate to the difference of my point of view from that of the front. After I came out of the prison camp, I was turned over to the army to work in it until 9 January 1979 as a first "recruitment" stage. During that time, I received various military training, although without participating in operations, since they always kept me in rear bases as a trainer. On 29 February 1979, they summoned me to work in the radio station located in the Tindouf camps, so that I could be watched constantly—the radio station is considered one of the most guarded places in the camp. I spent a full year working as an ordinary announcer. At the end of 1980, I was appointed general director of the station. I retained this post until 1984, when I was appointed editor-in-chief of the newspaper AL-SAHRA' AL-HURRAH in Arabic. Later, on 16 August 1986, I was appointed general director of the Saharan Arab Republic's information department, which was headquartered in Algiers. Since 1986, I have been thinking of a way to get to Morocco. From the beginning, I had a belief that Polisario's outlook was wrong, that it was not based on correct foundations, and that there are no tangible or rational reasons to justify the establishment of a "Saharan Republic."

During the period I spent in Algeria from 1986 until my going over to Morocco in 1989, I had no official travel document to facilitate the process of leaving. By private means, I was able to leave Algeria and reach Morocco by way of Spain.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Would it not be possible for you to clarify the meaning of your "private means," and how you reached Morocco?

[Rabbou] I am reluctant about this question. I cannot reply to you for a number of reasons, primarily related to security.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Why would the reason for your return not be your failure to obtain any important posts within Polisario?

[Rabbou] I would have returned to Morocco even if they had offered me all the positions. I do not believe there are any important positions within Polisario. So I repeat that my return was inevitable. As for the reasons that prevented or delayed it all these years, they have to do with my inability to leave a guarded camp from which no person could escape. When the only opportunity to leave the camps came, all the circumstances were not ripe for me to reach Morocco. Despite the presence of my name on the diplomatic list in a booklet published by the Algerian Foreign Ministry, I was not carrying a passport or even an identification paper. All I had was a card proving that I was the information director of Polisario, nothing else.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Suppose we turn the question around and ask it in another way: Was your descent from a tribe known for its loyalty to Morocco the obstacle that prevented your holding high posts within Polisario?

[Rabbou] Naturally, this is true; for they do take into consideration the question of tribal balances in Polisario. Before that, however, they take into consideration the extent of a person's loyalty to their projects. The front suffered in the beginning from a lack of cadres, and they were not able to carry out all tasks. They, therefore, made use of all the cadres available to them, provided the person was not against their theories.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Can you define your position within the power structure of Polisario? Have you ever held posts within the high commission that serves as a central committee?

[Rabbou] No, I never held any post within the high commission of Polisario, nor did I hold any functions within this body in my capacity as director of information in the front. I was responsible for the information center. At the same time, I was supervising the [front's] only newspaper, which was published in three languages—Arabic, Spanish, and French—and the front's programs that were broadcast from Radio Algiers. I also drafted the letters that Mohamed Abdelaziz, the president of the so-called "Saharan Arab Republic," sent to heads of state, in addition to preparing some of the reports and notes that we sent to representatives of the front overseas, since we had direct contact with them.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Polisario has said that the returnees to Morocco, including you and Omar Hadrami, were nothing but spies and intelligence agents and held no sensitive positions within the front. Some of them, like Hadrami, were expelled from the high commission before they went to Morocco.

[Rabbou] Naturally, Polisario will describe every person who has the chance to return to Morocco as a spy and agent. How can it imagine a person to be a spy for Morocco, when he is in a closed cage without any means of contact with the outside world, and when he is even prevented from receiving some stations within the camps, in which movement takes place only with a special permit? Polisario has started to level such charges at everyone who has the chance to return, because it must convince the residents of the camps and mislead public opinion.

Propagandistic Policy

[AL-MAJALLAH] As former director of information in the front, on what was Polisario's information policy based?

[Rabbou] I call it a "propagandistic policy." Polisario does not so much have information as it has propaganda, since they rely on inflating their "achievements and heroic deeds" and on misleading domestic and foreign public opinion. For example, an ordinary person might be on a trip to Germany for treatment and might meet with a German figure to discuss offering aid to Polisario. When the news was presented on the front's information media, the person would be given high leadership posts that he never had before. That is just a simple example. There are other examples of misleading foreign public opinion into believing that there really exists a state called "the Saharan Arab Republic," with institutions and a high commission, and that there are conferences and conventions. For example, you used to hear about "the Saharan Organization To Combat Racial Discrimination." There was one person in it, Moustafa Abouha, who also had membership in the politburo of Polisario's high commission. After the recent splits in the ranks of the front, he invented reasons to visit his family in Mauritania, went away, and never returned. There were also other organizations, such as "the Organization for Saharan Peace," affiliated with the World Peace Organization and the World Council for Peace. One person represented it.

Entire ministries consisted of only two persons—the minister and his assistant. Thus, Saharan information was based on making the "Saharan Arab Republic" appear to be an existing state with leadership bodies, people's assemblies, and an administration.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How do explain their having been able to obtain recognition from 72 countries?

[Rabbou] First of all, most of the countries that recognized Polisario are recently independent African countries. Many of them were misled into granting recognition. For example, the president of one African country sent a congratulatory telegram to the president of the so-called "Saharan Arab Republic" in the Moroccan city of Laayoune, assuming it to be the capital of the "Saharan Republic." As everyone knows, these countries know nothing about the Saharan issue. There are political and economic circumstances that caused some of

these countries to recognize the "Saharan Republic" in return for being supplied with Saharan oil at the end of the war. Other countries were promised supplies of phosphates in the future. Some countries were given financial assistance in return for recognition.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Where does the front get funds to give this financial assistance?

[Rabbou] It gets them from the aid that it, too, receives from international and humanitarian organizations. Much of the aid consists of bartering for weapons, or it is handed over as assistance by some countries. Something else that Polisario uses to persuade countries to recognize it or at least sympathize with it is the alleged issue of self-determination. This principle is respected by some of the African states that themselves engaged in a war of liberation in the name of self-determination for their people.

[AL-MAJALLAH] There has been much talk recently about the existence of splits in the ranks of Polisario. Do you think these splits are of tribal origin, or can they be traced to ideological reasons?

[Rabbou] I attribute these splits to two reasons: tribal, and ideological. The camp residents who came from Saguia el Hamra or Rio de Oro found themselves preceded by other people from regions other than the disputed Saharan regions—regions such as Tindouf and Bechar, the Algerian Sahara, northern Mauritania, and even northern Mali.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How were they gathered into the camps?

[Rabbou] This is something that the Polisario members who came to Tindouf before 1975 know. However, the inhabitants of Saharan regions who came after that year found the camps already prepared and containing inhabitants who had come from the previously mentioned regions. Those who ran the camps and held the high posts in them were people who were there earlier, not people who came from the Saharan regions. The latter therefore feared annihilation. These sensitivities were confirmed before the summer 1987 visit of the international mission to the region. The mission asked Polisario to supply it with exact figures about the people who had been included in the figures prepared by Spain in the Sahara region in 1974. It became clear that those of Saharan descent had no role in political life inside Polisario. Matters began to clear up somewhat within the camps, the army, or the foreign representations.

As for the ideological side of the splits, we must go back to the beginnings of Polisario, when principles and slogans were raised to entice people, especially ambitious young people searching for high ideals and principles. However, as time passed, the front began to turn into a limited organization in the hold of certain individuals at the expense of the inhabitants of the camps. Certain

reckless personal practices became apparent on the part of individuals who considered Polisario to be virtually their own private fiefdom.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Whom exactly do you mean?

[Rabbou] I mean the personnel of the current Polisario leadership. They have begun to treat the members as if the latter were a herd of sheep with which they may do whatever they want. They install whomever they want and dismiss whomever they want. They imprison whomever they want without cause and with no questions allowed. The prisoners' mothers do not even have the right to ask about the reasons for their sons' imprisonment. Other mistakes and excesses by the leadership have led to a flare-up of the ferment that had until recently remained quiescent. The problems within Polisario began to become worse. In the beginning of 1972, many people, particularly from the Ouled Moussa tribe, were mistreated and included in a broad campaign of arrests. In 1982, Polisario organized repressive campaigns to suppress all protest movements. However, the struggle, which took on a class character, developed and reached the level of the leadership. In the summer of 1988, a political conference was organized. Such conferences are usually held to liquidate certain elements. Self-criticism takes place at them, and certain charges are leveled; persons are arrested; others are exonerated. At the Ouzert conference, several exchanges of words took place between directors of the conference and the people attending. Afterwards, some cadres, including Omar Hadrami, who recently returned to Morocco, asked for a meeting of the politburo or of the government council: but to no avail. After the conference, the formation of a "government" was announced on 3 August 1988, without its being announced officially in Polisario bulletins. A large number of members of the new government refused to assume their functions, including Hadrami, Mohamed Salem Ould Essalek, and Mansour Omar. These were all among the most capable cadres in Polisario. The background of this refusal had to do with events of the Ouzert conference. Polisario was thus forced to make another change, in the hope that these people would accept their posts. Another change was made in the "government" on 24 September 1988. After this, the group took up their work, but only for a period of 3 days, because the front leadership issued a communique accusing some members of the "government" of conspiracy and of hiding behind factionalism. On 27 September of the same year, 10 politburo members and ministers announced their resignation and refused to work in the "government." The top leadership put them under house arrest and suspended their membership in the politburo and the new formation. Two days after this episode, a meeting was held in a camp on 28 February to bring charges against the 10 dissidents and their supporters, so that they might be liquidated. These 10 independents won the support of more than 50 directors of important organizations within Polisario, as well as the support of 70 percent of the camp residents. The 28 February conference therefore ended in failure; the crisis

increased, and insults were exchanged between the two groups—the members of the executive committee (i.e., the present Polisario leadership), on the one hand, and the 10 independent members, on the other. Since everyone in the camps supported the 10, the members of the executive committee remained isolated. They therefore relied on the army, which they began mobilizing, since it was far from the course of events and did not know their details and developments.

As the crisis intensified, meetings were held through the mediation of certain prominent figures who tried to bring the independents and the members of the executive committee together. However, the 10 independents refused to receive any of the members of the executive committee, with the exception of Mohamed Abdelaziz, the president of the front. Meetings were held between him and the group of 10, ending in the issuance of a communique criticizing certain mistakes that the leadership of the front had made. This was the first time that a communique issued by the Polisario executive committee had been criticized. In the wake of its issuance, a campaign was organized to explain the settlement and its reasons. However, when they wanted to present this step to the army, the leadership refused to explain the reasons—it had mobilized the army and had portrayed the group of 10 as being no more than people who spent their lives outside the camps aboard airplanes and in luxury hotels, while the members of the army were subjected to danger. If the results of the settlement were publicized to the army, it would lose its confidence in the members of the executive committee, and that might lead to a rebellion in its ranks. Faced with insistence by the 10 that the results of the settlement be publicized, the top leadership called for army intervention in the camps and the suppression of protest demonstrations where pro-Moroccan slogans were being raised and where the residents were shouting "Long live the king of Morocco!"

[AL-MAJALLAH] And after the suppression of the demonstrations?

[Rabbou] The executive committee organized festivals for self-criticism. It put the job of running the camps into the hands of members of the executive committee, four members of which became directly responsible for the camp; the governor no longer had a role in running the camp. At the time of my return to Morocco, matters stood as follows: suppression of the demonstrations, festivals to make an example of the 10 dissidents, and their humiliation before the people. However, the grumbling that gripped the camps soon spread to the army, which had learned the truth of the matter. This explains why many army personnel have recently joined Morocco, including a battalion leader, army cadres, and ordinary soldiers. During these splits in the higher echelons of Polisario, the front's leadership summoned the members of the foreign relations committee, because the latter also had begun to learn the truth of the matter through news that was reaching them, even though during the demonstrations in the camps all contacts

between the camps and the external world was forbidden. The members of the foreign relations committee were put into categories according to their loyalty to the executive committee.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Don't you think that the return of some leaders of the front [to Morocco] was due to psychological frustration imposed by reality, and not necessarily due to the existence of firm convictions and principles?

[Rabbou] The return of some of the Polisario cadres was primarily the result of awareness, besides the existence of a kind of psychological frustration. The frustration also exists on the part of those who are still holding to the positions of Polisario; but those who returned had an awareness of the dimensions of the conspiracy. Some of them returned as a result of the pardon that the king of Morocco issued. Even those who had doubts about returning had all their doubts removed by the appeal of the king of Morocco, and it opened the door for them to return whenever they have a chance.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

President Salih on Egyptian, Foreign Relations

90OL0040A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 8 Aug 89 pp 6-14

[Interview With YAR President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih by Mahmud al-Tuhami at Presidential Office in San'a': "In Exclusive Interview With ROSE AL-YUSUF: Palestinian People Will Not Be Able To Solve Their Problem by Themselves; Red Sea Security Is Responsibility of Its Masters; President Mubarak Is Leader Who Is Loyal to His Country and Arab Nation; Greater Arab Solidarity Is Required To Confront Zionist Intransigence; Party Plurality Is Not Necessity in Third World"; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] It is noticed that the YAR [Yemen Arab Republic] is enjoying a great degree of stability under your administration. What are the policies, meaning the economic and social policies, that have led to this stability, and what is the influence of the tendency toward greater democracy within the framework of the General People's Congress?

[Salih] First, insofar as stability in Yemen is concerned, it has not come instantaneously. It has come as a fruit of our people's constant struggle since the inception of the blessed September revolution and to this day. It is the result of the expanded sphere of popular participation and of involving our people in shouldering their responsibility of leading the country, because the people rule themselves. The masses have actually contributed and shouldered their responsibility through the General People's Congress whose members number more than 23,000. Moreover, the people have selected their representatives in the Consultative Assembly. This also falls

within the context of entrenching democracy, of emphasizing popular participation, and of involving the people in shouldering their responsibility. The people elected their representatives in the Consultative Assembly and the assembly then elected the leadership. This has led to reassuring the Yemeni citizen who feels that he is a participant involved in shouldering his responsibilities. This, in turn, has led to entrenching security and stability and has bolstered the country's national unity. Thus, the Yemeni revolution's objectives and principles have been embodied practically.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] What about the economic policies?

[Salih] Our country's economic policy is built on firm foundations embodied in involving all sectors in developing Yemen economically. We have a public sector, a joint sector, and a private sector, and they all contribute to developing the country. Of course, the public sector does not dominate or control the economic affairs. It creates a balance with the other sectors and it maintains balance and stability in prices, especially the prices of foodstuffs and essential goods. Likewise, we do not allow the private sector to dominate or control the economic field. All the economic sectors work together and side-by-side in harmony and integration to serve the country.

Generally, our economic conditions are not bad, despite all the economic changes and despite YAR's meager resources and our small exports. However, our conditions are much better than those of others. Our country is not burdened by heavy debts, considering that it is one of the least indebted countries. The loans and debts we owe are debts for investment in agriculture, in building dams, service roads, strategic plants, and oil investments. They are not debts for consumer goods.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] What is your assessment of the experience of the election of your country's Consultative Assembly, which is the first election held in Yemen's history? Does his excellency the president believe that the western model of democracy is fit for all times and all places? It is well known that in an endeavor to apply the western democratic model, the western countries always raise this issue when efforts are made to get loans from them or to conclude agreements with them. What is your comment on this?

[Salih] Regarding our country's Consultative Assembly elections, they are not the first. They were preceded by several elections, such as the General People's Congress election, the elections for local cooperative development councils, and the elections for professional and popular assemblies, federations, and unions. But the Consultative Assembly elections are special by virtue of the signals which they underline and the significance that they have gained. In these elections, our people demonstrated that they are a civilized people and a great people who adhered fully to exercising their democratic right in responsible patriotic ways and with utter freedom and democracy. These elections have been impartial and clean, as attested by all those who witnessed them, be

they brothers or friends, and who observed the voting and election process. It is certain that these elections are a feat, not only for Yemen but for the entire Arab homeland, because they were conducted in a civilized and advanced manner. This is, of course, an extension of Yemen's cultural role and its glorious and rich history. The practice was good as a result of the Yemeni leadership's and citizen's belief in exercising a responsible democratic right.

As for your question on the western model of democracy, our democracy is Yemeni in tendency and practice. So, it is not influenced by the West or the East but emanates from the particularities of our people and from the nature of their reality. Every people have their particularities in exercising their democratic right. We exercise our democratic right in the manner we deem suitable for our people. Every Arab country must have its particularities. We may make use of some democratic practices, be they eastern or western. We adopt what we see as positive without being fully influenced by any eastern or western democratic system. It is well known that we make use of whatever is positive in the world around us, whether in the area of democracy, technology, education, industrialization, or any other area. When we say that we preserve our particularities, it does not mean that we retreat into a shell and refuse to absorb anything around us that is modern or advanced. No. We take advantage of all that is positive in the world around us and we interact with it vigilantly and positively.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Your excellency, how have you managed to overcome the differences between the numerous and varying political tendencies in the Yemeni society? We are aware that certain political tendencies existed in Yemen prior to these elections. The success of the elections and of your democratic experiment indicates that an obstacle has been removed. How was this obstacle removed?

[Salih] First, there are in fact political forces in the arena and we are aware of them. But none of these forces will be permitted to become open parties, because the country's permanent constitution bans all kinds of partisanship in all its forms because partisanship harms the national interest. For these reasons, partisanship has been banned in our country. However, this does not mean that there is a ban on political forces, on national thinking, or on absorbing what is new. Partisanship has been banned in our country as a result of the legacy of the past and limited political awareness. When political awareness and maturity grow among the citizens, when illiteracy is eradicated from the country, and when every citizen becomes aware of all the dimensions of political action and of the importance of entrenching national unity, then there will be no objection in the future to having these forces declare themselves openly.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Do you believe that plurality is necessary?

[Salih] Plurality is not necessary for the third world. What has happened in Sudan's experiment and Lebanon's experiment suffices. However, there is verbal oneness over plurality in the Arab world. We have the national charter, which is the political meeting point among all the people's factions. This charter materialized after a national dialogue which lasted more than 4 years. It was approved in its final form as a formula for the country's national action. All the political forces believe in this national charter and they have joined the General People's Congress as a legitimate political framework. All the political tendencies feel that they are actual participants in the political action and that they are not excluded. In other words, the General People's Congress has united the scattered political forces. Consequently, the congress contributed fundamentally to the exercise of so much more democracy that we reached the point where the Consultative Assembly elections were held because all these forces fused within the framework of the General People's Congress and participated positively. It is on this basis that the Consultative Assembly elections were held.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Your excellency, we have a question on the mother revolution, namely the 23 July revolution whose 37th anniversary was celebrated last month. It is well known that blood relations tie the 23 July revolution to the Yemeni (26 September) revolution. What is your excellency's opinion of the reasons for the firm historical link between the two revolutions and what is the influence of this link on the current policy relations between the two sisterly countries?

[Salih] The 23 July Revolution is the Greater Arab homeland's mother revolution. This firm link between the Yemeni revolution and Egyptian revolution is a result of the great pan-Arab role the fraternal Egyptian people played side-by-side with their brothers in Yemen, and of the support the Egyptian people gave the Yemeni revolution with all the men and money at their disposal. It is not surprising that the Yemeni and Egyptian revolutions are tied by firm bonds. This is the result of history and of the Yemeni and Egyptian blood which mixed in the trenches in defense of the Yemeni revolution. Great and profound historical relations have existed between the Yemeni and Egyptian peoples since ancient times. The 23 July revolution's support for the Yemeni revolution was not a product of the instant or of the event, but a result of the historical relations between the two countries. So, it is not surprising that the two revolutions have embraced each other and have stood united in the same trench.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Do you think that the current contacts or the current growth in relations between Egypt and Yemen is also based on the special relations between the 23 July revolution and the 26 September revolution?

[Salih] Of course. As we have already said, the Egyptian revolution's support for the Yemeni revolution was based on a great historical asset. The development, continuation, and constant growth of Yemeni-Egyptian

relations is also a result of the other asset, namely the Egyptian revolution's support for the Yemeni revolution's just and legitimate defense of its gains. This represents a historical background or asset for this existing and ongoing cooperation. [passage omitted]

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Yemen has historical relations with the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Egypt is an Afro-Arab country and is, at the same time, a member of the ACC [Arab Cooperation Council]. What role can Yemen perform in bringing about African reconciliations under the umbrella of President Mubarak's chairmanship of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]? In other words, we have here a strong relationship [between Egypt and Yemen] and intricate relations in the region. Can Yemen play a role in bringing about African reconciliations?

[Salih] It is my opinion that there are no Afro-Arab problems, except for the Mauritania-Senegal problem and the Chad-Libya problem. President Mubarak can play an influential and positive role in solving these problems by virtue of his current chairmanship of the OAU. We in the ACC [Arab Cooperation Council] are with him and support any role he may play. At the level of our bilateral relations, we will support any role Egypt may play to solve any Afro-Arab dispute or inter-African dispute.

We support our Arab brothers. President Mubarak is more eligible than others at present to play this role. We will always be with him and support him.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Your excellency, you have noted that there is no conflict between the Arabs and the Africans but that there are some endeavors to create such a conflict.

[Salih] There should be no Afro-Arab conflict. If attempts are being made, then we must block them and foil those who initiate them with all means, so that there may be no Afro-Arab disputes.

The African countries are neighboring countries and it is in the Arab homeland's interest to improve our relations with all the African neighbors and with all the states surrounding us. Pan-Arab and national interests dictates that the Arabs have good relations with their neighbors.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] The Sudanese national salvation revolution is now trying to establish peace in the south and, moreover, correct Sudan's relations with the Afro-Arab countries. What, in your opinion, are the steps required to bolster Sudan's tendency to correct its relations with all countries of the world? In other words, what can the Arab countries offer Sudan?

[Salih] In principle, all of us in the Arab homeland must support all our brothers, be they in Sudan or elsewhere. It is a pan-Arab duty to support our brothers in the Arab homeland with all the means at our disposal, be they advice, political support, regional support, or international support, during any ordeal to which any Arab

country is subjected. We, on our part, support our brothers in the sisterly Sudan. On the basis of what I have observed, it is my opinion that brother President Mubarak is playing a role in realizing reconciliation in Sudan and in solving the southern problem through cooperation with Ethiopia. Egypt can play a positive role in this regard by virtue of the special Egyptian-Sudanese relations. The ACC will support Egypt and sisterly Sudan. The Arab homeland must support sisterly Sudan with the problems it has been encountering at all levels.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Your excellency, the intifadah [uprising] is escalating sharply and violently in the occupied territories and the Israeli intransigence is intensifying. How can this dilemma that is being faced by the Palestinian cause at present be overcome?

[Salih] The Israeli intransigence is not strange to us and it is expected, regardless of whether Shamir, Peres, Begin, or any other Zionist heads the government. The Zionist entity was planted in the heart of the Arab homeland for this role. There are forces that support this Zionist entity. What is required to confront this is greater Arab solidarity, a further unification of the ranks, and more support for the Palestinian intifadah at the various levels and fronts, be it with money or with political stances. The Arab relations with all the influential countries, especially with the five permanent Security Council members, and with all the peace-loving countries, should be exploited to solve the Arab Palestinian people's problem. The Palestinian people will not be able to solve their problem by themselves. But with the support and backing of their brothers in all the international lobbies, the Palestinians will be able to regain their legitimate rights and to establish their independent national state on their national soil under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] The YAR has firm relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. We are aware that there are U.S. and Soviet experts working together in joint sites in Yemen. What is the benefit Yemen has reaped from these balanced relations with the two countries and how can the Arab nation make use of such relations to serve its major causes?

[Salih] First, regarding Yemen's relations with the outside world, we have established excellent relations with the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union. We have also established good relations with the United States and West Europe. In all areas, these relations are founded on joint interests and nonintervention in internal affairs. As for the presence of Soviet, U.S., or western experts, they are actually present in Yemen at both the civilian and military levels, and they do sometimes work together at joint sites. In 1980, we proclaimed the policy of diversified sources of weaponry. Even though we rely mainly on the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc for our weapons, we find no objection to diversifying the sources of our weapons from both the East and the West, depending on our capabilities and on the principle of joint interests

and of nonintervention in internal affairs. These are joint benefits founded on mutual respect. By virtue of its important strategic position in the southern Arab Peninsula, it is not in Yemen's interest to be aligned with any camp. Consequently, we have established balanced relations with all. When we import weapons, whether eastern or western, we import them as pieces or blocks of iron. We do not import the beliefs of the countries that make them. When these pieces, be they eastern or western, arrive in our country, they become Yemeni pieces.

It is on this basis and with this concept that our relations with the East and the West are established.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] How can the Arab nation benefit from this balanced tendency?

[Salih] Every country has its particular relations with other countries. What I have told you about our balanced relations with the East and the West is what we believe to be our modest experience. If somebody sees this experience as successful and wishes to make use of it, then he can do so. If, in somebody's opinion, this experience has its negative aspects, then each country has its particular relations with others.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Your excellency, the Red Sea security is an issue that falls within the framework of the Arab and African national security, as well as an issue that is part of the concerns of the super powers which have interests in the region. What is the ideal formula for achieving Arab national security in the Red Sea?

[Salih] The Red Sea security is the responsibility of the countries overlooking the Red Sea. These countries are primarily interested in keeping this sea completely free of all forms of foreign presence, so that its security may continue to be the concern of the countries overlooking it, be they African or Asian, with the exception of Israel, which is an intruder on the Arab homeland.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] How can the cease-fire in the Arab Gulf be transformed into lasting peace, and what is required to achieve this transformation?

[Salih] Regarding Arab Gulf security and peace, it must be noted that our Iraqi brothers have responded to all the UN resolutions and to all the international endeavors and that they have launched their own initiatives beyond these resolutions to establish peace in the Arab Gulf region.

Regrettably, Iraq's peaceful tendencies have been countered by extensive intransigence on the part of the brothers in Iran. We hope that Iran will turn to peace and will end the war from which only those lurking for the two neighboring countries benefit. These forces have tried to make the war between the two countries a fertile field for testing and trying their destructive weapons and to prolong this war that has lasted 8 years, becoming the longest war between two countries since World War II. We hope that our brothers in Iran will respond to peace

as the fraternal Iraq has responded to and turned toward peace, so as to guarantee the establishment of a just and lasting peace and to safeguard the legitimate rights of each of the two neighboring countries.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Couldn't the ACC play a role in this problem?

[Salih] The ACC stands by its brothers in Iraq. Under all circumstances and conditions, the ACC stands by the fraternal Iraq in case Iraq's security and sovereignty are subjected to any danger, because Iraq's security is part of the Arab national security. The ACC will also support any Arab country, whether in the Gulf, in the Arab East, or in the Arab Maghreb, because Arab national security is indivisible, and because protecting or defending Arab national security is the responsibility of all the Arab countries.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] It is noted, your excellency, that the ACC has adopted unprecedented policies at the level of Arab relations in order to create a formula of cooperation between the Arab peoples. What, in your opinion, are the features of these policies and how can the ACC experiment be developed?

[Salih] The ACC is an economic bloc whose objectives were proclaimed in Baghdad. We implemented the Baghdad resolutions in Alexandria, where a number of agreements were concluded. We will sign a number of other agreements at the San'a' summit next month. The ACC is an Arab economic bloc and not a political axis. It operates within the framework of the Arab League and it is open to any Arab brothers who wish to join it and who believe in the objectives and tendencies of this Arab economic bloc. Generally, the ACC is similar to the other Arab blocs, such as the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] or the Arab Maghreb States Union.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] There is a viewpoint which says that the ACC is founded on an economic basis and on the basis of accomplishing the interests of the region's peoples and states, i.e. it is not founded on the basis of alliances. These are unprecedented policies in the region. This is to say, that this cooperation is founded to achieve the peoples' and the region's interests, regardless of any other objectives.

[Salih] We cannot separate the economic aspect from the political aspect because they are interconnected. Politics serve the economy and economics serve the policy and the two cannot be separated.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] What, in your belief, are the most significant political, economic, and social accomplishments achieved since the creation of the ACC? What should we expect of the San'a' meetings?

[Salih] Regarding the ACC resolutions agreed upon in Baghdad and Alexandria, it is my belief that they have now moved to the phase of implementation, whether in Iraq, Jordan, Yemen, or Egypt. The constitutional procedures for

a number of agreements are being completed and these agreements are moving toward the phase of practical application.

What is tangible now is the free movement of citizens and the priority of work and residence given to the citizens of the ACC states. These are major gains. A number of agreements will be concluded at the San'a' summit and they will all be implemented in the 4 countries.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] It is evident that the ACC policies are inclined more toward individual cooperation than governmental cooperation. Encouraging individuals to move and cooperate is a significant mainstay in the ACC tendencies. What is your comment on this?

[Salih] The ACC was created fundamentally to serve its citizens, not to serve the leadership and governments. The leadership and governments existing in the ACC states were created fundamentally to serve the citizen. Any economic or developmental accomplishment serves the citizen of the ACC's four member states and also serves the Arab citizen in all countries of the Arab homeland. In the ACC, all our efforts will be employed to serve the citizens, whether collectively or individually.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Your excellency, you were in Jiddah last July and you had talks with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Can you tell us about the outcome of those talks?

[Salih] The outcome of the Yemeni-Saudi talks was announced at the time. My visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was part of the mutual visits we exchange with the Saudi brothers by virtue of the historical and neighborly ties that bind us, and by virtue of the joint and interconnected interests between the two countries. A decision had been issued by the kingdom on the issue of business fronting [as published] in the kingdom. We have in the kingdom a large number of Yemeni emigrants who were disturbed by the decision and who believed that it would be applied to them. They were in a crisis. So I visited the kingdom and met with King Fahd, the custodian of the two holy mosques, and with Saudi officials who assured me that the decision does not apply to the Yemeni citizens living in the kingdom. This was announced in the wake of the visit and the announcement had a great impact on the special relations and on entrenching the trust, reassurance, and spirit of understanding between the two neighboring and fraternal peoples. This was the crux of the visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The issues in the Arab arena, including the efforts being exerted by the Tripartite Committee to solve the Lebanese problem, were discussed during the visit. The Palestinian issue, the issue of lasting peace in the Arab Gulf, and issues of common interest to the two fraternal countries were also discussed.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Your excellency, you are tied to President Mubarak by excellent friendly relations. What is your assessment or view of these relations?

[Salih] President Mubarak is generous. He is an Egyptian leader who loves Egypt and loves his Arab homeland. He is a man who has no complexes and no problems with the

Egyptian people or with others. He is a great man. Mubarak is a man who is loyal to his country and to the Arab nation. Special qualities characterize the Yemeni-Egyptian relations, considering that Yemeni blood mixed with Egyptian blood in the same trench in defense of the Yemeni revolution. It is not surprising that there

are profound historical relations founded on mutual trust, not only at the level of the Yemeni and Egyptian leaderships but at the popular level also.

[ROSE AL-YUSUF] Our thanks to President 'Ali 'Abdullah Salih.

INDIA

Overseas Indians: Loss of Talent Resented

90010007A Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 17 Sep 89 p 10

[Text] Nowadays, numerous Indians live overseas. The total number is approximately 120 million. They are scattered throughout more than 40 countries. Foreign travel by Indians is not unprecedented. In the old days, the stories of their spreading out in various Asian countries is one of the glorious chapters of our history. After that time, many restrictions were imposed due to historic reasons. Many prohibitions regarding crossing the black waters also came into being. In modern times, overseas travel by Indians began during the period of foreign domination. In those days, in the interest of the foreign conquerors, Indian laborers were exported to various countries. They were sent not only to Asia and Africa, but as far as the Caribbean islands. Those helpless Indians were in fact slave laborers. Although they were sent with agreements to work for a limited period of time, very few of those unfortunate people were able to return home at the end of their terms of employment. Their foreign addresses became their permanent addresses. Recently, there have been considerable problems with their descendants. As a matter of fact, in post-independent India, the descendants of the Indian people have become the main targets of national movements in many countries. Although in various East African and South-East Asian countries, their citizenship problems have largely been solved, India's anxiety over them has not been completely eliminated. The recent developments in Fiji and Sri Lanka are proof of this.

Even after these experiences, foreign travel by Indians has not ceased. Of course, there are many reasons. Firstly, India is no longer under foreign domination. It is not unusual for the sons of a free country to spread their wings in any country of the world of their choice. Especially nowadays since the world has shrunk considerably. Communication systems have improved considerably. For today's people, even the moon is not inaccessible. However, it could be pointed out that there may be other reasons for Indians to spread out in various directions. On the one hand there are limited opportunities in the motherland, and on the other hand glorious welcome gestures from other countries—Indians are simply trying to take advantage of the available opportunities. As a result, the developed countries are definitely benefiting, because most of these sojourners are educated scientists, technicians, and workers. From this standpoint, the developed countries may be appropriating the wealth of human resources from the underdeveloped countries. However, it should be kept in mind that this has no resemblance to the practice of slavery or the indentured labor systems, because these days foreign travel is in almost all cases completely voluntary. In addition, it is not an acceptable argument that overseas Indians are not giving anything to India in return. They are not only gathering honors overseas for their Indian

counterparts, every year they are sending loads of money to their country. Consequently, whether it is a gain or a loss needs to be evaluated properly.

It should not be fair to group all overseas Indians in one class or category. One group is engaged in conducting business overseas. Another group, most likely they are the largest, are engaged in various professions. There is also a third group. Their work area is primarily in West Asia. This group is composed of skilled and unskilled workers. Since the independence, current overseas Indians are the second generation of the first group of sojourners. Many of them most likely have earned the status of permanent residents in many countries. However, in the case of unskilled laborers this possibility is lesser. Usually, they return home after the end of their term of service. Consequently, the problem is not with them. The problem is not with those who are engaged in business overseas either. Because, it is very apparent that they are investing the profits from their operations in their homeland. Those who have not yet done so, are expressing an interest in doing so. For a developing country this investment is certainly very helpful. The problem is with the professional overseas Indians. By evaluating profit and loss, it becomes obvious that material loss to the country is greater in their account. When a skilled modern physician or an engineer goes overseas, the possibilities of getting reimbursed for the amount it costs the country to train them, become very remote. Most likely those professionals benefit personally from their sojourn. But the social loss to the country is never replenished. Especially because ours is a developing country, the role of experienced scientists and engineers is very vital. One happy development is that this sense of loss is becoming evident among them. Recently, they had organized a worldwide conference in New York. Considerable discussions took place about how they could serve their motherland. On behalf of the Indian Government, a proposal has been made to hold the next conference in New Delhi. By that way, the sojourners would have the opportunity of sitting face to face with their counterparts in the country to discuss this issue. The importance of such direct communication cannot be ignored. Because, probably not much could be gained by appealing to sojourners about their love for their motherland. In order to make their return a reality or to utilize their services, some definite planning is essential. And, even before implementing such planning, it is essential to determine the expectation of these groups. Incidentally, it has been heard that many Indians, particularly Bengalese, are expressing an interest in joint collaborations in various projects in this state. A few overseas physicians have expressed an interest in taking over management of one or two hospitals. However, in practice, it is found that there is a lack of proper planning; those who are ready to cooperate, do not find proper avenues of cooperation. Entrepreneurs in this country can fulfill that void.

PAKISTAN

Punjab Government Blamed for Delay on Industrial Projects

46000028B Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 9 Oct 89 p 8

[Article: "Punjab Government Indecision on Industrial Projects Discourages Investment"]

[Text] Islamabad—Private investors are worried over the attitude of the Punjab government with regard to slackening of development activity in the province particularly the non-establishment of sugar mills.

According to details, three sugar mills one each for Muzaffargarh, D. G. Khan and Hafizabad were to be set up during the current fiscal year under the deregulated sugar industry declared by the federal government which did not require prior approval of the Industries Ministry in Islamabad.

These have been put in doldrums due to indecision about the locational policy of the Punjab government. The industrialists view the in action of the Punjab government as a move to accuse the federal government of being indifferent to the promotion of investment in Punjab.

Industrial circles believe that the federal government had deregulated the sugar industry to encourage investment by quashing the provision of sanction but the right of a province to decide about the location of the project is being exercised to woo down the federal government policy.

Viewed in the perspective of provincial government's opposition to the People's Development Programme coupled with indecision about major industrial projects, all developmental activity in Punjab has been reduced to a virtual standstill.

The provincial government on its own is drawing development funds from the State Bank allocated in the AOP by the federal government but the same are being directed to extract political motive instead of their utilization for development purposes.

The bank sources disclosed that an amount of about Rs. 40 crore has been drawn by the Punjab government from the State Bank, and diverted to non-developmental purposes rather than putting them to the proper use. The industrialists have urged the federal government to take note of the situation in Punjab so that the people of the province should not suffer at the hands of political opportunists poised to ruin the economy of the province just in a bid to malign the federal government.—APP

Problems of Jute, Sugar Industries Viewed

46000029B Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL
in English 20 Oct 89 p 4

[Article: "Sick Industries"]

[Text] A report is expected soon from the committee formed by the Ministry of Industry to identify the cause

and remedies for the present situation of two jute industries and sugar mill in Biratnagar which are in dire straits. The sick jute mills are Biratnagar Jute Mill and Raghupati Jute Mill which are two major jute industries of the country and the sugar mill is Morang Sugar Mill. These were on the verge of liquidation due to the financial constraints since the last few months and remedial steps had to be taken to avert the catastrophe. The committee formed by the Ministry of Industry will be studying problems related to the entire jute industry such as jute trading and jute farming and suggest various measures to revitalize the industries. It is hoped that a way out from the crisis will be found for these sick mills after due study so that these mills can start operating all over again bringing valuable income through exports and domestic sales as well as providing employment to thousands who are employed by these industries.

Nepal until 10 years ago used to export a sizeable chunk of their produce to third countries, then after that sales were diverted to India. There is some domestic consumption of jute especially by cement factories, however, this is negligible compared to what the exports used to be. As a result, the imposition of high tariffs on Nepalese jute products by India adversely affected the export of the two jute industries, namely Biratnagar Jute Mill and Raghupati Jute Mill, as India was the major market for Nepalese jute since the last couple of years and thus created the present predicament. Biratnagar Jute Mill alone has jute products worth Rs. 50 million at the current price lying in its godown. The mill is on the lay-off since September 3 for two months at the request of the Ministry of Industry, the idea being to find time for exploring new markets for its products. Similarly, Raghupati Jute Mill is also looking for overseas market.

His Majesty's Government has currently provided cash incentives of 35 percent on jute hessian exports effective till January 13, 1990 on the Free on Board (FOB) value of the goods exported to third countries to divert jute exports to overseas countries. As the jute exports to third countries are being subsidised by cash incentives, the jute exporters may be better able to compete in the international market and, if they do their job well enough, there is every possibility that they could achieve market diversification within the lay-off period.

As stop-gap measures Biratnagar Jute Mill, meanwhile, has obtained a loan of Rs. 7.5 million from a commercial bank through government guarantee to maintain the industry during the lay-off period. Everything possible should be done for the benefit of the employees of the jute mills to alleviate their hardships due to the lay-off of the mills.

Likewise, Morang Sugar Mill has been granted with a loan of Rs. 10 million by mortgaging the factory's land, through government guarantee, to enable the factory to operate during this season despite financial constraints. Morang Sugar Mill is the oldest sugar manufacturer in the country. For the last couple of years, however, it has been running at a loss, the amount of the deficit now

reaching over Rs. 20 million. the Committee of the Ministry of Industry is thus expected to suggest means of reviving the ailing mills. It is of utmost importance, to help industries such as these to move forward in the industrial drive of the country.

Educational Institutions Said To Be In Sad Shape

90010012A Karachi JANG in Urdu 15 Sep 89 p 3

[Text] An explanation is not needed to show how our country's educational institutions have been changed from institutions of learning to arenas of war and death between the student organizations. Contrary to this, if we look at a report written by a member of Motamar-e Alam-e Islami, who just arrived from Bangladesh and who is currently studying at Poona University in India, the conditions in our educational institutions and the damage done by student participation in politics will make our hearts bleed. According to the report given by this student from Poona University, the students there do not know what politics are. Then again, the educational system there is organized in such a way that the students have no time for anything but education. This student says that student participation in political activities is something unheard of, and that a student will even shrink back from representing his own class for fear of missing his studies. This is the reason why the universities in India are advancing so fast in the fields of science and technology. According to this student, fearing that the United States may place obstacles in the supply of super computers, Indian universities have started developing super computers. These facts about Indian universities were disclosed not by an Indian student but by a Muslim student from the brotherly country of Bangladesh. Now let us glance at our own educational institutions, where a child, when he goes for admission to a school, is greeted at the very gates with a reference to politics. Quite often, a quarrel begins to prevent the student from going to a camp of political opponents. A few days ago, similar shameful incidents occurred in many of the city's colleges. But universities and colleges aside, the truth is that now, thanks to the untiring efforts of super political intellectuals, prejudiced politics dominate even our primary and middle schools. There are regular confrontations and fights in girls schools and colleges as well. We know very well that the few lines we are writing will not change the regrettable conditions prevailing in our educational institutions. Neither are we indulging in vain imagination that our lamentations will make the students abandon guns in favor of books and pens. As the saying goes, just as they will not change their habit, why should we give up ours. We consider it our duty to keep on reminding the country, the nation, and the students, in particular, about the unimaginable harm and damage in the future.

We would like to state here that since there is no politics in the Indian educational institutions, the students graduating from these universities are better informed than their fellow students graduating from

Pakistani universities. Their educational abilities, self-confidence, and mastery over their subjects is by far better than many of our students. In our country, hostilities between the opposing groups has gone as far as showing disrespect for the teachers, surrounding them, attacking and injuring them, protesting, demonstration and violence in favor of copying during examinations, and now there are fights, shootings, shedding the blood of students, and curfews are even imposed to get examination centers transferred to regions of their liking. It has now become a common tradition to fight pitched battles in the educational institutions, using automatic weapons. Wherever possible, first, student organizations do not allow members of opposing groups to enter the educational institutions. They tear up their forms and certificates, and after beating them, drive them out. If somehow they succeed in gaining entry, life is made unbearable for them, so much so that during the exams their papers are torn and they are forced to leave. During final exams, the MBBS [Bachelor Medicine Bachelor of Surgery] and engineering students pass their exams on the basis of copying on a collective basis. They do not view this as something to be ashamed of, but rather view it as their right, and if anyone dares to object they do not spare him, even if the person raising the objections is their teacher, who has worked so hard to educate them from an illiterate person. These are some of the aspects of the situation prevailing in our institutions of higher education, which have now become permanent features. Whereas we mentioned earlier, in our neighboring country India, the educational institutions and the students studying there do not know what politics is. They have to spend so much time on their education that they do not have the time to indulge in politics. On the other hand, our students are not prepared to acknowledge the existence of educational institutions where there is constant political confrontation. But the most important and perhaps the most ignored aspect is that the students who indulge in dirty politics are in a minority. The majority of students want to acquire knowledge. Similarly, the teachers in our educational institutions are accustomed to looking at the students in terms of political supporters or opposition groups. In other words, there are shrewd people who exploit student politics.

As the educational institutions remain closed for most of the year, the standard of education goes down every day. And the trend of succeeding in exams by immoral and unlawful means is on the rise. The students are more interest in Klashinkovs than books, and they have started paying more respect to their political leaders than to the teachers of their schools and colleges. There is nothing surprising in their behavior. The actions taken by the Governor of Sind in these regrettably bad circumstances are like a ray of hope. May he succeed in his mission, and like other countries we look forward to the day when the Pakistani educational institutions may set an example to be followed.

Commentary Discusses Benefits of Rejoining Commonwealth

46000028A Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 9 Oct 89 pp 6, 7

[Article by Ayaz Ahmed Khan, Air Marshal (Retd):
"Institutional Benefits of Rejoining Commonwealth"]

[Text] On first October 1989, Pakistan rejoined the Commonwealth after a period of 17 years. The absence of public interest on this important event reflects lack of knowledge of the institutional benefits that Pakistan could derive by becoming the 49th member of the Commonwealth.

While Pakistani embassies in London and in the member-states have become High Commissions, and our ambassadors High Commissioners, all embassies of the member-states in Pakistan also now have the status of High Commissions besides a separate desk being set up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, office stationery in Pakistani embassies in the Commonwealth countries will need immediate changes, i.e. new letter heads pads and stamps. But these changes of form will be meaningless if Pakistan does not play a constructive role, and does not contribute to maximum mutual benefits from the vast opportunities that Britain and the Commonwealth countries offer.

Speaking at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad on 19th September, 1989, Ambassador N.J. Barrington of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that "Pakistan's re-entry would enhance its capacity to exercise a constructive collective influence in world affairs. Pakistan's voice and contribution had been missing from the Commonwealth for too long. The commonwealth was not a power bloc or a forum where binding decisions were made. It was a free association of states in five continents representing approximately one-quarter of the world population.

Talking of former common links with Britain he said: "The most evident is the use of the English language common adherence to the rule of law, and the parliamentary democracy. It is a club where members meet to discuss a wide range of subjects without the necessity of elaborate diplomatic preliminaries". The British Ambassador apologetically said that "the Commonwealth is not dominated by the British. Britain is no longer leader of the Commonwealth. It is not a British club. The chairman rotates as the individual members host the annual head-of-government meetings, and the decisions are made by consensus."

Besides advantages flowing through the regular meetings of heads of governments, a multitude of institutions exist which could help Pakistan in one way or another. These are the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Commonwealth Press Union, Commonwealth Games Confederation, Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, and Association of Commonwealth Universities. The Commonwealth Foundation, with its headquarters

in London, coordinates the activities of non-governmental organizations in the educational information, welfare, and development fields. It includes the Commonwealth scholarship and fellowship scheme, which provides scholarships to students from other Commonwealth countries.

Of immediate benefit to the Pakistani students and scholars will be the increased number of scholarships available for education abroad. Considering the degradation of educational institutions, and the low standards, Pakistani universities would be wise to take immediate advantage of such offers, and select students on merit, without delay to avail all foreign scholarship opportunities. In this context it is important that our universities must have the freedom to select students on merit. It is well-known that a large number of foreign scholarships lapse every year because of bureaucratic interference and delays in the selection and despatch of students abroad. Deserving students are often unable to avail of scholarships, because the undeserving with recommendations wirepulling and influence, and with official connivance block such opportunities for the best students. The universities may be allotted scholarships and entrusted with selection and despatch of deserving students without provincial or federal interference. The universities must be encouraged to select the best for foreign education in the Commonwealth countries.

It is worth mentioning that the Commonwealth Institute in London has a centre for exchange of information on cultural activities in the various Commonwealth countries. Pakistan could derive maximum benefit for improving its cultural activities which were woefully neglected during the last decade. Pakistan should also take full advantage of the programmes for co-operation in the education, scientific, and technical programmes through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.

Pakistan gained nothing by leaving the Commonwealth in 1972. This decision jolted the half a million Pakistanis working or settled in Britain and another half a million Pakistanis in other Commonwealth countries viz, Canada, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Cyprus.

With a combined population of 1,300 million the Commonwealth comprises over a quarter of the world's population. Although the member-nations are at different stages of social and economic development democracy appears to be the common feature of the 49 Commonwealth nations. Pakistan's efforts since 1980 to enter the Commonwealth were blocked because this country was under a military dictatorship. Pakistan has succeeded in staging its re-entry after 17 years only as a democratic polity.

Undoubtedly the Commonwealth institutionally respects democracy and rule of law, and the greatest benefit Pakistan could draw would be by learning how to run the state as an undiluted democracy.

The British Commonwealth includes some of the richest and poorest members of the world community, some of the largest states and some of the smallest, with people drawn from all of the world's main races. This is evident enough of the democratic and tolerant nature of the Commonwealth. It comprises people subscribing to diverse faiths, beliefs and religions; people of widely different cultures and perspectives. Pakistan's association with the Commonwealth would have a salutary effect in enhancing international understanding, stability and peace as well as internal harmony, tolerance and stability.

Pakistan's return to the Commonwealth was hailed by Secretary General Sir Sharidath Ramphal who said that "the Commonwealth had responded with unanimity to the wish of the democratically-elected Government of Pakistan to rejoin the Commonwealth". Queen Elizabeth and the British Government welcomed the announcement on September 17 that Pakistan would rejoin the Commonwealth on October 1. In another statement the British Foreign Office said that the British government places great value on the Commonwealth and believes that Pakistan's return will enhance its capacity to exercise a constructive, collective influence on world affairs.

Malik Meraj Khalid, Speaker of the National Assembly commenting on Pakistan's return to the British Commonwealth, said that the whole world was readjusting itself to the realities of the day and four principles had generally been accepted by all nations for world peace, and saving human life from impending perils. These are: abolition of arms of all types including nuclear weapons; resolving all pending disputes peacefully, fight against environmental pollution; and promotion of organizations which provide forums to the comity of nations to sit together and promote goodwill. These words are important for all South Asian nations to enable them to curtail the arms race and agree to an embargo on nuclear weapon development.

The Commonwealth forum must be used to good advantage for the solution of the festering problems of Jammu and Kashmir and the highly explosive issue of Indian military occupation of Pakistan's Siachin Glacier region.

Discussions by expert groups must be initiated as soon as possible to discuss Indian violations of the Indus Basin Treaty viz construction of the Salal Dam over river Chenab and Wuller Barrage on river Jhelum.

That the educated and well-travelled Pakistani has a nostalgia for British institutions is nothing to be ashamed of. Britain has given the world English language. This is a major contribution to world progress. Britain is the mother of democracy. The British parliament is also known as the mother of Parliaments. British political maturity is proved by the fact that Britain does not have a written constitution. Free from any legal restraints imposed by a written constitution, the British parliament is able to legislate as it pleases. It can make,

unmake or alter any law. It can legalize past illegalities, and make voice punishable legalities, and thus reverse the decisions of ordinary courts. It can demolish established conventions or turn conventions into binding law. The British Parliament can prolong its own life beyond the normal period without consulting the electorate. In a sense the British Parliament is all powerful as far as Britain is concerned.

But in practice the British Parliament does not assert its supremacy in such a manner. Its members keep in mind the common law, and it acts in accordance with precedent and tradition. The validity of an Act of Parliament which has been duly passed, promulgated and published cannot be disputed in law courts. But no parliament would pass an Act which it knows would not receive public support. In Britain the system of party government helps to ensure that Parliament legislates in a fair response to the electorate's wishes.

When in London our politicians should make it a point to attend sessions of the House of Commons, and learn from British wisdom and forbearance in political debate and dialogue. It will help our MNA [Member of National Assembly]'s Senators and MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly]'s to sit in the visitors gallery and learn and absorb parliamentary manners and political and legislative etiquette. The British understatement, lowered tone in conversation, courtesy and politeness, sense of timing and discipline, if acquired, will help us to shun hypocrisy and fanaticism and will enable us to put our institution back on the track.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has acted wisely in taking Pakistan back into the Commonwealth. In our present state of national disarray, political chaos and indiscipline, we should look for intellectual, institutional, and cultural benefits from our membership of the Commonwealth are there, but we need to understand the meaning of political maturity, sagacity and democratic debate and tolerance. We need to gather the threads of institutional good behaviour and individual and group discipline which we threw away soon after we gained independence.

Let us have increased interaction with British institutions of learning like Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Glasgow, London and elsewhere to enable us to develop fully the abilities of our youth, and prepare them to shoulder their responsibilities with greater wisdom. Our education system needs total review, and we must take fullest advantage of our Commonwealth membership to launch a crash programme for higher learning not only in the United Kingdom, but also in other countries of the Commonwealth who have excelled in science and technology.

We need to learn from the British political experience, and imbibe the British political party system as far as is practicable. Democracy in Britain relies heavily on the existence of organized political parties, each laying its policies before the electorate for approval. Political

parties in Britain are neither registered nor formally recognized in law, but in practice almost all candidates for the House of Commons belong to one of the main political parties. For the last 150 years the two party political system has operated successfully, and since 1945 either the Conservative or the Labour Party has held power. Since 1945 seven general elections have been won by the Conservatives, and six by the Labour Party. This shows that the British people in their higher wisdom give opportunity to either of the two big parties to serve them in turn. Between the political parties there is a healthy rivalry, but not the feuding, acrimony and character assassination one sees here. In party politics we have a lot to learn from the British.

With Pakistan back in the British Commonwealth a new chapter of mutual harmony, discipline, patience and progress could be ushered in. We could learn from the British model of political and institutional democracy. Frankly, we must make full use of this new opportunity, and try sincerely to learn from the British and the Commonwealth experience in all fields of human endeavour.

Commentary: Problems of Drinking Water Supply

46000029A Kalmunda *THE RISING NEPAL*
in English 14 Oct 89 p 4

[Article: "Drinking Water Supply"]

[Text] The supply of clean drinking water constitutes one of the major tasks that fall under the purview of any government. With the population marking a rapid increase the problem of providing all with safe drinking water has become a bigger problem than ever before. With scientific evidences to support the fact that many of the diseases that afflict the mankind are water-borne the need to provide potable water to the populace had grown all the more. In recent times as the industrialisation aspect has picked up together with the rapid population growth the pollution of the water sources is creating a problem of bigger magnitude. To supply clean drinking water in such a situation is not only more expensive but also requires greater effort. Nepal with its abundance of snow-fed rivers has still the massive task of providing the majority of its people with clean drinking water. The network of rivers and streams that abound in

the country cannot be directly piped to homes as they may carry various impurities and germs that may affect the health of the people. A healthy and strong nation relies on healthy citizens and for this one of the basic needs is to provide them with clean drinking water.

According to a report published by the National Planning Commission, drinking water facility is available to six million three hundred and sixty one thousand people throughout the country. This figure represents 34.5 percent of the total population of the country. The report further elucidates the point by saying that in the urban sector one million one hundred and sixteen thousand people are availing this facility while in the rural sector five million two hundred and fifty-four thousand people have received drinking water facility. So, 66.7 percent of the people in the urban areas and 31.3 percent of the people in the rural sector are availing drinking water facility. A larger population was provided this facility in the last fiscal year compared to past years yet it fell short of the target that had been set. According to the report, the target was to provide drinking water to one million six hundred and thirty-five thousand people in the last fiscal year but the facility could be extended to only 40 percent of the target group. This shows that something is wrong somewhere. A shortfall by 60 percent is a big one. The causes for this must be delved into and rectified because of the nature of the services that it represents.

Now, going by the National Planning Commission's report itself it can be seen that over 65 percent of the people in the country have to forego the use of clean drinking water. That the majority of the people have to do without clean drinking water is a serious issue. The works regarding the same must be speeded if we are to meet our target within the specified time.

The increase in the quantity of water to the people is not enough. Specific measures must be taken to enhance the quality of the water supplied. Without this the supply of water has no meaning. To supply water full of impurities without the required amount of purification process puts the health of the people in a hazardous position. So, not only must steps be taken urgently to provide enough drinking water to all the people in the country but its quality should also be such that they offer no health hazard to the people. Only then can we rest assured to have fulfilled one basic requirement of the people.

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